Ned Block's widely used distinction between phenomenal consciousness (raw subjective experience) and access consciousness (information available for reasoning and action) is flawed because it smuggles in unargued theoretical assumptions. The distinction between phenomenal and reflexive consciousness also suffers from this problem. While mental states with qualitative character differ from those without, being conscious is the same property for both. Block's notion of access consciousness does not capture what we intuitively mean by a mental state's being conscious. More critically, his concept of phenomenal consciousness is ambiguous between two distinct mental properties, which begs important theoretical questions. Once these are distinguished, qualitative consciousness can be explained by a model like the higher-order-thought hypothesis.
Quality spaces can objectively represent mental qualities by grounding them in perceptual discrimination rather than subjective introspection. Mental qualities have a robust connection to how organisms perceptually discriminate stimuli, allowing quality spaces to be constructed without relying on impressionistic subjective access. Subjective appearances of mental qualities are constitutively tied to perceptual roles, as each appearance consists in how it seems when perceiving a specific object type. Therefore, quality spaces based on perceptual role can also characterize subjective appearances, though the tie to perceptual role is more fundamental. These spaces primarily represent discriminable stimuli objectively, and secondarily represent corresponding mental qualities in terms of both perceptual roles and subjective appearances.
The author critiques Doerig et al.'s approach to evaluating theories of consciousness, focusing on problems with their overall project, three specific criteria they propose, and how they handle higher-order-thought theory. The argument suggests that the criteria are flawed and the treatment of higher-order-thought theory is inadequate, raising doubts about the validity of the evaluation framework.
Advancing scientific research on consciousness is important for addressing clinical and ethical issues in neurology and mental health. To support this field, funding priorities must be set carefully, and challenges such as job creation and media misrepresentation need to be addressed.
The higher-order-thought hypothesis proposes that a mental state becomes conscious when one has a higher-order thought about that state, distinguishing conscious from non-conscious mental states.