Mental Appearance and Mental Reality
Cambridge University Press eBooks September 30, 2022 DOI: 10.1017/9781108768085.018 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 19 |
| Key points | The collection develops, criticizes, and expands upon David Rosenthal's two-part approach to qualitative consciousness—the higher-order thought theory of mental state consciousness and the quality-space theory of sensory quality—with contributors proposing that splitting the explanatory problem into two more manageable pieces opens the door to a satisfying explanation of what some see as an intractable puzzle. |
Abstract
Qualitative consciousness is conscious experience marked by the presence of sensory qualities, like the experienced painfulness of having a piano dropped on your foot or the consciousness of seeing the brilliant reds and oranges of a sunset. Over his career, philosopher David Rosenthal has defended an influential theoretical approach to explaining qualitative consciousness. This approach involves the development of two theories – the higher-order thought theory of mental state consciousness and the quality-space theory of sensory quality. If the problem of explaining qualitative consciousness is divided into two more manageable pieces, the door opens to a satisfying explanation of what is seen by some to be an intractable explanatory puzzle. This interdisciplinary collection develops, criticizes, and expands upon themes inspired by Rosenthal’s work. The result is an exciting collection of new essays by philosophers and scientists, which will be of interest to all those engaged in consciousness studies.
Citations in the library
Cited by 9
- Constructing a Scientific Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness Consciousness as Representing One's Mind July 1, 2025
- The Nonrelational Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness Defended American Philosophical Quarterly July 1, 2026
- Thought, Consciousness, and the Given European Journal of Philosophy September 1, 2025
- HOROR in the Brain Consciousness as Representing One's Mind July 1, 2025
- Non-Relational Versions of Traditional Higher-Order Theories Consciousness as Representing One's Mind July 1, 2025
and 4 more in the library