Higher‐order thoughts and the appendage theory of consciousness
Philosophical Psychology 1993 DOI: 10.1080/09515089308573085 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 45 |
| Key points | Argues that the difficulty Natsoulas raises for the higher-order-thought hypothesis does not require modifying that strategy, because the difficulty is a special case of a general question whose answer is independent of any issues about consciousness, and its intuitive force depends on a picture underlying the two explanatory strategies both authors reject. |
Abstract
Theories of what it is for a mental state to be conscious must answer two questions. We must say how we're conscious of our conscious mental states. And we must explain why we seem to be conscious of them in a way that's immediate. Thomas Natsoulas (1993) distinguishes three strategies for explaining what it is for mental states to be conscious. I show that the differences among those strategies are due to the divergent answers they give to the foregoing questions. Natsoulas finds most promising the strategy that amounts to the higher‐order‐thought hypothesis that I've defended elsewhere. But he raises a difficulty for it, which he thinks probably can be met only by modifying that strategy. I argue that this is unnecessary. The difficulty is a special case of a general question, the answer to which is independent of any issues about consciousness. So it's no part of a theory of consciousness to address the problem, much less solve it. Moreover, the difficulty seems to have intuitive force only given the picture that underlies the other two explanatory strategies, which both Natsoulas and I reject.