Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science
January 15, 2006
Bernard J. Baars
Abstract‘Consciousness’ operationally consists of all the things human beings report experiencing, from perception to mental images, inner speech, recalled memories, semantics, dreams, hallucinations, emotional feelings, and aspects of cognitive and motor control. In cognitive theory, consciousness appears to be a global access function, presenting an endless variety of focal contents to...
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science
January 15, 2006
Thomas W Polger
AbstractTo inquire about the function of consciousness is to ask what consciousness does, what it enables us to do that we might not be capable of otherwise, or why some creatures came to be conscious.
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science
January 15, 2006
J Allan Hobson
AbstractAdvances in, and links between, neurobiology and psychology as applied in the study of sleep and dreaming compared to the waking state are increasingly revealing significant evidence for the brain basis of consciousness.
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science
January 15, 2006
Tim Bayne
AbstractConsciousness is unified in various ways, but the nature and basis of its unity remains a matter of intense debate. This debate promises to illuminate the nature of experience, the self, and various pathologies of consciousness.
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science
January 15, 2006
Thomas Natsoulas
Abstract Except for time‐gaps, when the stream comes to a stop and then starts again, a stream of consciousness is constituted, from the Jamesian perspective, of tightly adjacent states of consciousness occurring very briefly one at a time. Unless a second such stream flows in the individual simultaneously, his or her conscious mental life at any instant consists entirely of one integral state...
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science
January 15, 2006
Torin Alter
AbstractQualia are the subjective aspects, the characteristic properties, of conscious experience. There is extensive philosophical debate about how qualia relate to the physical world, and in what terms they can be characterized.
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science
January 15, 2006
David Rosenthal
AbstractThe higher‐order‐thought hypothesis is a proposed explanation of what it is for a mental state to be a conscious state and hence of how conscious mental states differ from mental states that are not conscious.
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science
January 15, 2006
José Luis Bermúdez
AbstractSelf‐consciousness is deeply implicated in many aspects of cognition. To be self‐conscious is to be aware of oneself through information that one cannot fail to recognize is about oneself.
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science
January 15, 2006
Ned Block
AbstractThere are many problems of consciousness, but the most significant of them is: how is it possible to explain consciousness in terms of its neural basis?
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science
January 15, 2006
Benj Hellie
AbstractThe representationalist theory of consciousness is the view that consciousness reduces to mental representation. This view comes in several variants which must explain introspective awareness of conscious mental states.
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science
January 15, 2006
Charles A Heywood, A David Milner
Abstract The neural correlates of consciousness are those patterns of neural activity that are associated with subjective experience.
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science
January 15, 2006
David Braddon‐Mitchell
AbstractFunctionalism is the view in the philosophy of mind that that what makes some state of some system a mental state is what that state does in the system.
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science
January 15, 2006
Colin Allen
Abstract Observable similarities between humans and other animals with respect to behavior and neurology, as well as considerations related to evolutionary continuity between species, underlie most opinions that animals have conscious experiences. The attempt to understand other forms of consciousness – other species of mind – may help us to understand the evolutionary roots of our own.
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science
January 15, 2006
Keith Gunderson
AbstractThe widespread use of computers and robots within research programs in cognitive psychology has stimulated interest in the possibility of machine consciousness. As a result, many unsettled issues in the philosophy of mind and theory of knowledge have been reformulated in terms of, and in turn raised questions about, machine‐oriented modeling.