Consciousness, the self and bodily location
Analysis December 16, 2009 DOI: 10.1093/analys/anp167 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 27 |
| Key points | Argues that a necessary condition for a mental state to be conscious is that the subject is aware of it, a requirement termed the transitivity principle. Proposes that higher-order thoughts implement this principle, and specifies that awareness must be subjectively unmediated, spontaneous, and of the state as one's own. |
Abstract
One thing a theory of consciousness must do is capture the way conscious states differ from mental states that are not conscious. If an individual is in some mental state but wholly unaware of being in that state, that state is not a conscious state. By contraposition, a necessary condition for a state’s being conscious is that one is in some way aware of it. We can describe being conscious or aware of something as transitive consciousness; so we can call this necessary condition for a state’s being conscious the transitivity principle. Elsewhere (e.g. 2005) I have argued that this principle is implemented by higher-order thoughts (HOTs) to the effect that one is in the relevant states; such HOTs make us aware of our conscious mental states. Still, one can do a lot by appeal just to the more general transitivity principle, independent of HOTs. Plainly not any way of being aware of a state will do. For one thing, the awareness must be subjectively unmediated and spontaneous. Also, one must be aware of the state as one’s own, as a state that one is, oneself, in; being aware of a state as belonging to somebody else does not result in that state’s being conscious.