8 papers in the library · 504 citations · publishing 1996-2019
Human and Animal Minds November 28, 2019 Peter Carruthers
Abstract The present chapter outlines and defends the empirical case supporting global-workspace theory as the best account of the functional/neural correlates of consciousness, at least. The chapter explains the theoretical background to global-workspace theory and the evidence that supports it. It shows how the theory is well-supported by raft of findings in psychology and cognitive...
Human and Animal Minds November 28, 2019 Peter Carruthers
Abstract This chapter shows that global-workspace theory can be developed into a satisfying, fully reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness. It shows how globally broadcast nonconceptual content enables higher-order thoughts about that content, where those thoughts can lack conceptual connections with physical, functional, or representational facts. As a result, zombies are conceivable...
Consciousness and Cognition August 1, 2018 Peter Carruthers 37 citations
The goal of this paper is to establish the truth of the following conditional: if a global workspace theory of phenomenal consciousness is correct, and is fully reductive in nature, then we should stop asking questions about consciousness in nonhuman animals-not because those questions are too hard to answer, but because there are no substantive facts to discover. The argument in support of...
Consciousness and Cognition October 1, 2017 Peter Carruthers, Bénédicte Veillet 43 citations
This paper revisits the debate about cognitive phenomenology. It elaborates, defends, and improves on our earlier proposal for resolving that debate, according to which the test for irreducible phenomenology is the presence of explanatory gaps. After showing how proposals like ours have been misunderstood or misused by others, we deploy our operationalization to argue that the correct way to...
The MIT Press eBooks March 31, 2006 Peter Carruthers 10 citations
Are there different constraints on theories of conscious experience as against theories of conscious propositional thought?Is what is problematic or puzzling about each of these phenomena of the same, or of different, types?And to what extent is it plausible to think that either or both conscious experience and conscious thought involve some sort of selfreference?In pursuing these questions I...
Cambridge University Press eBooks September 28, 2000 Peter Carruthers 414 citations
How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective...
Cambridge University Press eBooks February 23, 1996 Peter Carruthers
In the present chapter I shall outline, and criticise in turn, a number of higher-order thought theories of consciousness, due to David Armstrong, David Rosenthal, Daniel Dennett, and others. Elements of these theories will then be incorporated into my own reflexive thinking theory, to be presented in the next chapter. Remember that one important strategic aim of this discussion is to see...
Cambridge University Press eBooks February 23, 1996 Peter Carruthers
This chapter will set the scene for the remainder of the book, reviewing the desiderata for a theory of consciousness, and setting aside some false starts. After a brief retrospect, I shall begin by explaining and defending the distinction between conscious and non-conscious mental states, before criticising two theories of the nature of this distinction which I regard as being overly simple –...