ISSN 1758-8936
21 papers in the library · 907 citations · publishing 2010-2024
Cognitive Neuroscience 2024 Guy Dove 1 citation
Mougenot and Matheson outline a theoretical approach to cognitive neuroscience that combines the commitments of embodied cognition with a mechanistic approach to scientific explanation. They argue that this theoretical approach provides several general benefits, including enabling researchers to develop more robust theories and ontologies that do not require either neuroscientific reductionism...
Cognitive Neuroscience 2023 Paul Sopcak 2 citations
This commentary makes three suggestions on Willems' neurocognitive model for understanding mixed and ambiguous emotions and morality. First, it proposes that his atheoretical approach risks unwittingly adopting theoretical and conceptual limitations implicit in reigning paradigms and overlooking the need for theoretical impetus and constraints in the development of valid constructs of targeted...
Cognitive Neuroscience 2021 Johannes J Fahrenfort, Simon van Gaal 10 citations
Doerig and colleagues put forward the notion that we need hard and theory-neutral criteria by which to arbitrate between empirical (mechanistic) theories of consciousness. However, most of the criteria that they propose are not theory neutral because they focus on functional equivalence between systems. Because empirical theories of consciousness are mechanistic rather than functionalist, we...
Cognitive Neuroscience 2021 Yair Pinto, Timo Stein 7 citations
In their paper Doerig et al. argue that we should put the hard problem aside and focus on empirical data to solve the 'easy' problems of consciousness - finding the neural and functional correlates of consciousness. In other words 'shut up and measure'. This has worked well with other thorny issues, such as explaining life, so why not adopt this approach here? We argue that despite the...
Cognitive Neuroscience 2021 J Kevin O'Regan 1 citation
Doerig et al. evaluate how current empirical theories approach access consciousness, but they neglect how they approach phenomenal consciousness - probably because most theories don't deal with phenomenal consciousness at all. One exception is the sensorimotor theory, but Doerig et al. did not evaluate it as being directed to phenomenal consciousness.
Cognitive Neuroscience 2021 Stan B. Klein
I consider the Doerig, Schruger, Herzog (this issue) paper to be a very important paper on the multiple empirical theories of consciousness (ToCs). The paper compared 13 different approaches. It would be wonderful to create a forum for all interested parties to discuss the many issues this paper brought up. Equally important is what the paper didn't bring up. Namely, how do the different...
Cognitive Neuroscience 2021 Anil K. Seth, Jakob Hohwy
The theories of consciousness discussed by Doerig and colleagues tend to monolithically identify consciousness with some other phenomenon, process, or mechanism. But by treating consciousness as singular explanatory target, such theories will struggle to account for the diverse properties that conscious experiences exhibit. We propose that progress in consciousness science will best be achieved...
Cognitive Neuroscience 2021 Bernard J. Baars
Doerig et al. point out that there is now a great deal of evidence bearing directly on our understanding of consciousness. However, they argue that the multiplicity of theories suggest that we have a 'lack of stringent criteria specifying how empirical data constrains ToCs.'
Cognitive Neuroscience 2021 David Rosenthal
I raise concerns about Doerig et al.'s general project, about three of their criteria, and about their treatment of higher-order-thought theory.
Cognitive Neuroscience 2021 Stuart Hameroff
The 'Orch OR' theory attributes consciousness to quantum computations in microtubules inside brain neurons. Quantum computers process information as superpositions of multiple possibilities (quantum bits or qubits) which, in Orch OR, are alternative collective dipole oscillations orchestrated ('Orch') by microtubules. These orchestrated oscillations entangle, compute, and terminate ('collapse...
Cognitive Neuroscience July 14, 2020 Adrien Doerig, Aaron Schurger, Michael H Herzog
ABSTRACT Consciousness is now a well-established field of empirical research. A large body of experimental results has been accumulated and is steadily growing. In parallel, many Theories of Consciousness (ToCs) have been proposed. These theories are diverse in nature, ranging from computational to neurophysiological and quantum theoretical approaches. This contrasts with other fields of...
Cognitive Neuroscience 2016 Georg Northoff 213 citations
What is the self? This is a question that has long been discussed in (Western) philosophy where the self is traditionally conceived a higher-order function at the apex or pinnacle of all functions. This tradition has been transferred to recent neuroscience where the self is often considered to be a higher-order cognitive function reflected in memory and other high-level judgements. However,...
Cognitive Neuroscience April 7, 2015 Anil K. Seth 56 citations
Can perceptual presence be explained by counterfactually-rich predictive models linking perception and action? Considering an unusually rich range of responses to this idea has led me to (1) re-emphasize the core conceptual commitment of "predictive processing of sensorimotor contingencies" (PPSMC) to predictive model-based perception, (2) reconsider the relationship between presence and...
Cognitive Neuroscience April 3, 2014 Thomas Metzinger 39 citations
Seth develops a convincing and detailed internalist alternative to the sensorimotor-contingency theory of perceptual phenomenology. However, there are remaining conceptual problems due to a semantic ambiguity in the notion of "presence" and the idea of "subjective veridicality." The current model should be integrated with the earlier idea that experiential "realness" and "mind-independence" are...
Cognitive Neuroscience January 21, 2014 Anil K. Seth 357 citations
Normal perception involves experiencing objects within perceptual scenes as real, as existing in the world. This property of "perceptual presence" has motivated "sensorimotor theories" which understand perception to involve the mastery of sensorimotor contingencies. However, the mechanistic basis of sensorimotor contingencies and their mastery has remained unclear. Sensorimotor theory also...
Cognitive Neuroscience 2011 Michael S A Graziano, Sabine Kastner
A common modern view of consciousness is that it is an emergent property of the brain, perhaps caused by neuronal complexity, and perhaps with no adaptive value. Exactly what emerges, how it emerges, and from what specific neuronal process, is in debate. One possible explanation of consciousness, proposed here, is that it is a construct of the social perceptual machinery. Humans have...
Cognitive Neuroscience September 1, 2010 Antti Revonsuo, Mika Koivisto 3 citations
Abstract Recent evidence from event-related brain potentials (ERPs) lends support to two central theses in Lamme's theory. The earliest ERP correlate of visual consciousness appears over posterior visual cortex around 100-200 ms after stimulus onset. Its scalp topography and time window are consistent with recurrent processing in the visual cortex. This electrophysiological correlate of visual...
Cognitive Neuroscience September 1, 2010 Victor A. F. Lamme
Is there consciousness in machines? Or in animals? What happens to consciousness when we are asleep, or in vegetative state? These are just a few examples of the many questions about consciousness that are troubling scientists and laypersons alike. Moreover, these questions share a striking feature: They seem to have been around forever, yet neither science nor philosophy has been able to...
Cognitive Neuroscience August 18, 2010 Geraint Rees, Anil K. Seth 11 citations
The past decade has seen an explosion of interest in the neural mechanisms underlying consciousness. Experimental approaches from cognitive neuroscience that emphasize converging evidence from multiple methodologies have changed our understanding of how conscious mental states are associated with patterns of brain activity. In this special issue of Cognitive Neuroscience, we bring together five...
Cognitive Neuroscience August 18, 2010 Agustin Ibanez, Tristán Bekinschtein 2 citations
Abstract Visual perception and integration seem to play an essential role in our conscious phenomenology. Relatively local neural processing of reentrant nature may explain several visual integration processes (feature binding or figure-ground segregation, object recognition, inference, competition), even without attention or cognitive control. Based on the above statements, should the neural...
Cognitive Neuroscience July 1, 2010 Marcello Massimini, Fabio Ferrarelli, Michael J. Murphy et al. 205 citations
We recorded the electroencephalographic (EEG) responses evoked by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) during the first rapid eye movement (REM) sleep episode of the night and we compared them with the responses obtained during previous wakefulness and NREM sleep. Confirming previous findings, upon falling into NREM sleep, cortical activations became more local and stereotypical, indicating...