Cognitive NeuroscienceJuly 2026Giovanni Federico, François Osiurak, Maria A Brandimonte et al.
Understanding how the human brain generates, utilizes, and adapts to technology is one of our most urgent scientific questions today. Recent advances in cognitive neuroscience reveal a complex neurocognitive structure that underpins human interaction with technology. Here, we propose an integrated framework that considers the interplay of causal reasoning, semantic cognition, visuospatial...
Mougenot and Matheson outline a theoretical approach to cognitive neuroscience that combines the commitments of embodied cognition with a mechanistic approach to scientific explanation. They argue that this theoretical approach provides several general benefits, including enabling researchers to develop more robust theories and ontologies that do not require either neuroscientific reductionism...
This commentary makes three suggestions on Willems' neurocognitive model for understanding mixed and ambiguous emotions and morality. First, it proposes that his atheoretical approach risks unwittingly adopting theoretical and conceptual limitations implicit in reigning paradigms and overlooking the need for theoretical impetus and constraints in the development of valid constructs of targeted...
Doerig and colleagues put forward the notion that we need hard and theory-neutral criteria by which to arbitrate between empirical (mechanistic) theories of consciousness. However, most of the criteria that they propose are not theory neutral because they focus on functional equivalence between systems. Because empirical theories of consciousness are mechanistic rather than functionalist, we...
In their paper Doerig et al. argue that we should put the hard problem aside and focus on empirical data to solve the 'easy' problems of consciousness - finding the neural and functional correlates of consciousness. In other words 'shut up and measure'. This has worked well with other thorny issues, such as explaining life, so why not adopt this approach here? We argue that despite the...
Doerig et al. evaluate how current empirical theories approach access consciousness, but they neglect how they approach phenomenal consciousness - probably because most theories don't deal with phenomenal consciousness at all. One exception is the sensorimotor theory, but Doerig et al. did not evaluate it as being directed to phenomenal consciousness.
The theories of consciousness discussed by Doerig and colleagues tend to monolithically identify consciousness with some other phenomenon, process, or mechanism. But by treating consciousness as singular explanatory target, such theories will struggle to account for the diverse properties that conscious experiences exhibit. We propose that progress in consciousness science will best be achieved...
I consider the Doerig, Schruger, Herzog (this issue) paper to be a very important paper on the multiple empirical theories of consciousness (ToCs). The paper compared 13 different approaches. It would be wonderful to create a forum for all interested parties to discuss the many issues this paper brought up. Equally important is what the paper didn't bring up. Namely, how do the different...
Doerig et al. point out that there is now a great deal of evidence bearing directly on our understanding of consciousness. However, they argue that the multiplicity of theories suggest that we have a 'lack of stringent criteria specifying how empirical data constrains ToCs.'
The 'Orch OR' theory attributes consciousness to quantum computations in microtubules inside brain neurons. Quantum computers process information as superpositions of multiple possibilities (quantum bits or qubits) which, in Orch OR, are alternative collective dipole oscillations orchestrated ('Orch') by microtubules. These orchestrated oscillations entangle, compute, and terminate ('collapse...
Doerig et al. have set several criteria that theories of consciousness need to fulfill. By these criteria, higher-order theories fare better than most existing theories. But they also argue that higher-order theories may not be able to answer both the 'small network argument' and the 'other systems argument'. In response, we focus on the case of the Perceptual Reality Monitoring theory to...
Doerig et al. point out a number of shortcomings with existing theories of consciousness and argue they should be systematically constrained by empirical data. In this commentary I suggest a further constraint - the potential functions of (the contents of) consciousness. One such candidate function in humans is the social sharing of reportable mental states. The social function of...
(1) Let me begin by thanking Doerig et al. for including my work in their survey of empirical theories of consciousness (although I am a bit spooked by being assigned the number 13!), especially given the authors’ concern for the large number of currently competing theories. I also appreciate their idea that the reason for this abundance may be a lack of stringent selection criteria although I...
ABSTRACT Consciousness is now a well-established field of empirical research. A large body of experimental results has been accumulated and is steadily growing. In parallel, many Theories of Consciousness (ToCs) have been proposed. These theories are diverse in nature, ranging from computational to neurophysiological and quantum theoretical approaches. This contrasts with other fields of...
In this study, we aimed to compare the oscillatory dynamics accompanying self-referential and non-self-referential stimulus-independent thoughts. Electroencephalograms were recorded in 30 healthy participants who were asked to press buttons classifying their spontaneous thoughts as self-referential or non-self-referential. EEG data were analyzed using independent component analysis in...
What is the self? This is a question that has long been discussed in (Western) philosophy where the self is traditionally conceived a higher-order function at the apex or pinnacle of all functions. This tradition has been transferred to recent neuroscience where the self is often considered to be a higher-order cognitive function reflected in memory and other high-level judgements. However,...
Can perceptual presence be explained by counterfactually-rich predictive models linking perception and action? Considering an unusually rich range of responses to this idea has led me to (1) re-emphasize the core conceptual commitment of "predictive processing of sensorimotor contingencies" (PPSMC) to predictive model-based perception, (2) reconsider the relationship between presence and...
Seth develops a convincing and detailed internalist alternative to the sensorimotor-contingency theory of perceptual phenomenology. However, there are remaining conceptual problems due to a semantic ambiguity in the notion of "presence" and the idea of "subjective veridicality." The current model should be integrated with the earlier idea that experiential "realness" and "mind-independence" are...
Normal perception involves experiencing objects within perceptual scenes as real, as existing in the world. This property of "perceptual presence" has motivated "sensorimotor theories" which understand perception to involve the mastery of sensorimotor contingencies. However, the mechanistic basis of sensorimotor contingencies and their mastery has remained unclear. Sensorimotor theory also...
Abstract We argue that Graziano and Kastner are mistaken to claim that neglect favors their self-directed social perception account of consciousness. For the latter should not predict that neglect would result from damage to mechanisms of social perception. Neglect is better explained in terms of damage to attentional mechanisms.
Abstract I welcome the idea that consciousness, rather than being private, has a crucial role in understanding other minds. However, I believe that the critical mechanism underlying consciousness is meta-cognition; the ability to reflect upon and report mental states, whether our own or those of others. This allows us to share experiences and create a more accurate picture of the world.
Abstract Hybrid social cognitive models, based not only on simulation, are desirable, especially in complex scenarios. It is unclear, however, which neural systems support non simulative processes. Furthermore, the proposal that consciousness is a form of representation of attention, while novel, relies on a traditional concept of representation. Recent findings suggest an ontological priority...
Abstract A consensus emerging from neuroscience is that certain brain regions show activity correlated with stimulus independent (e.g. private) conscious thought and yet are also implicated in public social processes. The fact that systems supporting social processing also exhibit activity with no obvious perceptual referent, can be seen as support for the framework suggested by Graziano and...