Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences
September 19, 2018
Daniel C Dennett
The so-called hard problem of consciousness is a chimera, a distraction from the hard question of consciousness, which is once some content reaches consciousness, 'then what happens?'. This question is seldom properly asked, for reasons good and bad, but when asked it opens up avenues of research that promise to dissolve the hard problem and secure a scientifically sound theory of how the human...
Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge
2007
Daniel C Dennett
91 citations
AbstractThis chapter further develops a line of argument Daniel Dennett presented in his 1991 book, Consciousness Explained, where he argued that we should reject the intuition that Mary gains knowledge when she leaves the room. In his view, this intuition derives from a failure to appreciate the implications of knowing all the physical facts. Dennet gives a more detailed account of his case....
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
December 1, 1998
Daniel C. Dennett
Pessoa et al.'s target article shows that although filling-in of various kinds does appear to occur in the brain, it is not required in order to furnish a “bridge locus” where neural events are “isomorphic” to the features of visual consciousness. Some recently uncovered completion phenomena may well play a crucial role in the elaboration of normal visual experience, but others occur too slowly...
Complexity
July 1, 1996
Daniel C. Dennett
1 citation
A tale of cognitive pursuit hat Douglas Hofstadter is, quite simply, is a phenomenologist, a practicing phenomenologist, and he does it better than anyone else.Ever.For years he W has been studying the processes of his own consciousness, relentlessly, unflinchingly, imaginatively, but undeludely.He is not a Phenomenologist with a capital "P"-with few exceptions, Phenomenologists don't actually...
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
December 1, 1993
Daniel C. Dennett
117 citations
Consciousness has always been a baffling phenomenon, and some have seen it to be fundamentally mysterious, irretrievably beyond human understanding. I argue, on the contrary, that its mysteries are beginning to dissolve, thanks largely to the onslaught of empirical and conceptual advances in cognitive science. So entrenched, however, are the traditional ways of addressing the philosophical...
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
December 1, 1993
David Rosenthal, Daniel C. Dennett
11 citations
One strategy for explaining consciousness is to locate it relative to its causes and effects. Common sense seems to tell us what the causes and effects of consciousness are; so perhaps we can identify consciousness as being whatever it is that occurs in between the two. Though superficially tempting, this idea heightens the air of mystery surrounding consciousness. As far as we can tell, the...
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
December 1, 1993
Sydney Shoemaker, Daniel C. Dennett
2 citations
is so much that is brilliant, delightful, and right in Dennett's book that it is tempting try explain away, or sweep under the rug, the things that seem wrong. I was aware of one long standing disagreement between him and me, namely over the existence of But I had hoped that this was an isolated case. And, indeed, the book a whole presents a vision of mind and its place in nature (to steal C....