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Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia.
2003
|
theoretical or philosophical paper |
|
↑Supports
|
Proposes that dysregulated dopamine transmission produces aberrant salience at the mind level, with delusions as cognitive explanations of these experiences and antipsychotics dampening salience rather than erasing symptoms. |
|
From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis.
2005
|
theoretical or philosophical paper |
|
↑Supports
|
Argues that psychosis arises from aberrant assignment of novelty and salience, that antipsychotics attenuate this salience rather than eradicate symptoms, and that improvement appears within the first few days. |
|
Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics
2008
|
review |
|
↑Supports
|
Argues that somaesthetics offers a philosophical route beyond Cartesian mind-body dualism by treating mindful bodily awareness as integral to experience and self-improvement. |
|
Phenomenology, Structure, and Dynamic of Psychedelic States
2016
|
review |
|
↑Supports
|
Describes psychedelic states as structured along three primary dimensions (oceanic boundlessness, anxious ego-dissolution, visionary restructuralization) and as shaped by both pharmacological and non-pharmacological factors. |
|
Classic Hallucinogens and Mystical Experiences: Phenomenology and Neural Correlates.
2018
|
review |
|
↑Supports
|
Reports that under double-blind conditions psilocybin can occasion complete mystical experiences in the majority of people studied, with dose-dependent and enduring effects on mood, attitudes, and behavior. |
|
How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC).
2017
|
theoretical or philosophical paper |
|
↑Supports
|
Proposes a Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness in which four brain mechanisms (nestedness, alignment, expansion, globalization) correspond to different dimensions of consciousness. |
|
The lived experience of psychosis: a bottom-up review co-written by experts by experience and academics.
2022
|
co-written bottom-up review |
|
↑Supports
|
Describes the lived experience of psychosis as progressing through stages with core existential themes, from loss of common sense early on to grieving and struggles with acceptance later. |
|
The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model.
2013
|
theoretical or philosophical paper |
|
↑Supports
|
Proposes an enactive, affordance-based model with four aspects to capture the phenomenological changes reported by OCD patients treated with deep brain stimulation. |
|
Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution
2017
|
theoretical or philosophical paper |
|
↑Supports
|
Argues that drug-induced ego dissolution disrupts subpersonal processes underlying the minimal or embodied self, consistent with Bayesian models of selfhood, and challenges theories that consciousness always involves self-awareness. |
|
From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: Francisco Varela's exploration of the biophysics of being.
2003
|
review |
|
↑Supports
|
Reviews Varela's framework in which biological autonomy, embodiment, and neurophenomenology explain consciousness as emergent from circular causality in living systems. |
|
Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology.
1968
|
theoretical or philosophical paper |
|
↑Supports
|
Presents Ricoeur's reading of Husserl's philosophy of consciousness, emphasizing the Husserlian elements that shaped Ricoeur's own philosophical position. |
|
The phenomenology of near-death experiences
1980
|
retrospective study |
78 |
↕Mixed
|
Found that prior experiences suggestive of transcendence of death were more common among near-death experiencers than controls, while prior extrasensory-type experiences were less common, and subsequent attitude changes were more common than in subjects with other psychic experiences. |
|
Visual Phenomenology of the LSD Flashback
1983
|
observational cohort |
123 |
↑Supports
|
Identified a syndrome of ten visual disturbances lasting up to five years in half the sample, treatable with benzodiazepines, exacerbated by phenothiazines, and most commonly precipitated by emergence into darkness. |
|
Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (A Draft)
1995
|
theoretical or philosophical paper |
|
↓Opposes
|
Argues that the Putnam-Nussbaum thesis equating modern functionalism with Aristotelianism is false, because Aristotle's conception of the material side of the soul-body relation cannot be shared by modern functionalists. |
|
Studying the experience of meditation through Micro-phenomenology
2018
|
pilot project |
|
↑Supports
|
Reports that micro-phenomenological interviews can produce rigorous descriptions of meditative experience useful for understanding, practicing, and teaching meditation. |
|
Embodied Transformation: Psychedelic Therapy Through the Lens of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology
2026
|
theoretical or philosophical paper |
|
↑Supports
|
Argues via Merleau-Ponty that psychedelic mystical experience recalibrates the intentional arc and restores pre-reflective meaning, and that objections to its therapeutic value rest on implicit Cartesian assumptions. |
|
Współobecność jako przeżycie. Aksjomatyczne wyprowadzenie odpowiedzi na trudny problem świadomości / Co-presence as Experience: An Axiomatic Derivation of an Answer to the Hard Problem of Consciousness
2026
|
theoretical or philosophical paper |
|
↑Supports
|
Proposes an axiomatic model in which feeling arises from a subject co-holding initial and realized states of an open function, deriving the obligatoriness of phenomenality, the impossibility of zombies, and graded subjecthood. |
|
General Cross-Substrate Phenomenology: A Type-Safe, Transformation-First Framework for Phenomenal Existence, Structure, Perspective, and Continuation
2026
|
theoretical or philosophical paper |
|
↕Mixed
|
Argues that cross-substrate comparisons of phenomenal consciousness require a typed architecture separating causal descriptions, evidence, and psychophysical bridges, and that five causal counterexamples expose limitations in earlier transport accounts. |
|
Reinterpretation of Logotherapy’s Dimensional Ontology via Embodied Phenomenology
2026
|
theoretical or philosophical paper |
|
↑Supports
|
Argues that logotherapy's dimensional ontology can be reinterpreted through embodiment, recasting meaning discovery, self-detachment, and self-transcendence as somatic processes integrable into clinical practice. |
|
The Hard Problem: "What it's like to be a Category Error" – A Biological Forensic Audit of the Experiencer
2026
|
theoretical or philosophical paper |
|
↑Supports
|
Argues that the narrator-level 'I' is a causally downstream product of biological and representational operations, not a primitive subject, and that treating it as primitive is a category error. |
|
The Chromatic Communion: A Christocentric Phenomenology of Inter-spiritual Sociality and Celestial Communion
2026
|
autoethnographic case study |
|
↑Supports
|
Argues through a Christocentric lens that post-mortem sociality operates as refracted chromatic light serving as a linguistic medium and as eschatological hospitality, constituting an eternal perichoresis. |
|
Biological naturalism, synthetic phenomenology, and the physics of awareness.
2026
|
theoretical or philosophical paper |
|
?Unclear
|
Suggests that biological naturalism may collapse into eliminative materialism and that the ethics of synthetic phenomenology will remain an open issue. |
|
Qualia and the Semantic Ledger: A Formal Dissolution of the Hard Problem Paper 55 of the NEMS Suite
2026
|
theoretical or philosophical paper |
|
↑Supports
|
Argues that the hard problem of consciousness is a category mistake because qualitative content must be represented in a semantic ledger and cannot be reduced to purely syntactic content. |
|
It from I: Internal Phenomenology
2026
|
theoretical or philosophical paper |
|
↑Supports
|
Proposes that consciousness is an active thermodynamic purification of a mind-body state rather than a computational output, with the topology of the body's low-dimensional collective mode determining the texture of subjective experience. |
|
Exploring the Origins of Subjectivity and Awareness with the Twin Cognitive Cycle (TCC): the Hard Problem of Consciousness
2026
|
theoretical or philosophical paper |
|
↑Supports
|
Proposes extending the Twin Cognitive Cycle model with a quantitative account of structured event patterns to describe mental states and explain subjectivity, with awareness as the aggregate of modality-specific variables and emotional states. |