Multiple Drafts and Higher-Order Thoughts
David Rosenthal, Daniel C. Dennett
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research December 1, 1993 DOI: 10.2307/2108263 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 11 |
| Key points | Argues that the Cartesian Theater model tacitly underlies much mistaken thinking about consciousness, and that a correct explanation will share much with Dennett's Multiple Drafts model, though its explanatory benefits may be available from a somewhat weaker model. |
Abstract
One strategy for explaining consciousness is to locate it relative to its causes and effects. Common sense seems to tell us what the causes and effects of consciousness are; so perhaps we can identify consciousness as being whatever it is that occurs in between the two. Though superficially tempting, this idea heightens the air of mystery surrounding consciousness. As far as we can tell, the physiological causes of consciousness lead directly to its physiological effects. So how could consciousness lie anywhere along that causal path unless, as Dennett evocatively puts it, miracle occurs?1 The idea that consciousness occurs at the unique interface of certain causes and effects underlies what Dennett calls the Cartesian Theater model of mind. I agree with Dennett that this model, though seldom acknowledged, tacitly underlies much that's mistaken in current thinking about mind and consciousness; his sustained, effective effort to expose and demolish that myth is an important contribution to our understanding of consciousness. I'm convinced, moreover, that a correct explanation of consciousness will share much with the alternative theory Dennett puts forth, the Multiple Drafts model (MDM). Nonetheless, I think the explanatory benefits of the MDM may be available with a model that's in one respect somewhat weaker. Perhaps the most important virtue of the MDM is its ability to accommodate the apparent temporal anomalies Dennett catalogues. In color phi a green flash occurs in the left of our visual field followed by a red flash on the right, but we seem to see a single spot that moves and changes color. Why don't we first consciously sense the initial stationary flash? Dennett believes the MDM has the answer. According to the MDM, consciousness is continuously revised, much as a text changes through successive drafts. Some features of a text undergoing revision persist through many drafts; others may be so transitory as to es-