A challenge is developed for Higher-Order Thought theories of consciousness: they fail to explain the presentational character of visual experience—the sense that objects are directly given to us. A novel alternative, the Map Theory of consciousness, is proposed, which holds that the higher-order representations responsible for conscious experience have a cartographic, map-like format, thereby accounting for presentational character.
The claim that consciousness is necessary for a being to have a welfare—a view called phenomenalism—can take two forms: either consciousness is required for welfare subjecthood, or conscious beings have greater welfare capacity. The authors argue that hedonism, the most plausible source of support for either version, actually provides no support for phenomenalism. They instead discuss an alternative view, mentalism, which holds that welfare subjectivity and capacity depend on mentality more broadly, not specifically on consciousness.
The history of philosophy shows a pattern of expanding the moral circle—the set of entities considered worthy of moral concern—alongside expanding beliefs about which entities possess consciousness. Recently, proposals for consciousness have extended to invertebrates, plants, logic gates, and fundamental entities, the last driven by renewed interest in panpsychism. This paper explores the ethical implications of panpsychism, concluding that while panpsychism likely expands the moral circle significantly, it probably offers little of practical significance.