According to higher-order (“HO”) theories, consciousness consists in HO awareness of being in mental states. While many objections to such theories have been addressed elsewhere, the most well-known seems to remain: the problem of so-called “empty” HO states, which holds that HO theory cannot explain cases wherein one is aware of mental states that do not exist. This paper offers a novel...
Abstract Many claim that there is an important relationship between consciousness and welfare. Call this general view phenomenalism . One way of fleshing out phenomenalism is to hold that consciousness is what makes one the type of entity that can be noninstrumentally better or worse off in the first place. Consciousness is at least a necessary condition on welfare subjecthood . A different...
ABSTRACT The history of philosophy is a history of moral circle expansion. This history correlates with a history of expansionism about consciousness. Recently, expansionism about consciousness has exploded: to invertebrates, to plants, to logic gates, and to fundamental entities. The last of these expansions stems from a surge of interest in panpsychism. In an exploratory spirit, this paper...
ABSTRACT I begin by developing a challenge for the Higher-Order Thought variant of Higher-Order representational theories of consciousness. The challenge is to account for the distinctive phenomenal character of visual experience—its presentational character. After setting out the challenge, I articulate a novel form of Higher-Order theory that can account for presentational character—the Map...