Neuron
June 17, 2026
Vincent Taschereau-Dumouchel, Jun Seo Hwang, Hakwan Lau et al.
Growing public discussion about consciousness in animals, fetuses, organoids, and artificial intelligence has prompted strong claims. However, most of these claims rely on 'markers' of consciousness that measure general information processing capacity rather than subjective experience itself. Consequently, the usefulness of such markers for settling theoretical debates about consciousness may be limited.
Acta Psychologica
February 13, 2026
Hina Kawaguchi, Vincent Taschereau-Dumouchel, Hakwan Lau et al.
People with aphantasia, who report no visual mental imagery, show the same gaze patterns as controls when reading imagery-rich stories. Both groups fixated longer on words and phrases describing sensory-rich perceptual imagery. Despite these identical eye movements, aphantasics reported feeling less immersed in the stories. Among controls, longer fixation on perceptual imagery correlated with stronger self-reported mental imagery, but this relationship was absent or reversed in aphantasics. The findings tentatively suggest that imagery may occur nonconsciously in aphantasia, with the condition primarily impairing introspective access to mental images rather than eliminating imagery itself.
Current Biology
August 1, 2023
J. LeDoux, Jonathan Birch, Kristin Andrews et al.
Leading experts in consciousness research address big questions about the relationship between AI and consciousness. The piece presents a multi-perspective discussion, with contributors including philosophers, neuroscientists, and cognitive scientists responding to challenges posed by Joseph LeDoux and Jonathan Birch. The experts explore whether AI systems could ever be conscious, what criteria might be used to assess machine consciousness, and how insights from animal and human consciousness research might inform these debates. No single conclusion is reached; instead the work maps the current landscape of scientific and philosophical positions on AI consciousness.
February 10, 2022
Hakwan Lau
A mechanistic account of subjective experience is proposed, drawing on cognitive neuroscience of conscious perception, attention, and metacognition. The book argues that empirical studies are often misinterpreted, with undue focus on perceptual capacity rather than subjective experience itself, and null findings overemphasized despite limited methodological sensitivity. A synthesis combines global and local theories of consciousness, discussed in relation to sense of agency, emotion, rationality, culture, philosophy, and clinical applications. Insights from physiology and artificial intelligence address the qualitative nature of subjective experience.
In Consciousness we Trust
February 10, 2022
Hakwan Lau
Consciousness likely emerged during evolution, but its functional role remains unclear. Subliminal priming experiments, which compare conscious and nonconscious processing, show only small, hard-to-replicate effects, and even when functions can operate nonconsciously, consciousness may be needed for them to work fully. New experimental methods that produce strong nonconscious signals are needed. Current evidence suggests consciousness may be less useful than global theories propose; metacognition may be one of the few specific functions to which consciousness contributes.
In Consciousness we Trust
February 10, 2022
Hakwan Lau
The subjective quality of a conscious experience can be understood by how similar it is to all other possible experiences. Similarity relationships are implicitly assessed through the structure of mammalian sensory cortices, allowing effortless knowledge of what an experience is like. This view aligns with perceptual reality monitoring: subjective experience occurs when qualitative sensory information acquires assertoric force. Metaphysical theories generally do not account for these qualitative aspects of consciousness better and may hinder scientific progress.
Nature Human Behaviour
February 1, 2019
M. Michel, Diane M Beck, N. Block et al.
Advancing scientific research on consciousness is important for addressing clinical and ethical issues in neurology and mental health. To support this field, funding priorities must be set carefully, and challenges such as job creation and media misrepresentation need to be addressed.
Frontiers in Psychology
November 5, 2018
Matthias Michel, Stephen M Fleming, Hakwan Lau et al.
A survey of 249 participants, mostly in academia and about 40% experts in consciousness research, assessed views on the field's progress, funding, job opportunities, and scientific rigor. 78% of respondents said scientific research on consciousness has been making progress. However, most perceived obtaining funding and getting a job in consciousness research as more difficult than in other neuroscience subfields. Work in consciousness research was seen as less rigorous than other neuroscience subfields, but this perception was not linked to the perceived difficulty in funding and jobs. Global workspace theory was rated most promising overall (about 28%), while among non-experts integrated information theory (IIT) was most popular (about 22%).
The Journal of neuroscience : the official journal of the Society for Neuroscience
October 4, 2017
Brian Odegaard, Robert T. Knight, Hakwan Lau
Activity in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is critical for conscious perception, contradicting claims that PFC lesions do not affect subjective experience, that PFC activity does not reflect perceptual content, or that its role is solely due to task-related reporting. Empirical evidence shows PFC is essential for subjective experience in perception, not just for performing visual tasks. Confusing these two aspects can lead to misunderstandings.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2016
Megan A. K. Peters, T. Ro, Hakwan Lau
Response bias can contaminate studies of consciousness when observers report not seeing a stimulus not because they lack subjective experience but because they compare it to other stimuli. While bias-free signal detection measures help avoid this confound, an overemphasis on eliminating criterion effects can mislead research. The authors argue that Balsdon and Azzopardi mistakenly criticized a previous report of 'relative blindsight' for response bias, when the original study never intended to use their bias-removal methods. Dismissing findings solely because they depend on criterion is problematic, as many real effects necessarily involve criterion. The authors conclude that criterion effects are conceptually important in conscious awareness research and should be treated carefully, not avoided thoughtlessly.
WIREs Cognitive Science
January 1, 2011
Hakwan Lau
Different theories of visual awareness—the global workspace theory, local visual processing theories, and the higher-order representation theory—are supported by different neural correlates. Studying these neural correlates can advance theoretical understanding, but resolving disagreements between interpretations of neural evidence also requires addressing conceptual issues.