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Consciousness and Cognition

ISSN 1090-2376

263 papers in the library · 4,259 citations · publishing 1994-2026

Papers

Functional neuroanatomy of altered states of consciousness: The transient hypofrontality hypothesis

Consciousness and Cognition May 19, 2003 Arne Dietrich 486 citations

Altered states of consciousness—such as dreaming, endurance running, meditation, daydreaming, hypnosis, and drug-induced states—are primarily caused by temporary reduced activity in the prefrontal cortex, a brain region supporting higher-order cognitive functions. This transient hypofrontality is proposed as the unifying feature across all altered states, while the unique qualities of each state arise from which specific frontal circuits remain more or less active. Consciousness is conceptualized as a hierarchy of cognitive functions, with the prefrontal cortex at the top contributing the most sophisticated content. The framework generates testable hypotheses about how subtle prefrontal changes produce diverse conscious experiences.

ERP and MEG correlates of visual consciousness: The second decade.

Consciousness and Cognition April 1, 2020 Jona Förster, Mika Koivisto, Antti Revonsuo 176 citations

The earliest and most reliable brain signal linked to visual phenomenal consciousness is the visual awareness negativity (VAN), a negative voltage deflection occurring around 200-300 milliseconds after a stimulus appears over posterior scalp regions. A later positive component, the late positivity (LP), which appears over frontal areas around 300-500 milliseconds, likely reflects later cognitive processes such as reflective or access consciousness rather than phenomenal awareness itself. This conclusion is supported by a review of event-related potential and magnetoencephalography studies published since 2010 that directly compared brain responses to consciously perceived versus unseen stimuli. The evidence strengthens VAN's role as the primary neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness and further undermines LP as a marker of phenomenal awareness.

The neural correlates of consciousness: New experimental approaches needed?

Consciousness and Cognition April 5, 2009 Jakob Hohwy 164 citations

The search for the neural correlates of consciousness faces problems in both of its main approaches. The content-based approach, which contrasts conscious perception of different stimuli like faces versus houses, appears to set aside crucial aspects of consciousness. The state-based approach, which contrasts overall conscious states like dreamless sleep versus wakefulness, seems over-inclusive in a way that is hard to rectify without losing the crucial conscious-unconscious contrast. Consequently, the search for the neural correlates of consciousness needs new experimental paradigms.

Absorption and spiritual experience: A review of evidence and potential mechanisms.

Consciousness and Cognition August 1, 2019 Michael Lifshitz, Michiel van Elk, T M Luhrmann 162 citations

A general tendency called 'absorption'—the capacity to become deeply immersed in sensory and imaginative experiences—underlies a broad proclivity for spiritual experiences. People high in absorption readily sense supernatural presences, receive messages from God, and feel self-transcendence, awe, and wonder. High scorers on the Tellegen Absorption Scale report vivid experiences such as hearing God's voice during prayer, intense mystical states from psychedelics or placebo brain-stimulation, and strong feelings of presence and transcendence when encountering natural beauty, virtual reality, or music. Absorption appears to intensify inner and outer sensory experience, blending prior expectation with novel engagement, making imagined things feel more real.

How does it feel to lack a sense of boundaries? A case study of a long-term mindfulness meditator.

Consciousness and Cognition December 1, 2015 Yochai Ataria, Yair Dor-Ziderman, Aviva Berkovich-Ohana 158 citations

Based on detailed self-reports from a long-term mindfulness practitioner with about 20,000 hours of meditation experience, the sense of boundaries (SB) can shift through three stages: default, dissolving, and disappearing. During these shifts, seven overlapping categories change, including senses of internal versus external, time, location, self, agency, ownership, and the first-person perspective. Two categories—the touching/touched structure and bodily feelings—persist even when the SB disappears entirely. The findings suggest that the sense of boundaries is not a single, fixed experience but a composite of multiple, separable dimensions that can be altered through meditative practice.

Anomalous self-experience in depersonalization and schizophrenia: a comparative investigation.

Consciousness and Cognition June 1, 2013 Louis Sass, Elizabeth Pienkos, Barnaby Nelson et al. 144 citations

Anomalous self-experiences are central to schizophrenia and other psychiatric disorders. This analysis compared such experiences in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, as cataloged in the EASE, with those described in severe depersonalization. Numerous affinities were found, showing that pure forms of diminished self-affection (depersonalization) can involve experiences resembling those of schizophrenia. However, important discrepancies emerged, suggesting that more automatic or deficiency-like factors—probably involving self/world or self/other confusion and erosion of first-person perspective—are more distinctive of schizophrenia-spectrum disorders.

Mysticism and schizophrenia: A phenomenological exploration of the structure of consciousness in the schizophrenia spectrum disorders.

Consciousness and Cognition July 1, 2016 Josef Parnas, Mads Gram Henriksen 128 citations

Mysticism and schizophrenia, though distinct categories, share important phenomenological similarities that have been largely overlooked. This paper explores structural analogies between key features of mysticism and major clinical-phenomenological aspects of schizophrenia spectrum disorders, including attitudes, the nature of experience, and the experience of an 'other' reality. These features revolve around basic dimensions of consciousness and appear to involve a specific alteration of the structure of consciousness itself. This finding has implications for understanding consciousness and its psychopathological distortions.

Anticipating seizure: pre-reflective experience at the center of neuro-phenomenology.

Consciousness and Cognition September 1, 2007 Claire Petitmengin, Vincent Navarro, Michel Le van Quyen 123 citations

A dynamic approach to epileptic seizure anticipation, combining neuro-dynamic analysis of brain activity with pheno-dynamic analysis of subjective experience, can guide and determine each other. This method consolidates the foundations for a cognitive, non-pharmacological therapy for epilepsy. The neuro-phenomenological co-determination demonstrated through this example offers new insight into the gap between subjective experience and neurophysiological activity.

How many kinds of consciousness?

Consciousness and Cognition December 1, 2002 David Rosenthal 118 citations

Ned Block's widely used distinction between phenomenal consciousness (raw subjective experience) and access consciousness (information available for reasoning and action) is flawed because it smuggles in unargued theoretical assumptions. The distinction between phenomenal and reflexive consciousness also suffers from this problem. While mental states with qualitative character differ from those without, being conscious is the same property for both. Block's notion of access consciousness does not capture what we intuitively mean by a mental state's being conscious. More critically, his concept of phenomenal consciousness is ambiguous between two distinct mental properties, which begs important theoretical questions. Once these are distinguished, qualitative consciousness can be explained by a model like the higher-order-thought hypothesis.

The first prior: From co-embodiment to co-homeostasis in early life.

Consciousness and Cognition May 1, 2021 Anna Ciaunica, Axel Constant, Hubert Preissl et al. 99 citations

Perceptual experiences are shaped by prior events, as argued by Predictive Processing and Active Inference frameworks. This paper examines how such experiences begin before birth, within the womb. A key but often neglected point is that humans develop inside another human body, a universal experience. The authors focus on the emergence of minimal selfhood in utero as a process of co-embodiment and co-homeostasis, emphasizing their interdependence. They conclude by discussing implications for debates on conscious experience, the minimal self, and social cognition.

Neurochemical models of near-death experiences: A large-scale study based on the semantic similarity of written reports.

Consciousness and Cognition March 1, 2019 Charlotte Martial, Héléna Cassol, Vanessa Charland-Verville et al. 98 citations

Near-death experiences (NDEs) share consistent features across cultures, suggesting a common neurobiological basis. Analyzing semantic similarity between about 15,000 reports from 165 psychoactive substances and 625 NDE narratives, the NMDA receptor antagonist ketamine produced reports most similar to NDEs, followed by Salvia divinorum and serotonergic psychedelics like DMT. The similarity was driven by concepts of self and environmental consciousness, as well as therapeutic, ceremonial, and religious aspects of drug use. Ketamine may serve as a safe experimental model for NDE phenomenology, and endogenous NMDA antagonists might be released near death.

Lucid dreaming incidence: A quality effects meta-analysis of 50 years of research

Consciousness and Cognition June 20, 2016 David Saunders, Chris A Roe, Graham Smith et al. 93 citations

A meta-analysis of 34 studies from 1966 to 2016 estimated that 55% of people have had at least one lucid dream in their lifetime, with a 95% confidence interval of 49% to 62%. A separate analysis of 25 studies found that 23% of people experience lucid dreams at least monthly, with a 95% confidence interval of 20% to 25%. The analysis used a quality effects method to reduce the influence of study quality on the estimates. Moderator analyses found no systematic bias from suspected sources of variability. These findings align with earlier estimates but are based on more robust evidence.

EEG oscillatory states as neuro-phenomenology of consciousness as revealed from patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states.

Consciousness and Cognition March 1, 2012 Alexander A Fingelkurts, Andrew A Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato et al. 91 citations

Resting electroencephalogram (EEG) microstates—brief, recurring patterns of brain activity—relate to levels of consciousness in brain-damaged patients and healthy individuals. A reduced number of microstate types was associated with altered consciousness, and unawareness corresponded to a lack of diversity in alpha-rhythmic microstates. Delta-, theta-, and slow-alpha-rhythmic microstates were more probable and longer during unawareness, whereas fast-alpha-rhythmic microstates were linked to consciousness. The findings suggest resting EEG can reveal neural correlates of consciousness, with potential implications for clinical care and medical-legal decisions for patients with disorders of consciousness.

Testing the involvement of the prefrontal cortex in lucid dreaming: A tDCS study

Consciousness and Cognition September 8, 2013 Tadas Stumbrys, Daniel Erlacher, Michael Schredl 88 citations

Applying transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) over the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during REM sleep increased dream lucidity in frequent lucid dreamers, though the effects were not strong. Nineteen participants spent three nights in a sleep laboratory; on the second and third nights they randomly received either 1 mA tDCS for 10 minutes or sham stimulation during each REM period starting with the second one. Self-ratings showed increased lucidity only in frequent lucid dreamers. The results provide preliminary support for the involvement of the DLPFC in lucid dreaming, but further research controlling for indirect effects and including other brain regions is needed.

Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia.

Consciousness and Cognition September 1, 2019 Mads Gram Henriksen, Josef Parnas, Dan Zahavi 82 citations

In consciousness research, the authors defend experiential minimalism, the view that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood) is a necessary, universal feature of all conscious experience. They refute claims that thought insertion in schizophrenia is a counterexample showing experiences without for-me-ness. Instead, they argue that thought insertion involves a disturbed, not absent, for-me-ness. The authors highlight unaddressed methodological and psychopathological problems in philosophical discussions of thought insertion and offer a novel account of how for-me-ness is disturbed in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, potentially contributing to the formation of thought insertion.

I overthink—Therefore I am not: An active inference account of altered sense of self and agency in depersonalisation disorder

Consciousness and Cognition April 28, 2022 Anna Ciaunica, Anil K. Seth, Jakub Limanowski et al. 76 citations

Depersonalisation disorder may arise when the brain fails to modulate sensory precision, leading to a loss of the normal sense of control over one's own perceptions and actions. The paper proposes that individuals with depersonalisation adopt the hypothesis that they are embodied perceivers who are not in control of their perception, while still recognizing that the controlling agent is themselves. This account uses predictive processing to explain the phenomenology of depersonalisation, including the feeling of being detached from one's own thoughts and actions. The analysis suggests specific psychophysical and physiological abnormalities that could underlie these experiences.

The Near-Death Experience Content (NDE-C) scale: Development and psychometric validation

Consciousness and Cognition November 1, 2020 Charlotte Martial, Jessica Simon, Ninon Puttaert et al. 69 citations

Two scales for measuring near-death experiences (NDEs) were evaluated. The original NDE scale showed several weaknesses. A new 20-item Near-Death Experience Content (NDE-C) scale was developed and validated, revealing a five-factor structure covering relevant dimensions. The NDE-C scale demonstrated very good internal consistency (Cronbach α = 0.85) and concurrent validity (correlations above 0.76). This new reliable scale should facilitate future research on NDEs.

The epistemic innocence of psychedelic states.

Consciousness and Cognition January 1, 2016 Chris Letheby 68 citations

The concept of 'epistemic innocence' holds that some flawed cognitive processes can still provide valuable knowledge otherwise unavailable. This idea is applied to psychedelic drugs, often dismissed as epistemically harmful due to their label 'hallucinogens'. The argument is that certain psychedelic states can be epistemically innocent, offering unique epistemic benefits despite their suboptimal nature. This conclusion has implications for psychedelic therapy policy and also refines the concept of epistemic innocence itself.

Investigating the interaction between schizotypy, divergent thinking and cannabis use

Consciousness and Cognition January 10, 2012 Gráinne Schäfer, Amanda Feilding, Celia J. A. Morgan et al. 60 citations

Cannabis acutely increases schizotypy and chronic use is linked to higher rates of psychosis. Creative individuals tend to have higher schizotypy, but the connection between cannabis, schizotypy, and creativity had not been studied. In 160 cannabis users tested sober and intoxicated, cannabis increased verbal fluency in low-creative individuals to the same level as high-creative individuals. Cannabis also increased state psychosis-like symptoms in both groups. High-creativity participants had significantly higher trait schizotypy, but this was not linked to the verbal fluency change. Acute cannabis use enhances divergent thinking, measured by verbal fluency, specifically in those with low trait creativity.

No iconic memory without attention.

Consciousness and Cognition February 1, 2016 Arien Mack, Muge Erol, Jason Clarke et al. 58 citations

More than half of participants failed to notice when a letter matrix was completely absent or distorted, a phenomenon called inattentional blindness. These findings provide strong evidence that iconic memory requires attention and that conscious perception does as well, contradicting the idea that iconic memory has a phenomenal experience component independent of attention.

Ketamine as a primary predictor of out-of-body experiences associated with multiple substance use

Consciousness and Cognition February 16, 2011 Leanne K. Wilkins, Todd A. Girard, J. Allan Cheyne 57 citations

Out-of-body experiences (OBEs) are linked to specific brain regions, but little is known about the neurochemical systems involved. Ketamine, a drug that produces dissociative effects, offers a way to study this. An online survey of 192 people found that both how often someone had used ketamine in their lifetime and whether they had OBEs while on ketamine were more strongly tied to how often they had OBEs and related experiences than other drugs were. The apparent effects of other drugs could mostly be explained by the fact that people who used them also tended to use ketamine. These findings suggest NMDA receptors play a role in OBEs.

Varieties of the extended self.

Consciousness and Cognition October 1, 2020 Richard Heersmink 56 citations

The boundaries of selves are fluid, shifting across biological, artifactual, and sociocultural structures. This analysis distinguishes minimal self, person, and narrative self, then surveys how philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists argue that embodiment, cognition, emotion, consciousness, and moral character can be extended, with implications for self-boundaries. It reviews criticisms of the extended self and focuses on the link between the extended mind and extended self, which has received the most attention, while also discussing accounts developed independently. The article concludes by drawing out conceptual, methodological, and normative implications and suggesting directions for future research.

EEG manifestations of nondual experiences in meditators.

Consciousness and Cognition January 1, 2015 Amanda E Berman, Larry Stevens 55 citations

Meditation's benefits are well documented, but its underlying mechanisms remain unclear due to a lack of unified taxonomy and confusion between practice methods and resulting states. This study aimed to identify Nondual Awareness—a theoretically universal culminating meditative state distinct from the method or practice state. Participants meditated in the lab while EEG patterns were recorded. During reported nondual events, EEG power was significantly higher in slower wave frequencies (delta, theta, alpha). These events were neurologically distinct from meditation sessions overall, which showed significant elevation in the gamma range.

A global workspace model for phenomenal and access consciousness.

Consciousness and Cognition June 1, 2010 Antonino Raffone, Martina Pantani 51 citations

A unifying global workspace model proposes that phenomenal and access consciousness arise from distinct yet interacting brain loops involving recurrent neural interactions. Feedback signaling onto sensory cortical maps is critical for phenomenal consciousness, while two forms of top-down attention—attention for perception and attention for access—play differential roles for phenomenal and access consciousness. The model was implemented as a neural network that simulated single and multiple visual object processing and the attentional blink.