First-Person Operationalism and Mental Taxonomy
Consciousness and Mind November 17, 2005 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198236979.003.0009 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a theory of consciousness must either accommodate, predict, remain neutral about, or explain away folk-psychological intuitions, and that any rejected intuition must be accounted for in terms of why it still seems compelling. |
Abstract
Abstract Any acceptable theory of consciousness must plainly satisfy two main constraints. It must, first of all, do reasonable justice to our commonsense, folk-psychological intuitions about consciousness and mentality. Some of these intuitions will be helpful in identifying just what phenomena the theory seeks to explain. Others the theory will predict, using its explanatory machinery. Still others the theory may be neutral about, avoiding any conflict between theory and intuition. Also, a theory may jettison certain intuitions, ruling in effect that they do not reflect the nature of conscious phenomena; but the theory must then explain why those intuitions, despite being mistaken, still strike us as compelling.