Cognitive Neuropsychology
January 1, 2020
Richard Brown, Joseph E LeDoux
26 citations
The Attention Schema Theory (AST) of consciousness attempts to unify Global Workspace Theory, Illusionism, and Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory. This response argues that AST misrepresents HOT by equating subjective experience with dualism and by presenting HOT as a form of strong illusionism, which it is not. HOT requires awareness of one's mental life through re-representation of lower-order states, but AST denies re-representing visual stimuli. An alternative unification is proposed: Global Workspace Theory and AST explain how lower-order states are assembled and maintained, while HOT accounts for subjective experience.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
July 6, 2026
Richard Brown
Higher-order theories of consciousness are empirical conjectures that can be tested and potentially falsified. The author examines what these theories imply about infant consciousness, focusing on Ned Block's argument that infants aged 6–11 months have conscious color experiences without possessing color concepts. The author contends that Block's argument does not disprove higher-order theories but instead raises empirical questions that could help distinguish between different versions of the theory or determine whether the approach is viable.
Psychology Travelogs
May 28, 2026
Richard Brown, Patricia L. Gerbarg
An innovative program called Breath-Body-Mind (BBM) is introduced to address the shortage of mental health professionals during war by providing an evidence-based, safe, and adaptable intervention. Combat-related stress and trauma are difficult to treat with conventional methods alone; BBM activates multiple healing pathways to mitigate autonomic dysregulation and neurophysiological dysfunction caused by extreme stress. It is easy to learn and has been effectively used worldwide during wars and mass disasters. BBM can be integrated into individual or group therapy, in-person or online, for civilians, military personnel, and medics, with potential benefits including improved battlefield survival, faster recovery from trauma, and better long-term reintegration into civilian life.
Consciousness as Representing One's Mind
July 1, 2025
Richard Brown
Phenomenal consciousness—the subjective, first-person experience of being—is the core phenomenon that any scientific theory of consciousness must explain. The author argues that the central task for the emerging field of cognitive neuroscience of consciousness is to evaluate and adjudicate among existing theories of human phenomenal consciousness, rather than focusing on secondary puzzles or methodological issues. This argument sets a clear explanatory target for future research in consciousness science.
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
October 29, 2019
Richard Brown
Higher-order theories explain phenomenal consciousness—the subjective 'what it is like' aspect of experience—by proposing that an organism is conscious when it has an appropriate inner awareness of its own mental states. Different versions of this approach vary in how they conceive that awareness: as inner perception, as a higher-order thought that transforms a first-order state (Relational Model), as a joint determination where higher- and first-order content belong to the same state (Same-Order and Split-Level Models), or as a non-relational state that directly determines conscious experience. Non-standard theories appeal to acquaintance or mental quotation. Contemporary psychology and neuroscience do not support inner perception, leading to the higher-order thought theory developed in the 1990s.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
September 1, 2019
Richard Brown, H. Lau, Joseph E LeDoux
The higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness is often misunderstood. This theoretical paper clarifies HOT's position, distinguishing it from global workspace theory and early sensory models. Critics have accused HOT of overintellectualizing consciousness, but the authors argue that the cognitive requirements for higher-order states are considerably less than often presumed, positioning HOT as intermediate between other views. Most HOT proponents do not equate consciousness with metacognition or confidence. Compared to other theories, HOT can better account for complex everyday experiences like emotions and episodic memories, making it useful for conceptualizing pathological mental states.
Nature Human Behaviour
February 1, 2019
M. Michel, Diane M Beck, N. Block et al.
Advancing scientific research on consciousness is important for addressing clinical and ethical issues in neurology and mental health. To support this field, funding priorities must be set carefully, and challenges such as job creation and media misrepresentation need to be addressed.
Cerebrum
January 1, 2018
Joseph E LeDoux, Richard Brown, D. Pine et al.
Studying subjective experience is a major challenge for cognitive scientists, but one that is now receiving more attention. Subjectivity makes experience harder to measure with traditional objective scientific methods than other topics. The authors argue that to truly understand the mind, subjectivity must eventually be investigated and understood.