Higher-order theories of consciousness have gained attention as of late. This is because we are in a position where we can begin to see how we would empirically falsify these kinds of theories. I view these kinds of theories as interesting empirical conjectures about the nature of phenomenal consciousness. If they are false, it will be for empirical reasons. There has been a long debate about...
This article introduces an innovative program to bridge the gap between the high demand for psychological services and the limited number of healthcare professionals during war. Combat-related stress and trauma are difficult to treat with conventional methods alone. Mind-body programs, specifically Breath-Body-Mind (BBM), activate multiple healing pathways to mitigate autonomic dysregulation...
Visual experience can sometimes depart from visual performance, providing a powerful lens into the mechanisms generating conscious perception. In one proposed dissociation—subjective inflation—unattended locations in the periphery appear stronger than attended ones despite equated performance. Subjective inflation has played a central role in motivating theories of consciousness that reject the...
Abstract Understanding consciousness has presented a long-standing challenge to the science of the mind. There are many interesting phenomena, unanswered questions, and challenging methodological puzzles in the scientific study of consciousness. As a result, there are many avenues for research in consciousness science. At the core of them all is phenomenal consciousness. The author will argue...
Abstract In the next three chapters the author will develop the Higher-Order Representation of a Representation, or HOROR, theory of phenomenal consciousness. In this chapter, the author discuss issues about higher-order representationalism and HOROR at a very general level. In Chapter 3, the author focuses on the content that the author takes the HORORs to have in more detail. In Chapter 4,...
Abstract The goal of this book is to introduce and explore one of the most wildly counter-intuitive ideas about the nature of consciousness on the market. This is the idea that consciousness might ultimately turn out just to be representing one’s own mental life—and what’s more, that the right kind of representation might itself be something more like a thought than it is like a picture or...
Abstract While not exactly higher-order theories in the sense invoked here (i.e., in the sense of attempting to explain phenomenal consciousness), it is helpful to start with views that invoke acquaintance before turning to specific versions of relational higher-order theories. In section 7.1, the author begins by discussing a related view that appeals to acquaintance and non-physical qualia....
Abstract In section 4.1, the author argues that the only reasons to take a theory of consciousness seriously are empirical. In section 4.2, the author examines the question of how we should map our psychological states to neural states. In section 4.2.1, the author examines the relation of HOROR theory to the prefrontal cortices. In section 4.2.2, the author does the same with respect to the...
Abstract We have now set out the HOROR theory as the author sees it and given some indication of the empirical status of the theory. Overall, the author thinks it is safe to say that it is so far consistent with what we know, hasn’t been falsified, but also hasn’t passed any major empirical hurdles directed directly against it. Though, as we also saw, there are some in the works as the author...
Abstract In this chapter, the author will argue that the purely non-relational versions of the traditional approach have a problem specifying which of one’s various mental states is the state-conscious state. Since non-relational higher-order theories are traditional in the sense that they aim to give an account of state-consciousness, this puts the theory in some hot water. Mixed...
In the interesting and thought-provoking article Grazziano and colleagues argue for their Attention Schema Theory (AST) of consciousness. They present AST as a unification of Global Workspace Theory (GWT), Illusionism, and the Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory. We argue it is a mistake to equate 'subjective experience,' ad related terms, with dualism. They simply denote experience. Also, as...
Higher-order theories are theories of phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is the property of there being something that it is like for one to have an experience. Something that it is like from the point of view of the organism. According to the higher-order approach, an organism is phenomenally conscious just in case it has an appropriate kind of inner awareness of itself as...
The higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness has often been misunderstood by critics. Here, we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views, such as the global workspace theory (GWT) and early sensory models (e.g., first-order local recurrency theories). For example, HOT has been criticized for overintellectualizing consciousness. We show that, while...
Scientific research on consciousness is critical to multiple scientific, clinical, and ethical issues. The growth of the field could also be beneficial to several areas including neurology and mental health research. To achieve this goal, we need to set funding priorities carefully and address problems such as job creation and potential media misrepresentation.
Critics have often misunderstood the higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness. Here we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views such as the global workspace theory (GWT) and early sensory models, such as first-order local recurrency theory. The criticism that HOT overintellectualizes conscious experience is inaccurate because in reality the theory assumes...
Editor’s Note The study of subjective experience represents a significant challenge to cognitive scientists, but one that is beginning to be increasingly addressed. Subjectivity renders experience less amenable to traditional objective scientific measurements than other subject matter. Our authors believe that when seeking to understand the mind, subjectivity must ultimately be investigated and...
Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system...
In this paper I examine the dispute between Hakwan Lau, Ned Block, and David Rosenthal over the extent to which empirical results can help us decide between first-order and higher-order theories of consciousness. What emerges from this is an overall argument to the best explanation against the first-order view of consciousness and the dispelling of the mythological notion of phenomenological...