The Higher-Order Representation of a Representation (HOROR) Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness
Consciousness as Representing One's Mind July 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197784006.003.0003 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Proposes and seeks to clarify a "Higher-Order Representation of a Representation" (HOROR) theory of phenomenal consciousness, which holds that conscious experiences involve higher-order representations of first-order representations. The author states the aim is to clarify the theory and identify empirical challenges rather than to defend its superiority over rival accounts. |
Abstract
Abstract In the next three chapters the author will develop the Higher-Order Representation of a Representation, or HOROR, theory of phenomenal consciousness. In this chapter, the author discuss issues about higher-order representationalism and HOROR at a very general level. In Chapter 3, the author focuses on the content that the author takes the HORORs to have in more detail. In Chapter 4, the author evaluates the HOROR theory from an empirical standpoint. The author’s primary goal is not to defend the theory from rivals or argue for its superiority. The author’s interests lie in clarifying what the theory holds, as well as the ways in which it might be challenged empirically.
Citations in the library
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