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The myth of phenomenological overflow.

Richard Brown

Consciousness and Cognition July 22, 2011 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.06.005 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Humans Awareness Consciousness Perception Psychological theory Empirical research
Key points Argues that an inference to the best explanation from empirical results favors higher-order theories of consciousness over the first-order view, and contends that the notion of 'phenomenological overflow' should be dispelled as mythological.

Abstract

In this paper I examine the dispute between Hakwan Lau, Ned Block, and David Rosenthal over the extent to which empirical results can help us decide between first-order and higher-order theories of consciousness. What emerges from this is an overall argument to the best explanation against the first-order view of consciousness and the dispelling of the mythological notion of phenomenological overflow that comes with it.

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