Non-Relational Versions of Traditional Higher-Order Theories
Consciousness as Representing One's Mind July 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197784006.003.0007 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that purely non-relational higher-order theories cannot specify which mental state is the state-conscious state, and that mixed non-relational views may address this but rely on implausible, ad hoc assumptions; proposes converting these differences into empirical predictions. |
Abstract
Abstract In this chapter, the author will argue that the purely non-relational versions of the traditional approach have a problem specifying which of one’s various mental states is the state-conscious state. Since non-relational higher-order theories are traditional in the sense that they aim to give an account of state-consciousness, this puts the theory in some hot water. Mixed non-relational views, which aim to establish some sort of substantial targeting relation between first-order and higher-order states/contents (with identity being the strongest relation), may solve the problem of which state is the conscious state, but require implausible and ad hoc assumptions. The author will aim to turn these various differences into possible empirical predictions. In the next chapter we will turn to relational versions of the traditional higher-order thought accounts.
Citations in the library
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