Trends in Cognitive Sciences
June 1, 2026
Patrick Butlin, Robert Long, Tim Bayne et al.
Rapid progress in artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities has drawn fresh attention to the prospect of consciousness in AI. There is an urgent need for rigorous methods to assess AI systems for consciousness, but significant uncertainty about relevant issues in consciousness science. We present a method for assessing AI systems for consciousness that involves exploring what follows from...
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 17, 2026
Claudia Passos-Ferreira, David J. Chalmers
Abstract We surveyed attendees at two leading conferences on consciousness, asking for their views on central issues concerning infant consciousness. These include questions about whether newborns are conscious, when consciousness and self-consciousness emerge, where in the brain the neural basis of infant consciousness is found, what sorts of consciousness infants may have, and how best to...
Nature
June 1, 2025
Oscar Ferrante, Urszula Gorska-Klimowska, Simon Henin et al.
94 citations
Different theories explain how subjective experience arises from brain activity1,2. These theories have independently accrued evidence, but have not been directly compared3. Here we present an open science adversarial collaboration directly juxtaposing integrated information theory (IIT)4,5 and global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT)6-10 via a theory-neutral consortium11-13. The theory...
bioRxiv Preprint Server
June 23, 2023
Oscar Ferrante, Urszula Gorska-Klimowska, Simon Henin et al.
preprint
Different theories explain how subjective experience arises from brain activity1,2. These theories have independently accrued evidence, yet, confirmation bias and dependence on design choices hamper progress in the field3. Here, we present an open science adversarial collaboration which directly juxtaposes Integrated Information Theory (IIT)4,5 and Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT)6–10,...
PLoS One
February 10, 2023
Lucia Melloni, Liad Mudrik, Michael Pitts et al.
106 citations
The relationship between conscious experience and brain activity has intrigued scientists and philosophers for centuries. In the last decades, several theories have suggested different accounts for these relationships. These theories have developed in parallel, with little to no cross-talk among them. To advance research on consciousness, we established an adversarial collaboration between...
arXiv Preprint Archive
May 5, 2021
David J. Chalmers, Kelvin J. McQueen
Does consciousness collapse the quantum wave function? This idea was taken seriously by John von Neumann and Eugene Wigner but is now widely dismissed. We develop the idea by combining a mathematical theory of consciousness (integrated information theory) with an account of quantum collapse dynamics (continuous spontaneous localization). Simple versions of the theory are falsified by the...
Oxford University Press eBooks
October 7, 2010
David J. Chalmers
234 citations
This chapter analyzes aspects of the relationship between consciousness and intentionality. It focuses on the phenomenal character and the intentional content of perceptual states, canvassing various possible relations among them. It argues that there is a good case for a sort of representationalism, although this may not take the form that its advocates often suggest. By mapping out some of...
Oxford University Press eBooks
October 7, 2010
David J. Chalmers
38 citations
This chapter addresses the question: how can we isolate the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) in the absence of a “consciousness meter,” which measures consciousness directly? The obvious answer is that we rely on verbal reports and other behavioral indicators of consciousness. Importantly, the use of these indicators tacitly relies on pre-experimental principles that connect these...
Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge
2007
David J. Chalmers
95 citations
Abstract Philosophers have reacted in different ways to the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold that there is an explanatory gap for now, but that it will eventually be closed. Some hold that the explanatory gap corresponds to an ontological gap in nature. This chapter explores another reaction to the...
The MIT Press eBooks
October 25, 2002
David J. Chalmers
156 citations
I will discuss one aspect of the role that neuroscience plays in the search for a theory of consciousness. Whether or not neuroscience can solve all the problems of consciousness singlehandedly, it undoubtedly has a major role to play. Recent years have seen striking progress in neurobiological research bearing on the problems of consciousness. The conceptual foundations of this sort of...