Consciousness as Representing One's Mind
July 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197784006.001.0001 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Proposes that consciousness may be a matter of representing one's own mental life, with the relevant representation being more thought-like than image-like, and introduces a novel version of higher-order theory termed the 'HOROR' (higher-order representation of a representation) theory. Also develops a taxonomy of existing higher-order theories to clarify their relations and the empirical evidence that would challenge them. |
Abstract
Abstract The goal of this book is to introduce and explore one of the most wildly counter-intuitive ideas about the nature of consciousness on the market. This is the idea that consciousness might ultimately turn out just to be representing one’s own mental life—and what’s more, that the right kind of representation might itself be something more like a thought than it is like a picture or image. The aim of the book is twofold. The first is to set out a novel version of higher-order theory called the HOROR—higher-order representation of a representation—theory. The second is to develop a taxonomy of existing higher-order theories that sheds light on their relations to one another and makes clear what kind of empirical evidence would—or wouldn’t—challenge them.
Citations in the library
Cited by 4
- Is “Consciousness” a folk psychological concept? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences August 12, 2026
- The Nonrelational Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness Defended American Philosophical Quarterly July 1, 2026
- On consciousness in animals and in artificial intelligence. Journal of Neurophysiology April 1, 2026
- Neuroscience undermines the higher-order theorists’ preferred solution to the targetless HOT problem Philosophical Psychology February 15, 2026
Cites 42
- On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State Science September 7, 2006
- Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 2007
- Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory Philosophical Psychology September 27, 2011
- Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument Canadian Journal of Philosophy March 1, 2003
and 37 more in the library