HOROR in the Brain
Consciousness as Representing One's Mind July 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197784006.003.0005 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that only empirical reasons should determine whether a theory of consciousness is taken seriously, and develops specific neural implementations of the HOROR theory of consciousness, including a distinction between sparse and rich versions, while reviewing existing empirical support and the case for subjective inflation. |
Abstract
Abstract In section 4.1, the author argues that the only reasons to take a theory of consciousness seriously are empirical. In section 4.2, the author examines the question of how we should map our psychological states to neural states. In section 4.2.1, the author examines the relation of HOROR theory to the prefrontal cortices. In section 4.2.2, the author does the same with respect to the sensory cortices. In section 4.2.3, the author takes up the question of the neural coding of HORORs. In section 4.2.4, the author looks at the argument against conceptual representations based on fears that the cortex cannot handle the required amount. In section 4.3, the author puts all this together and begins to spell out specific neural implementations of the specific versions of the HOROR theory. Of particular interest is the distinction between sparse and rich HOROR theories developed in section 4.3.1. Finally in section 4.4, the author examines the existing empirical support for HOROR theory. The author ends the chapter, in section 4.4.1, by discussing the case for subjective inflation.