Relational Versions of Traditional Higher-Order Theories
Consciousness as Representing One's Mind July 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197784006.003.0008 (opens in new tab)
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AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that relational higher-order theories of consciousness can be categorized into pure relationalist 'spotlight views' and joint-determination views, and that these theories may be empirically differentiated. Proposes that examining acquaintance-based views and specific models like Mental Quotation and Perceptual Reality Monitoring clarifies the theoretical landscape. |
Abstract
Abstract While not exactly higher-order theories in the sense invoked here (i.e., in the sense of attempting to explain phenomenal consciousness), it is helpful to start with views that invoke acquaintance before turning to specific versions of relational higher-order theories. In section 7.1, the author begins by discussing a related view that appeals to acquaintance and non-physical qualia. This will set the theme for our discussion. In section 7.2, the author examines several versions of pure relationalism, what the author has called spotlight views. As of now there are five such views. (1) Mental Quotation (discussed in section 7.2.2), (2) non-representational intentionality (what the author calls ‘Attentional Sifting’ (7.2.3), (3) dual-content theory (7.2.4), and the latest addition, Perceptual Reality Monitoring (7.2.5). Afterward we turn to the comparatively few versions of the joint-determination view. A classic version of the view is the traditional higher-order perception theory (7.3.1). We then discuss a more recent version of this kind of view, which is called the Higher-Order State Space model (7.3.2). Then in the final section, 7.4.1, the author discusses the ways we might empirically differentiate these views.
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