Constructing a Scientific Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness
Consciousness as Representing One's Mind July 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197784006.003.0002 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractPhenomenal consciousness—the subjective, first-person experience of being—is the core phenomenon that any scientific theory of consciousness must explain. The author argues that the central task for the emerging field of cognitive neuroscience of consciousness is to evaluate and adjudicate among existing theories of human phenomenal consciousness, rather than focusing on secondary puzzles or methodological issues. This argument sets a clear explanatory target for future research in consciousness science.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that phenomenal consciousness is the primary explanatory target for a theory of consciousness and that cognitive neuroscience should arbitrate among existing theories. |
Abstract
Abstract Understanding consciousness has presented a long-standing challenge to the science of the mind. There are many interesting phenomena, unanswered questions, and challenging methodological puzzles in the scientific study of consciousness. As a result, there are many avenues for research in consciousness science. At the core of them all is phenomenal consciousness. The author will argue that phenomenal consciousness is the primary explanatory target for a theory of consciousness. The central challenge for the emerging cognitive neuroscience of consciousness is to arbitrate, insofar as it can, among currently existing theories of human phenomenal consciousness.