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Constructing a Scientific Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness

Richard Brown

Consciousness as Representing One's Mind July 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197784006.003.0002 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that phenomenal consciousness is the primary explanatory target for a theory of consciousness and that cognitive neuroscience should arbitrate among existing theories.

Abstract

Abstract Understanding consciousness has presented a long-standing challenge to the science of the mind. There are many interesting phenomena, unanswered questions, and challenging methodological puzzles in the scientific study of consciousness. As a result, there are many avenues for research in consciousness science. At the core of them all is phenomenal consciousness. The author will argue that phenomenal consciousness is the primary explanatory target for a theory of consciousness. The central challenge for the emerging cognitive neuroscience of consciousness is to arbitrate, insofar as it can, among currently existing theories of human phenomenal consciousness.