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PsyArXiv

278 papers in the library · 33 citations · publishing 2018-2026

Papers

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Public Skepticism about AI Consciousness

PsyArXiv October 29, 2026 Ali Ladak, Lucius Caviola preprint

Most people think that current AI systems, such as ChatGPT, lack consciousness—the capacity for subjective experience. But what about future AI systems so advanced that their behavior, appearance, and functionality are indistinguishable from humans? Across one main and four supplementary preregistered experiments (total N = 3,455), participants imagined interacting with such systems in...

What artificial minds would need to remember

PsyArXiv October 28, 2026 Burhan Ogut, Michelle Yin preprint

The debate over machine consciousness has been dominated by top-down approaches that extract indicator properties from theories of consciousness. Developmental cognitive psychology, which has characterized how self-related capacities are assembled in humans, has been largely absent. We propose the Autobiographical Architecture Model (AAM), a five-layer developmental framework in which embodied...

Don't just do something, sit there! Decisiveness as a product of mindfulness and acceptance traits

PsyArXiv October 23, 2026 Christopher Jon Anderson, Steven Jay Lynn preprint

Decisiveness, the capacity to commit to difficult choices, has traditionally been studied through cognitive and motivational frameworks, leaving the role of one's relationship to inner experience open. Two studies examine dispositional mindfulness, acceptance, and regret sensitivity as predictors of decisiveness. In Study 1 (n = 64), all three significantly predicted decisiveness. In Study 2 (n...

Induction and Overreach in the Science of Consciousness

PsyArXiv October 22, 2026 Matthew Phillip Gunn, Christine Minton, Chienyem Nweke preprint

Induction shapes consciousness science as researchers infer experience, generalizing neural signatures, and project across contexts. While deduction sets ideals of certainty, induction guides experimentation and decision-making. This article provides a synoptic analysis of induction’s role in consciousness science by surveying its philosophical background, from Aristotle and Hume to Popper,...

Comparing the temporal dynamics of top-down mindfulness and bottom-up reward systems in optimizing cognitive functioning

PsyArXiv October 13, 2026 Preslava Hristova, Silvy Collin preprint

Optimizing human cognitive functioning requires a delicate balance between top-down self-regulation and bottom-up motivational reinforcement. However, the precise temporal trade-offs between these opposing trajectories (specifically, immediate reward-driven gains versus gradual mindfulness-based structural adaptation) remain poorly understood. Using a mixed longitudinal design, we assessed...

Mental health of preadolescents in western Ukraine: feasibility and acceptability of a school-based psychosocial intervention during war

PsyArXiv October 9, 2026 Oleksandr Avramchuk, Olha Germanovych, Olha Ivanenko et al. preprint

Background: Children living in conflict zones experience high levels of psychological distress. Schools can provide an accessible setting for support, yet evidence on the effectiveness of school-based interventions in active war contexts remains limited. Objectives: To evaluate children’s well-being and internal coping resources during the war in Ukraine and to examine the feasibility of a...

Hybrid Consciousness and the Cultural Evolution of Leadership

PsyArXiv October 3, 2026 Rebekah Senānāyaka preprint

Ninety percent of human societies practise institutionalised alterations of consciousness. Across independent traditions, communities that develop governed protocols for sustained engagement with non-human organisms produce practitioners whose hybrid consciousness becomes the basis of social authority. Drawing on 27 months of apprenticeship-based fieldwork in the Peruvian and Colombian Amazon...

What is it like for matter to matter?

PsyArXiv October 1, 2026 David Vandenheever preprint

Consciousness research often asks where, when, or under what conditions neural processing becomes conscious. Here I introduce the Distributed Architecture of Valenced Evaluation (DAVE), which starts from a different premise. Nervous systems continuously represent states in terms of what those states imply for the organism, and these evaluations are physically instantiated in dispositions that...

From Self to Others? Testing Whether Brief Mindfulness Reduces Intergroup Bias through Decentering or Self-Compassion

PsyArXiv September 28, 2026 Gabriela Górska, Paweł Holas preprint

AbstractBrief mindfulness reliably changes how individuals relate to their own internal experiences, but whether these intrapersonal changes generalize to intergroup responding remains unclear. This preregistered experiment (N = 91) examined whether mindfulness-related processes—decentering and compassionate self-responding—were associated with socio-affective responses toward in-group and...

Brain–Environment Rhythmic Coupling: An Interdisciplinary Review of Rhythm Synchronization between the brain and the environment

PsyArXiv September 23, 2026 Farzaneh Behzadi, Amir Kalantarifard, Dylan Chau Huynh et al. preprint

Rhythm is a fundamental aspect of both architectural design and brain–body dynamics, yet research across these domains remains fragmented and largely descriptive. The absence of a shared conceptual framework limits systematic investigation of how architectural rhythms interact with human brain–body dynamics and may influence cognition and behavior. Drawing on enactivism and the concept of...

Overcoming essentialism: evaluation of theories of consciousness by the lawful regularities they predict

PsyArXiv September 8, 2026 Mathis Bassler, Cyriel M A Pennartz preprint

A common objection to consciousness research is that researchers cannot agree on what consciousness is. But how should a consensus on the nature of consciousness be reached? Does consciousness have essential features that one can be right or wrong about? Should we select theories of consciousness based on their descriptions of the essential features of experience alone? In this article, we will...

Reconsidering the Exclusion of Langerian Mindfulness: A Commentary on Chems-Maarif et al. (2025)

PsyArXiv September 8, 2026 Peter Aungle, Francesco Pagnini preprint

Objectives. Chems-Maarif et al. (2025) propose a refined definition of mindfulness for psychological science and exclude Langer’s socio-cognitive construct on the grounds that it is empirically differentiated from Buddhist-inspired conceptualizations. This commentary offers a perspective on that exclusion.Methods. We examine two questions. First, what does the factor-analytic separation between...

From synergy to redundancy: An information-relation account of consciousness

PsyArXiv September 4, 2026 Andrés Canales-Johnson, Daniel Rebbin, Borjan Milinkovic et al. preprint

Research on the neural basis of consciousness has largely focused either on where and when neural activity represents conscious contents, or on the interactions through which distributed neural populations become integrated. We argue that these approaches can be connected by analysing information relations among neural representations. A perceptual content can be synergistic when it is carried...

Toward a Layered Framework of Environmental Experience: Integrating Sensory, Perceptual, and Semantic Processes

PsyArXiv September 2, 2026 Dylan Chau Huynh, Aja Khalid Hussein, Farzaneh Behzadi et al. preprint

Environmental experience is shaped by sensory stimulation, perceptual organization, and semantic meaning, yet these dimensions are often studied in isolation or reduced to broad environmental categories. This fragmentation limits our ability to explain how environments are experienced, how bottom-up and top-down processes interact, and how person-environment relations can be studied in a...

The perceived role of consciousness in moral status attributions

PsyArXiv August 31, 2026 Rony Hirschhorn, Niccolò Negro, Liad Mudrik preprint

Determining which entities deserve moral consideration is crucial to policy debates about animal welfare and artificial intelligence regulation. A common assumption is that consciousness is a key criterion for moral status, often considered to be necessary or sufficient for it. However, it is unclear whether public attitudes also share this assumption. In a large, preregistered study (N=1493),...

Consciousness and emotions in non-human animals: Are laypeople more or less skeptical than experts?

PsyArXiv August 28, 2026 Bastian Jaeger, Stefan Leach, Matthew Zipple preprint

Consciousness and the capacity to experience affective states, such as pain, pleasure, fear, and hunger (i.e., sentience) are seen as key determinants of an individual’s moral status, a view that is shared by scientists, philosophers, and laypeople. Whether (and which) non-human animals are believed to possess these capacities can therefore have important consequences for how they are treated....

Empowering Educators: Teacher–Researcher Co-Development of a Classroom-Based Mindfulness Intervention

PsyArXiv August 25, 2026 preprint

Teacher stress and burnout can affect teacher well-being, classroom functioning, and student outcomes, yet school-based mindfulness interventions (MBIs) may be difficult to sustain without attention to feasibility, social validity, and cultural and contextual fit. Twelve elementary teachers collaborated in the development and adaptation of an MBI for teacher self-practice and classroom...

From Extended Minds to Coupling Flexibility: Cognitive Eco-Sourcing and Generative AI in Education

PsyArXiv August 22, 2026 Laura Desirée Di Paolo preprint

Debates about generative artificial intelligence (AI) in education often oppose enhancement to diminishment. This framing obscures important differences in how learners recruit AI and how cognitive labour is distributed between agents and technological resources. We introduce cognitive eco-sourcing as a framework for analysing these relations. It distinguishes four non-parallel and potentially...