Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2024
Niccolò Negro
19 citations
The neuroscience of consciousness is accelerating empirically through adversarial collaborations that test rival theories. This paper argues that consciousness science should be paired with confirmation theory, the philosophical study of evidence and hypotheses, to understand how experiments challenge or validate theories. Using Lakatos's philosophy of science, the author proposes a model of theory-appraisal built on three criteria: the distinction between prediction and accommodation, the structural relevance of predictions, and the boldness of predictions. This Lakatosian model offers both normative and descriptive advantages, advancing the debate by considering theories' diachronic development, logical structure, and relationship with background knowledge.
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2023
Marius Usher, Niccolò Negro, Hilla Jacobson et al.
7 citations
The Unfolding Argument (UA) against causal structure theories of consciousness relies on unwarranted assumptions that express a behaviorist methodology, despite its proponents' claims. The same reasoning can be applied to functionalist approaches, proving too much and deeming a wide range of non-causal structure theories unscientific. The authors argue that the UA's philosophical assumptions are overly restrictive and fit poorly with common practice in cognitive neuroscience. They propose a more inclusive methodology for consciousness science that incorporates neural, behavioral, and phenomenological evidence from the first-person perspective. Theories of consciousness should be tested and evaluated on humans, not on systems considerably different from us, thus restricting the range of systems rather than the methodology.
Philosophy of Science
August 27, 2025
Niccolò Negro, Liad Mudrik
4 citations
Attributing consciousness to nonstandard systems such as animals, neural organoids, and artificial intelligence requires a robust justificatory framework. This article argues that analogical abduction—a reasoning method that combines analogical and abductive elements—is the strongest approach for extrapolating consciousness from humans to these systems. The argument from analogy and inference to the best explanation, taken individually, fail to meet the criteria for successful extrapolations. Analogical abduction offers a promising alternative, though limitations in current consciousness science remain. The article clarifies the argumentative structure behind such attributions, which is important for evaluating their validity.
Synthese
June 19, 2025
Niccolò Negro
1 citation
Understanding consciousness requires describing its relational and structural properties, a view called phenomenal structuralism. This paper distinguishes three types: methodological, epistemological, and metaphysical structuralism. It critically evaluates metaphysical structuralism, which claims that the phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by its relational properties, and presents three arguments demonstrating its inadequacy. However, this critique does not affect the fruitfulness of methodological and epistemological structuralism. The analysis clarifies that these latter forms can contribute to consciousness science without heavy and counterintuitive metaphysical commitments.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
July 6, 2026
Niccolò Negro
Analogical abduction combines analogical reasoning with inference to the best explanation to justify claims about consciousness in others. This paper applies that method to fetuses at the end of the second trimester, using a three-step recipe. Given the best minimal model of adult human consciousness and current evidence on fetal brain architecture, the argument supports the conclusion that these fetuses are probably not conscious. The work also shows both the strengths and limits of analogical abduction as a theory-light tool for detecting consciousness across different populations.
Erkenntnis
June 1, 2024
Niccolò Negro
The integrated information theory (IIT) identifies consciousness with integrated information, and is often interpreted as endorsing panpsychism—the view that consciousness is a fundamental, widespread feature of reality. This paper argues instead that IIT is better understood as a form of emergentism, which is incompatible with panpsychism. The author shows that the properties of integrated information that seem to support panpsychism—intrinsicality and fundamentality—actually align with emergentism. The paper then analyzes how integrated information can be seen as causally emerging from a physical substrate, depending on the fusion of cause-effect powers of that substrate while being autonomous through global-to-local determination. Consciousness, on this view, is the constraining power of a system as a whole upon itself, emerging from the fusion of its components' powers.
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2024
Ignacio Cea, Niccolò Negro, Camilo Miguel Signorelli
Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness (IIT) 4.0 faces two ontological problems: the intrinsicality 2.0 problem and the engineering problem. These problems suggest that genuinely existing conscious entities could depend on, and be engineered from, entities that do not objectively exist—a contradiction, since something that lacks objective existence cannot serve as the material basis for entities that do exist independently. The root cause is IIT's equation of true existence with phenomenal existence (consciousness) and its consequent exclusion of non-conscious physical entities from objective reality. These problems indicate that IIT must reconsider the ontological status of such extrinsic entities, which must exist objectively to account for the theory's own permissible scenarios.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
October 16, 2023
Ignacio Cea, Niccolò Negro, Camilo Miguel Signorelli
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0 rejects the mainstream view that consciousness is generated by the brain, instead positing that consciousness is ontologically primary and the physical domain is merely operational. This idealistic ontology is underdeveloped and creates a tension with the theory's simultaneous endorsement of realism about an external world independent of mind. The authors argue that IIT's idealistic ontology should be understood as a combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism about Φ-structures and complexes, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. After refuting three potential solutions, they propose that IIT's realism is best interpreted as a non-solipsistic idealist realism—the assertion of other experiences beyond one's own.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
August 3, 2022
Niccolò Negro
In consciousness science, theories differ in whether they start from experimental data or phenomenological data. The Integrated Information Theory (IIT), a prominent phenomenology-first approach, uses a self-evidencing explanation that begins with consciousness itself to explain consciousness. While this circular reasoning can be virtuous, IIT faces a data-fitting problem: there is insufficient information to determine whether its explanatory hypotheses are the best available. This issue, termed the self-evidencing problem, parallels the roadblock faced by experiment-driven approaches, where no current model is clearly superior. A possible solution for IIT is proposed.
The Behavioral and brain sciences
March 23, 2022
Niccolò Negro
Integrated information theory (IIT) attempts to explain consciousness, but Merker and colleagues contend its formal structure does not align with subjective experience. This commentary argues that they do not fully clarify how IIT's postulates are derived from its axioms. A reformulated version of this problem is proposed, which could offer a new perspective on IIT's usefulness for studying consciousness.
Phenomenology and Mind
September 17, 2018
Niccolò Negro
The paper argues that the justification for using third-person mathematical methods to study consciousness, which is inherently subjective, may be found in a particular interpretation of the second-person perspective. It briefly outlines how Integrated Information Theory (IIT), a leading contemporary theory of consciousness, could align with this interpretation, suggesting a philosophical bridge between objective scientific frameworks and subjective experience.
Ignacio Cea, Niccolò Negro, Pedro A. M. Mediano et al.
preprint
The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0 defines minimal conscious entities called 'monads' as single-unit systems with maximal integrated information (phi_s*). This paper argues that IIT's own formalism cannot apply to monads because it requires any candidate substrate of consciousness to consist of at least two non-overlapping, non-empty, jointly exhaustive parts—the Plurality requirement. Monads violate this requirement, making the equations for calculating system integrated information undefined. The authors call for clarification or revision from IIT proponents regarding the status of phi-monads as ontologically fundamental building blocks and minimal substrates of consciousness.
Ignacio Cea, Niccolò Negro, Camilo Miguel Signorelli
preprint
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0 proposes that consciousness is the fundamental reality, not something generated by the brain, and that the physical world is merely a tool for describing it. This idealistic ontology, however, is underdeveloped and creates a tension with the theory's simultaneous claim that an external world exists independently of our minds. The authors clarify this ontology as a combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism about Φ-structures, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. They then reject three potential resolutions to the tension and argue that the most plausible solution is a non-solipsistic idealist realism: the external world consists of other conscious experiences beyond one's own.