ISSN 0165-0106
10 papers in the library · 1 citation · publishing 2022-2026
Erkenntnis July 2, 2026 Miguel Egler
Abstract What makes some intuitions more skilful than others? To answer this question, I first argue that prominent phenomenalist views of intuition—which define intuitions as mental states with a unique phenomenology—cannot capture the distinction between skilful and unskilful intuitions. I then propose a desideratum for an account of skilful intuition: they must address the problem of...
Erkenntnis June 1, 2026 Daniel Giberman
Zombies are non-conscious physical duplicates of conscious physical entities. It has been argued that the conceivability of zombies supports their (metaphysical) possibility (Chalmers in The conscious mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996; in The two-dimensional argument against materialism, pp 414–201, 2010a, in The character of consciousness, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010b)....
Erkenntnis May 14, 2026 Yaron Wolf
Abstract Does experience itself unfold in time? This paper defends an extensional account of temporal consciousness—on which the temporal properties we directly experience match the temporal properties of experience itself—while drawing upon features of agential awareness. After showing that recent debate on the ability of introspection to settle the question about the temporal properties of...
Erkenntnis May 9, 2026 Mahammad Ayvazov
Abstract This paper addresses a fundamental tension in contemporary epistemology: how finite cognitive agents achieve reliable knowledge despite operating under severe informational constraints. Drawing from the statistical learning concept of the bias-variance tradeoff, I argue that human epistemic success depends not on minimizing error through optimal model selection, but on achieving what I...
Erkenntnis April 15, 2026 J. L. McINTYRE 1 citation
Abstract This paper argues that if an artificial system realizes consciousness, then it’s likely to realize not just one, but many independent minds at once. This view is motivated by analogy to split-brain cases, in which the two hemispheres of a patient’s brain are functionally disconnected. While there are several ways to interpret this phenomenon, it’s highly plausible that split-brain...
Erkenntnis February 21, 2026 Jacopo Pallagrosi
Recent discussions of acquaintance typically assume three claims: (i) acquaintance is a form of knowledge of qualitative character, (ii) acquaintance constitutes phenomenal consciousness, and (iii) necessarily, mental qualities are phenomenally conscious. This paper argues that, although each claim is independently attractive, together they generate a trilemma. Drawing on a general...
Erkenntnis February 16, 2026 Marcelino Botin, Markel Kortabarria
Abstract Grounding is a non-reductive relation which promises to help physicalists deal with the hard problem of consciousness. Grounding physicalists, however, are yet to face the new challenge for physicalism, which consists of explaining our substantive phenomenal knowledge. Among the difficulties posed by this challenge, grounding physicalists struggle the most in accounting for revelation,...
Erkenntnis April 1, 2025 Leonard Dung
Abstract If a machine attains consciousness, how could we find out? In this paper, I make three related claims regarding positive tests of machine consciousness. All three claims center on the idea that an AI can be constructed “ad hoc”, that is, with the purpose of satisfying a particular test of consciousness while clearly not being conscious. First, a proposed test of machine consciousness...
Erkenntnis June 1, 2024 Niccolò Negro
AbstractThe integrated information theory (IIT) is an ambitious theory of consciousness that aims to provide both a neuroscientific and a metaphysical account of consciousness by identifying consciousness with integrated information. In the philosophical literature, IIT is often associated with a panpsychist worldview. In this paper, I show that IIT can be considered, instead, as a form of...
Erkenntnis 2022 Clare Mac Cumhaill
I present a novel anti-sceptical BIV argument by focusing on conditions on the production and use of the locative preposition 'in'. I distinguish two uses of 'in'-material and descriptive phenomenological-and I explain in what respect movement is central to the concept that our use of 'in' expresses. I go on to argue that a functionalist semantics of the intelligible use of 'in' demands a...