Erkenntnis
July 2, 2026
Miguel Egler
Abstract What makes some intuitions more skilful than others? To answer this question, I first argue that prominent phenomenalist views of intuition—which define intuitions as mental states with a unique phenomenology—cannot capture the distinction between skilful and unskilful intuitions. I then propose a desideratum for an account of skilful intuition: they must address the problem of...
Erkenntnis
June 1, 2026
Daniel Giberman
Zombies are non-conscious physical duplicates of conscious physical entities. It has been argued that the conceivability of zombies supports their (metaphysical) possibility (Chalmers in The conscious mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996; in The two-dimensional argument against materialism, pp 414–201, 2010a, in The character of consciousness, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010b)....
Erkenntnis
May 14, 2026
Yaron Wolf
Abstract Does experience itself unfold in time? This paper defends an extensional account of temporal consciousness—on which the temporal properties we directly experience match the temporal properties of experience itself—while drawing upon features of agential awareness. After showing that recent debate on the ability of introspection to settle the question about the temporal properties of...
Erkenntnis
May 9, 2026
Mahammad Ayvazov
Abstract This paper addresses a fundamental tension in contemporary epistemology: how finite cognitive agents achieve reliable knowledge despite operating under severe informational constraints. Drawing from the statistical learning concept of the bias-variance tradeoff, I argue that human epistemic success depends not on minimizing error through optimal model selection, but on achieving what I...
Erkenntnis
April 15, 2026
J. L. McINTYRE
1 citation
Abstract This paper argues that if an artificial system realizes consciousness, then it’s likely to realize not just one, but many independent minds at once. This view is motivated by analogy to split-brain cases, in which the two hemispheres of a patient’s brain are functionally disconnected. While there are several ways to interpret this phenomenon, it’s highly plausible that split-brain...
Erkenntnis
February 21, 2026
Jacopo Pallagrosi
Recent discussions of acquaintance typically assume three claims: (i) acquaintance is a form of knowledge of qualitative character, (ii) acquaintance constitutes phenomenal consciousness, and (iii) necessarily, mental qualities are phenomenally conscious. This paper argues that, although each claim is independently attractive, together they generate a trilemma. Drawing on a general...
Erkenntnis
February 16, 2026
Marcelino Botin, Markel Kortabarria
Abstract Grounding is a non-reductive relation which promises to help physicalists deal with the hard problem of consciousness. Grounding physicalists, however, are yet to face the new challenge for physicalism, which consists of explaining our substantive phenomenal knowledge. Among the difficulties posed by this challenge, grounding physicalists struggle the most in accounting for revelation,...
Erkenntnis
April 1, 2025
Leonard Dung
Abstract If a machine attains consciousness, how could we find out? In this paper, I make three related claims regarding positive tests of machine consciousness. All three claims center on the idea that an AI can be constructed “ad hoc”, that is, with the purpose of satisfying a particular test of consciousness while clearly not being conscious. First, a proposed test of machine consciousness...
Erkenntnis
November 24, 2024
Liam D. Ryan
Some philosophers argue that mental properties are ontologically distinct from physical properties and that, therefore, physicalism ought to be rejected. There are philosophers who feel the force of this challenge but who wish to maintain their physicalism. They suggest that mentality is grounded in inscrutable properties or ‘incrutables’: properties that are not revealed through physical...
Erkenntnis
June 1, 2024
Niccolò Negro
AbstractThe integrated information theory (IIT) is an ambitious theory of consciousness that aims to provide both a neuroscientific and a metaphysical account of consciousness by identifying consciousness with integrated information. In the philosophical literature, IIT is often associated with a panpsychist worldview. In this paper, I show that IIT can be considered, instead, as a form of...
Erkenntnis
May 5, 2024
Umut Baysan
In the contemporary literature on panpsychism, one often finds the claim that a Russellian-monist version of panpsychism, i.e., Russellian panpsychism, is a superior view compared to alternative non-physicalist theories. The argument for this claim is that while Russellian panpsychism can integrate consciousness in the causal order and explain mental causation, alternative theories fail to do...
Erkenntnis
August 17, 2023
Ivar Labukt
1 citation
Abstract I present some problems for phenomenal (i.e. consciousness-based) accounts of personal identity and egoistic concern. These accounts typically rely on continuity in the capacity for consciousness to explain how we survive ordinary periods of unconsciousness such as dreamless sleep. I offer some thought experiments where continuity in the capacity for consciousness does not seem...
Erkenntnis
2022
Clare Mac Cumhaill
I present a novel anti-sceptical BIV argument by focusing on conditions on the production and use of the locative preposition 'in'. I distinguish two uses of 'in'-material and descriptive phenomenological-and I explain in what respect movement is central to the concept that our use of 'in' expresses. I go on to argue that a functionalist semantics of the intelligible use of 'in' demands a...
Erkenntnis
December 9, 2021
Martina Fürst
The cognitive phenomenology debate centers on two questions. (1) What is an apt characterization of the phenomenology of conscious thought? And (2), what role does this phenomenology play? I argue that the answers to the former question bear significantly on the answers to the latter question. In particular, I show that conservatism about cognitive phenomenology is not compatible with the view...
Erkenntnis
July 24, 2021
Camden Alexander Mckenna
4 citations
Abstract I argue for constraining the nomological possibility space of temporal experiences and endorsing the Succession Requirement for agents. The Succession Requirement holds that the basic structure of temporal experience must be successive for agentive subjects, at least in worlds that are law-like in the same way as ours. I aim to establish the Succession Requirement by showing...