Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
June 20, 2021
Adam Safron
53 citations
Explaining goal-directed behavior may require rethinking mental homunculi and Cartesian theaters as embodied self-models (ESMs)—body maps with agentic properties that function as predictive-memory systems and cybernetic controllers. ESMs are proposed as a major organizing principle for neural architectures, providing foundational inductive biases that constrain inference spaces during cognitive and affective development. Drawing on the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference, the account describes how consciously imagined goal states influence action selection via predictive coding and backward-chained imaginings. Embodied experience supplies empirical priors, and bidirectional linkages between sensory modalities and frontal-parietal control hierarchies infuse perception with somatic-motoric properties, solving frame problems. The manuscript offers neurophenomenological treatments of qualia like pleasure, pain, and desire, and argues that radically embodied minds create foundations for intelligence, consciousness, and will.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
May 30, 2020
Johannes Kleiner
37 citations
Mathematical models of consciousness often lack a clear justification for their formal structure. This article provides that justification by examining what makes phenomenal experience suitable for mathematical representation. It derives a general mathematical framework grounded in the epistemic context of consciousness—specifically, the non-collatability of experience and the structure of phenomenal space. The framework shows how key characteristics of conscious experience imply particular mathematical structures, allowing theory-building to go beyond what standard philosophical methodology alone can achieve. The result is a formal foundation that can guide the development and evaluation of specific mathematical models of consciousness.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
May 14, 2020
Michael Silberstein, William Stuckey
21 citations
The authors argue that conscious experience and fundamental physics are most deeply related through a metaphysical starting point called neutral monism, specifically the variant from William James and Bertrand Russell. Rather than treating physics as fundamental, they derive key features of relativity and quantum mechanics from two axioms grounded in neutral monism, suggesting a unity between these theories. They claim that biases toward property dualism and reductive dynamical explanation create the hard problem of consciousness and the explanatory gap, as well as unresolved issues in physics like the measurement problem and quantum entanglement. The paper aims to resolve these problems and offer a more intuitive model of the relationship between conscious experience and physics.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
February 26, 2025
Lea Gassab, Onur Pusuluk, Marco Cattaneo et al.
8 citations
This perspective article categorizes quantum models of consciousness into three groups based on the brain level at which quantum mechanics might operate: electron delocalization within microtubules, the brain's electromagnetic field, or neurotransmitter-mediated interactions between neurons. The authors focus on the Posner model of cognition, presenting preliminary calculations on how entanglement of phosphate molecules is preserved within the geometric structure of Posner clusters. The work suggests that quantum information theory can improve understanding of brain functions.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
March 27, 2024
Tom Froese
8 citations
The mind and body are one but not the same, related in a way that is efficacious yet non-reducible, non-observable, and non-intelligible. This proposal treats the mind as a hidden 'black box' coupled to the body, introducing two concepts: irruption, where the unobservable mind makes a difference to observable matter, and absorption, where observable matter makes a difference to the unobservable mind. These concepts align with information-theoretic neuroscience, measuring cognitive activity and subjective qualia via entropy and compression respectively. The theory offers responses to the hard problem of consciousness and mental causation from first principles, aiming to set the agenda for future mind sciences.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
July 28, 2020
Matthew Owen
8 citations
Mental causation is central to integrated information theory (IIT), which holds that consciousness exists because it is causally efficacious. This article surveys three problems for mental causation—the lack of psychophysical laws, the causal exclusion problem, and the causal pairing problem—and assesses their threat to IIT under different metaphysical commitments. Three versions of IIT are distinguished: reductive, non-reductive, and non-physicalist. The lack of psychophysical laws appears unthreatening to all versions. Reductive and non-reductive IIT are seriously threatened by the exclusion problem, and it is difficult to see how they could overcome it while maintaining the causal closure principle. Non-physicalist IIT denies that principle but faces the pairing problem, for which a response is briefly outlined. The survey aims to clarify which commitments lead to which problems.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
September 13, 2023
Ivanna Montoya, Daniel Montoya
7 citations
A biologically inspired neural network (BNN) made from human cortical cells learned to predict a digital ball's trajectory and move a paddle, with performance improving as sensory information increased. Among theories of neural correlates of consciousness, only Information Integration Theory (IIT) allows for the possibility that such a BNN could be conscious, because its Φ value is greater than zero. IIT holds that any system capable of integrating information has some degree of phenomenal consciousness. The real-time neural activity responding to environmental stimuli, together with the pattern of increased information density leading to better performance, suggests the BNN could be conscious, raising psychological, philosophical, and ethical questions.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
October 31, 2021
Jonathan W D Mason
7 citations
Phenomenal unity is a key property of consciousness but often poorly defined. This paper introduces model unity: a system has model unity when a single relational model covering the whole system is optimal; otherwise, unity may exist only at a higher level. As part of expected float entropy minimisation theory, relational models interpret system states and may explain why visual experience is unified and why separate people do not share unified consciousness. Four example investigations are given, along with a postulate that distills the foundations of EFE minimisation into a clear statement for evaluating whether it identifies a self-evident fundamental property of consciousness.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
January 19, 2025
Giulio Ruffini, Francesca Castaldo, Jakub Vohryzek
6 citations
Tracking natural data forces an agent to mirror the symmetry properties of the generative world model, enforcing a hierarchical organization in the agent's neural network consistent with the manifold hypothesis. Using Lie pseudogroups to formalize invariance in natural data and drawing parallels to Noether's theorem, the study shows that data tracking constrains both the agent's constitutive parameters and dynamical repertoire. This bridges algorithmic information theory, symmetry, and dynamics, offering insights into neural correlates of agenthood and structured experience, as well as AI and brain model design.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
May 29, 2026
Zoe Lee-Youngzie, Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Michael Robinson et al.
4 citations
A structural approach to consciousness models qualia—the qualities of experience—by examining either the internal organization of parts within an experience or the external relations between experiences. Integrating these two perspectives is a key step toward understanding phenomenally unified global experience. This paper describes both types of structural models and their category-theoretic formalizations, then proposes a sheaf-theoretic framework that maps mereological parts of experience to empirical measures of their qualia. Applying the framework to visual space demonstrates a formal description of experience's structure and conditions for phenomenal unity. The approach supports an empirical research program linking local and global phenomenal qualities.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
October 27, 2020
Adrian Kent
4 citations
A fascinating approach highlights how consciousness and material physics can mutually influence each other through higher-level structures. Using probabilistic toy models based on cellular automata, the exploration involved 100 simulations to illustrate these concepts. The findings suggest that integrating top-down causation could bridge quantum theory with classical physics or general relativity. This perspective aligns with a form of panprotopsychism, proposing that both consciousness and physical phenomena possess dual properties that interact dynamically, offering fresh insights into the nature of reality.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
June 24, 2025
Abir U Igamberdiev
3 citations
Meaningful information is reality in potential form; its actualization increases a system's negentropy. Biological evolution expands meaningful information by generating new coding systems (codepoiesis), where evolutionary changes gain functional value through interpretation that yields a meaningful function. Complexification corresponds to generating new meaningful information and developing new structures with functions. Each biological function has meaning within its environmental context, and the evolutionary search for new meanings establishes sustainable non-equilibrium as an attractor, maximizing power through synergistic effects. At higher organizational levels, innovations emerge as niche construction, behavioral choices, and cognition. The growth of meanings is part of an expanding information system formed by organisms, expanding greatly with consciousness, which incorporates the world's image into knowledge acquisition and enables global civilization.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
August 22, 2023
Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen
3 citations
Resilience, a fundamental property of cognitive systems, is tied to their autopoietic (self-maintaining) organization and helps preserve their identity against disturbances. The autopoietic theory of Maturana and Varela rejects traditional Shannon information as irrelevant to cognition. This paper proposes an alternative: an affordance-based view of information from radical cognitive science that avoids that critique. It argues that social influence on how affordances are used is key to understanding resilience in the informational relations within the human cognitive ecology.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
April 24, 2025
Prakash Chandra Kavi, Gorka Zamora-López, Daniel Ari Friedman et al.
2 citations
A computational model called the Thoughtseeds Framework simulates thought dynamics during focused-attention Vipassana meditation. It treats thoughts as dynamic attentional agents organized in a hierarchy of nested Markov blankets across three levels: knowledge domains, a network where thoughtseeds compete, and meta-cognition that regulates awareness. The model generates four states—breath control, mind wandering, meta-awareness, and redirecting to breath—through self-organizing interactions. Expert meditators sustain control dominance, reinforcing focused attention, while novices show frequent and prolonged mind wandering, reflecting instability. The framework integrates Global Workspace Theory and active inference to explain how meta-awareness shapes a unitary meditative experience, offering testable predictions about meditation skill development.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
March 25, 2025
Chris Percy, Andrés Gómez-Emilsson
2 citations
Neuroscientific theories of consciousness must address how separate micro-units of information combine into a single, unified conscious experience—the phenomenal binding problem. This paper examines how Integrated Information Theory (IIT) v4.0 offers a solution by proposing that particular entities called 'complexes' define existence. While this works in a static framework, it creates difficulties when applied to dynamic systems. The authors identify a dilemma for IIT: non-local entity transitions versus contiguous selves, termed the 'dynamic entity evolution problem.' Three potential ways IIT could dissolve this dilemma are described. The paper contributes to IIT's shift from static to dynamic analysis.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
January 28, 2025
Francis Heylighen, Shima Beigi
1 citation
Local prospect theory (LPT) proposes that consciousness relies on uncertainty, not just accurate prediction. The brain creates a "local prospect"—a range of possible futures shaped by subjective experience—from which an agent freely chooses how to respond. Consciousness is a self-sustaining loop of neural activity that forms a temporary working memory, allowing thoughts and feelings from different brain modules to interact non-linearly, unlike automatic unconscious processes. Entropy-based measures, such as the determination of actions by conditions and the breadth of prospect, quantify the range of considered possibilities. The framework explains Buddhist mindfulness and meditation as broadening consciousness and reducing automatic reactions by lessening conditioning. The prospect measure could be operationalized through action variety, perception breadth, and behavioral unpredictability for empirical testing.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
September 5, 2024
Don M Tucker, Phan Luu
Intelligence arises from patterns of connections among neurons, whether in brains or machines. Brains develop continuously as experience shapes their neural connections. Active inference theory suggests that sentient systems organize themselves by minimizing free energy, a process of informatic self-evidencing. This implies that the mind can be described in information terms independent of its physical substrate. At a certain complexity level, self-evidencing becomes hierarchical and reentrant, leading to consciousness as a good regulator. These principles indicate that adequate reconstruction of an individual human brain's computational dynamics is possible through neuromorphic computational emulation.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
May 28, 2024
Hartmut Neven, Adam Zalcman, Peter Read et al.
Conscious experience may emerge from quantum mechanical superpositions, a groundbreaking idea that suggests the structure of these superpositions shapes our experiences. This theory posits that quantum entanglement resolves the binding problem, creating a unified phenomenal experience. In a proposed series of experiments involving brain organoids and xenon anesthesia, the aim is to explore these connections further. With a focus on brain-computer interfaces, this approach could potentially enhance human consciousness, offering innovative avenues for understanding the physical substrate of consciousness.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
April 4, 2026
William G. P. Mayner, William Marshall, Giulio Tononi
Integrated information theory (IIT) begins with the fact of consciousness and identifies its essential features: every experience is intrinsic, specific, unitary, definite, and structured. The theory then translates these features into operational terms based on the cause-effect power of a substrate of units. To have cause-effect power intrinsically and specifically, substrate units in their current state must both (i) ensure the intrinsic availability of a repertoire of cause-effect states and (ii) increase the probability of a specific cause-effect state. A previous study showed that requirement (ii) can be measured by the intrinsic difference of a state's probability from maximal differentiation.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
April 1, 2026
Kelvin J. McQueen, Ian T. Durham, Markus P Müller
A proposed theory linking wave-function collapse to integrated information would require placing a minimal system—a feedback dyad—into a superposition of states that differ in their associated conscious states. The authors prove a structural constraint on collapse dynamics of a standard (Lindblad) type: if collapse is governed by too few collapse operators, collapse rates cannot in general depend solely on qualitative differences between conscious states. Avoiding this limitation requires introducing many commuting operators, leading to a rapid proliferation of collapse terms even for very simple systems. This proliferation makes such theories experimentally intractable and applies broadly to any Wigner-style collapse theory that distinguishes experiences using rich internal organization.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
September 5, 2024
Zenan Ruan, Hengwei Li
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is a prominent candidate for a theory of consciousness, but it has faced criticism for failing to meet expectations. This paper argues that IIT operates on two levels: a second level that claims to anchor consciousness directly, and a first level that deals with autonomous systems or systems with critical complexity. The gap between these levels, along with IIT's panpsychist tendency, underlies the criticisms. The authors contend that IIT's problems are not pseudoscientific and that by adding necessary elements to combine the two levels, IIT can move toward a theory of consciousness that provides necessary and sufficient interpretations.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
July 30, 2024
John Sanfey
Consciousness cannot be integrated with physics without proven causal power, making it an epiphenomenon—the 'hard problem'. Integrated Information Theory (IIT) attempts to bypass this by equating subjective experience with informational physical structures whose cause-and-effect power exceeds their parts, but its focus on spatial structures rather than temporal events introduces a deep flaw, including in its measure Φ (phi). Correcting this requires incorporating the temporal feature that experiencer and experienced exist simultaneously, not separated in time. Simultaneous causation is impossible in physics, yet deductive proof shows consciousness has causal power because this simultaneity makes some facts logically possible that otherwise would not be. Bypassing the hard problem has drawn criticism to IIT, but returning to complexity theory could repurpose its model to measure temporally rather than spatially related causal connections.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
January 31, 2024
Pavel Kraikivski
The brain creates its own internal representations of time and space, which may differ from external time and space. This work presents a mechanistic model of interconnected processes that encode phenomenal representations of space and time, elaborating how these processes bind together. A stochastic version of the model explores how binding strength interacts with noise, using spectral entropy to characterize noise effects. Results show that spectral entropy values for strongly bound systems are similar to those for weakly bound or decoupled systems, indicating that the binding mechanism is resilient to noise.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
December 8, 2023
Johnjoe Mcfadden
A comparison of three theories of consciousness—the conscious electromagnetic information field (cemi field) theory, integrated information theory (IIT), and global workspace theory (GWT)—evaluates how well each predicts which entities, structures, states, and dynamics are conventionally recognized as conscious or nonconscious. The cemi field theory shares features with both IIT and GWT but is argued to be more successful at carving nature at its conventionally accepted joints between conscious and nonconscious systems, making it a more successful theory of consciousness.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
October 16, 2023
Ignacio Cea, Niccolò Negro, Camilo Miguel Signorelli
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0 rejects the mainstream view that consciousness is generated by the brain, instead positing that consciousness is ontologically primary and the physical domain is merely operational. This idealistic ontology is underdeveloped and creates a tension with the theory's simultaneous endorsement of realism about an external world independent of mind. The authors argue that IIT's idealistic ontology should be understood as a combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism about Φ-structures and complexes, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. After refuting three potential solutions, they propose that IIT's realism is best interpreted as a non-solipsistic idealist realism—the assertion of other experiences beyond one's own.