Neurosci Conscious
August 27, 2021
Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Joanna Szczotka, Robert Prentner
93 citations
Different models of consciousness subscribe to different notions of explanation, use different tools, and aim to explain different phenomena, making direct comparison difficult. A framework is presented that compares models along three minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation, and target of explanation. The approach may help identify driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, and experimental predictions, and points toward more integrative theoretical research where axiomatic models could resolve current contradictions.
May 27, 2021
Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Joanna Szczotka, Robert Prentner
13 citations
preprint
Current models of consciousness are not universally accepted on theoretical or empirical grounds, and direct comparison is difficult because they differ in what counts as a satisfactory explanation, the tools they use, and the phenomena they aim to explain. A framework is presented for comparing models along three minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation, and target of explanation. The empirical consequences of these discrepancies are discussed. The approach may help identify driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, and experimental predictions, and improve the design of future tests. The conclusion advocates for more integrative theoretical research, where axiomatic models may resolve current contradictions.
Entropy (Basel)
March 5, 2021
Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Quanlong Wang, Ilyas Khan
12 citations
Consciousness is treated as fundamental and characterized by other-dependence, meaning conscious processes are defined by their relations to one another. A mathematical framework using compact closed categories is introduced, where morphisms represent these co-dependent conscious processes. This compositional model naturally incorporates other-dependence and may help avoid the hard problem of consciousness while addressing the combination problem of conscious experiences.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
August 29, 2022
Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Ignacio Cea, Robert Prentner
8 citations
Integrated information theory (IIT) aims to explain consciousness by linking its subjective structure to physical systems without reducing it to neural activity alone. This article identifies ambiguities in IIT, particularly tensions between its claim that experience is ontologically and epistemologically primary and its goal of explaining consciousness in physical, operational terms. The authors propose ways to resolve these issues and suggest alternative explanatory approaches—mathematical, processual, and autonomy-based—that may better guide future models of consciousness. The goal is to clarify points of contention for both supporters and critics of IIT.
Consciousness and Cognition
October 1, 2021
Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Quanlong Wang, Bob Coecke
4 citations
A mathematical framework using the graphical calculus of process theories (symmetric monoidal categories with Frobenius algebras) provides an ontologically neutral language to model aspects of consciousness. A toy example demonstrates how this axiomatic approach recovers features of conscious experience, including the distinction between external and internal subjective perspectives, the privacy or unreadability of personal subjective experience, and phenomenal unity—a key challenge for scientific studies of consciousness. These features emerge naturally from the compositional structure of the calculus.
Elife
October 13, 2025
Guylaine Hoffner, Pablo Castro, Lynn Uhrig et al.
Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) applied to the prefrontal cortex alters the dynamic organization of functional connectivity in the primate brain, with effects depending on the state of consciousness. In awake macaques, cathodal tDCS disrupted the repertoire of connectivity patterns, increased structure-function correlation, decreased Shannon entropy, and favored transitions toward anatomically based patterns. Under deep sedation, anodal tDCS significantly altered brain pattern distribution and reduced structure-function correlation. The stimulation also modified dynamic connectivity arrangements typically associated with consciousness and unconsciousness. These findings suggest that prefrontal tDCS can modulate brain dynamics differently in conscious and unconscious states, offering insights into mechanisms relevant to disorders of consciousness.
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2024
Ignacio Cea, Niccolò Negro, Camilo Miguel Signorelli
Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness (IIT) 4.0 faces two ontological problems: the intrinsicality 2.0 problem and the engineering problem. These problems suggest that genuinely existing conscious entities could depend on, and be engineered from, entities that do not objectively exist—a contradiction, since something that lacks objective existence cannot serve as the material basis for entities that do exist independently. The root cause is IIT's equation of true existence with phenomenal existence (consciousness) and its consequent exclusion of non-conscious physical entities from objective reality. These problems indicate that IIT must reconsider the ontological status of such extrinsic entities, which must exist objectively to account for the theory's own permissible scenarios.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
October 16, 2023
Ignacio Cea, Niccolò Negro, Camilo Miguel Signorelli
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0 rejects the mainstream view that consciousness is generated by the brain, instead positing that consciousness is ontologically primary and the physical domain is merely operational. This idealistic ontology is underdeveloped and creates a tension with the theory's simultaneous endorsement of realism about an external world independent of mind. The authors argue that IIT's idealistic ontology should be understood as a combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism about Φ-structures and complexes, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. After refuting three potential solutions, they propose that IIT's realism is best interpreted as a non-solipsistic idealist realism—the assertion of other experiences beyond one's own.
arXiv Preprint Archive
June 30, 2021
Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Quanlong Wang, Bob Coecke
Consciousness can be described using a mathematical language called process theory, which uses diagrams to represent how experiences combine. This approach treats consciousness as a compositional system, where basic elements combine to create complex experiences. The mathematical framework naturally explains several features of conscious experience, including the distinction between external and internal subjective experience, the privacy of personal experience, and phenomenal unity—how different sensations feel like they belong to one unified experience. A toy example demonstrates how this axiomatic approach recovers these features without needing to add them separately. The work suggests that these puzzling aspects of consciousness may arise naturally from the compositional structure of experience itself.
arXiv Preprint Archive
July 31, 2020
Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Quanlong Wang, Ilyas Khan
Consciousness is treated as fundamental and characterized by other-dependence, meaning conscious processes are defined by their relations to one another. A mathematical framework using compact closed categories is introduced, where morphisms represent conscious processes composed of generators specified by their interrelations. This compositional model may help avoid the hard problem of consciousness and address the combination problem of conscious experiences.
bioRxiv Preprint Server
June 4, 2020
Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Lynn Uhrig, Morten L. Kringelbach et al.
preprint
Anesthesia disrupts the brain's hierarchical organization, which may be a key mechanism behind loss of consciousness. By analyzing resting-state fMRI data from awake and anesthetized macaques, the authors found that anesthesia reduces the flexibility and richness of brain dynamics, making them more rigid and driven by brain structure. The depth of anesthesia and the specific anesthetic agent used both modulate these effects. Spatial and temporal aspects of cortical hierarchy are affected differently, involving distinct brain networks. The findings suggest that a breakdown in brain hierarchy is a new signature of unconsciousness.
Ignacio Cea, Niccolò Negro, Camilo Miguel Signorelli
preprint
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0 proposes that consciousness is the fundamental reality, not something generated by the brain, and that the physical world is merely a tool for describing it. This idealistic ontology, however, is underdeveloped and creates a tension with the theory's simultaneous claim that an external world exists independently of our minds. The authors clarify this ontology as a combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism about Φ-structures, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. They then reject three potential resolutions to the tension and argue that the most plausible solution is a non-solipsistic idealist realism: the external world consists of other conscious experiences beyond one's own.
Ignacio Cea, Niccolò Negro, Pedro A. M. Mediano et al.
preprint
The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0 defines minimal conscious entities called 'monads' as single-unit systems with maximal integrated information (phi_s*). This paper argues that IIT's own formalism cannot apply to monads because it requires any candidate substrate of consciousness to consist of at least two non-overlapping, non-empty, jointly exhaustive parts—the Plurality requirement. Monads violate this requirement, making the equations for calculating system integrated information undefined. The authors call for clarification or revision from IIT proponents regarding the status of phi-monads as ontologically fundamental building blocks and minimal substrates of consciousness.