Skip to content

Ignacio Cea

7 papers in the library · 33 citations · publishing 2022-2026

Papers

Sort Most recent Most cited

Rejecting the “formless stuff” response to the origin of consciousness problem for IIT 4.0

Límite May 31, 2026 Ignacio Cea

This paper examines and ultimately rejects a proposed solution to a problem arising from the ontological commitments of Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0, particularly its claim that only conscious entities truly exist. This commitment generates the “origin of consciousness problem”: if non-conscious entities are denied genuine existence, how could consciousness evolve from non-conscious...

From Insentient Allostasis to Adaptive Bodily Selfhood: Conscious vs Unconscious Instrumental Interoceptive Inference

Adaptive Behavior April 18, 2026 Ignacio Cea

The pre-reflective experience of being a body is a fundamental component of consciousness and selfhood. A leading account from the perspective of active inference is Seth and Tsakiris’ (2018, see also Seth, 2021, 2024) proposal that this experience arises from instrumental interoceptive inference (III), namely the nervous system’s interoceptive predictions about the sensory consequences of...

Only consciousness truly exists? Two problems for IIT 4.0's ontology.

Frontiers in Psychology 2024 Ignacio Cea, Niccolò Negro, Camilo Miguel Signorelli

In this article we present two ontological problems for the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness 4.0: what we call the (i) the intrinsicality 2.0 problem, and (ii) the engineering problem. These problems entail that truly existing, conscious entities can depend on, and be engineered from, entities that do not objectively exist, which is problematic: if something does not exist in...

The Fundamental Tension in Integrated Information Theory 4.0's Realist Idealism.

Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) October 16, 2023 Ignacio Cea, Niccolò Negro, Camilo Miguel Signorelli

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is currently one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. Here, we focus specifically on a metaphysical aspect of the theory's most recent version (IIT 4.0), what we may call its idealistic ontology, and its tension with a kind of realism about the external world that IIT also endorses. IIT 4.0 openly rejects the mainstream view that...

We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic

Neuroscience of Consciousness August 29, 2022 Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Ignacio Cea, Robert Prentner 8 citations

Models of consciousness need to explain both the objective correlates of conscious experience as well as its subjective structure. However, such an explanation would not need to entail a reduction exclusively in terms of physical or neural systems. A model that intends to avoid such reduction is integrated information theory (IIT). In this article, we discuss the explanatory rationale of IIT,...

"I am feeling tension in my whole body": An experimental phenomenological study of empathy for pain.

Frontiers in Psychology 2022 David Martínez-pernía, Ignacio Cea, Alejandro Troncoso et al. 25 citations

Traditionally, empathy has been studied from two main perspectives: the theory-theory approach and the simulation theory approach. These theories claim that social emotions are fundamentally constituted by mind states in the brain. In contrast, classical phenomenology and recent research based on the enactive theories consider empathy as the basic process of contacting others' emotional...

Phi-monads are conceptually problematic and mathematically undefined in Integrated Information Theory 4.0

Ignacio Cea, Niccolò Negro, Pedro A. M. Mediano et al. preprint

The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0 is an influential framework aiming to explain consciousness mathematically in terms of intrinsic existence, namely what exists for itself in a specific, maximally irreducible, structured form. IIT thus posits that the minimal substrates of consciousness are also the ultimate building blocks of what exists. These are called ‘monads’, and are defined as...