Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2022
David Martínez-pernía, Ignacio Cea, Alejandro Troncoso et al.
25 citations
Empathy for pain involves direct bodily perception and sensation, not just mental states. In an experimental phenomenological study, 28 adults watched videos of extreme-sport accidents and then underwent phenomenological interviews. Four main themes emerged: bodily resonance (kinesthetic and affective sensations coordinated with the athlete's actions), attentional focus (either on one's own discomfort or the athlete's pain), kinesthetic motivation (avoidance or helping impulses), and temporal fluctuations in experience. Two experiential structures were identified: a self-centered empathic experience focused on personal discomfort and self-protection, and an other-centered empathic experience focused on the athlete's suffering with prosocial motivation. The findings support an enactive, embodied view of empathy and extend enactive theory to non-interactive social contexts.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
August 29, 2022
Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Ignacio Cea, Robert Prentner
8 citations
Integrated information theory (IIT) aims to explain consciousness by linking its subjective structure to physical systems without reducing it to neural activity alone. This article identifies ambiguities in IIT, particularly tensions between its claim that experience is ontologically and epistemologically primary and its goal of explaining consciousness in physical, operational terms. The authors propose ways to resolve these issues and suggest alternative explanatory approaches—mathematical, processual, and autonomy-based—that may better guide future models of consciousness. The goal is to clarify points of contention for both supporters and critics of IIT.
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2024
Ignacio Cea, Niccolò Negro, Camilo Miguel Signorelli
Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness (IIT) 4.0 faces two ontological problems: the intrinsicality 2.0 problem and the engineering problem. These problems suggest that genuinely existing conscious entities could depend on, and be engineered from, entities that do not objectively exist—a contradiction, since something that lacks objective existence cannot serve as the material basis for entities that do exist independently. The root cause is IIT's equation of true existence with phenomenal existence (consciousness) and its consequent exclusion of non-conscious physical entities from objective reality. These problems indicate that IIT must reconsider the ontological status of such extrinsic entities, which must exist objectively to account for the theory's own permissible scenarios.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
October 16, 2023
Ignacio Cea, Niccolò Negro, Camilo Miguel Signorelli
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0 rejects the mainstream view that consciousness is generated by the brain, instead positing that consciousness is ontologically primary and the physical domain is merely operational. This idealistic ontology is underdeveloped and creates a tension with the theory's simultaneous endorsement of realism about an external world independent of mind. The authors argue that IIT's idealistic ontology should be understood as a combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism about Φ-structures and complexes, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. After refuting three potential solutions, they propose that IIT's realism is best interpreted as a non-solipsistic idealist realism—the assertion of other experiences beyond one's own.
Ignacio Cea, Niccolò Negro, Camilo Miguel Signorelli
preprint
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0 proposes that consciousness is the fundamental reality, not something generated by the brain, and that the physical world is merely a tool for describing it. This idealistic ontology, however, is underdeveloped and creates a tension with the theory's simultaneous claim that an external world exists independently of our minds. The authors clarify this ontology as a combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism about Φ-structures, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. They then reject three potential resolutions to the tension and argue that the most plausible solution is a non-solipsistic idealist realism: the external world consists of other conscious experiences beyond one's own.
Ignacio Cea, Niccolò Negro, Pedro A. M. Mediano et al.
preprint
The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0 defines minimal conscious entities called 'monads' as single-unit systems with maximal integrated information (phi_s*). This paper argues that IIT's own formalism cannot apply to monads because it requires any candidate substrate of consciousness to consist of at least two non-overlapping, non-empty, jointly exhaustive parts—the Plurality requirement. Monads violate this requirement, making the equations for calculating system integrated information undefined. The authors call for clarification or revision from IIT proponents regarding the status of phi-monads as ontologically fundamental building blocks and minimal substrates of consciousness.