Review of Philosophy and Psychology
June 17, 2026
Darius Parvizi-Wayne, Rasmus Pedersen, Jules Rankin
Abstract Despite our proclivity to make either tacit or overt passage of time judgments in daily life, insufficient work has been done to uncover the neurocognitive mechanisms underpinning such determinations. A prima facie promising account of passage of time judgments derives from the predictive processing framework. More precisely, Hohwy et al. (2016) propose that the reported speed of the...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
March 28, 2026
Mcarthur Mingon, Alexander James Gillett, John Sutton
Abstract Although wayfinding is a central domain for 4E research, much work on spatial cognition and navigation still operates within an internalist framework. This is particularly damaging in evaluating the cognitive impact of technologies like Global Positioning Systems (GPS), where negative assessments about ‘de-skilling’ and the digital disruption of biocognitive spatial memory capacities...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
March 3, 2026
Mads J. Dengsø
Abstract ‘Modern times’ are consistently associated with a sense of temporal acceleration and disruption brought on by the breakneck speed of modern sociotechnology. But how does modern sociotechnology impact our sense of time and temporality? This paper seeks to establish the relationship between human time and technology in order to explain the contemporary phenomenon of temporal disruption....
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
March 1, 2026
Francesca Righetti, Bastien Perroy
Abstract Temporal disorientation in episodic memory includes recalling episodes we struggle to posit in time. In this paper, we theorize how this disorientation arises by arguing for a constrained functional analogy between mental time travel and spatial navigation. We characterize temporal orientation as coordination between egocentric anchors and temporal structure (order, interval, and...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
November 11, 2025
Gabriel Siegel
Abstract The sense of agency is the experience of predicting, initiating, or controlling actions. In this paper, I provide a novel account of the sense of agency that appears in perceptual consciousness. I follow theorists such as Bayne and Prinz in suggesting that the perceptual sense of agency (PSoA) is underpinned by self-monitoring processes. The self-monitoring mechanism compares sensory...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
February 3, 2025
Victor Lange
Abstract Mindfulness is a large research field, involving disciplines such as philosophy, cognitive psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience, and Buddhist studies. Despite this widespread interest, one question remains unanswered: Is there a psychological capacity that is essential to mindfulness and which demarcates mindfulness from most other mental activities? The most promising idea is that...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
2025
Julian Kiverstein, Mark Miller, Erik Rietveld
The predictive processing theory refers to a family of theories that take the brain and body of an organism to implement a hierarchically organized predictive model of its environment that works in the service of prediction-error minimization. Several philosophers have wondered how belief-like states of prediction account for the conative role desire plays in motivating a person to act. A...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
March 1, 2024
Adriana Alcaraz-Sánchez
AbstractRecently, the construct ‘lucid dreamless sleep’ has been proposed to explain the state of ‘clear light’ described by Tibetan Buddhist traditions, a special state of consciousness during deep sleep in which we’re told to be able to recognise the nature or essence of our mind (Padmasambhava & Gyatrul 2008; Ponlop 2006; Wangyal 1998). To explain the sort of awareness experienced during...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
October 10, 2023
Paweł Gładziejewski
11 citations
Abstract Psychedelic substances elicit powerful, uncanny conscious experiences that are thought to possess therapeutic value. In those who undergo them, these altered states of consciousness often induce shifts in metaphysical beliefs about the fundamental structure of reality. The contents of those beliefs range from contentious to bizarre, especially when considered from the point of view of...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
November 22, 2022
Daniel Wehinger
Abstract The claim that phenomenal consciousness essentially involves self-consciousness, in the sense of mineness , has gained momentum in recent years. In this paper, I discuss the main non-phenomenological, theoretical argument for this claim: the so-called “transcendental argument” for universal mineness (Zahavi 2018, p. 711), which, in essence, corresponds to Shoemaker’s critique of the...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
August 3, 2022
Niccolò Negro
In consciousness science, theories often differ not only in the account of consciousness they arrive at, but also with respect to how they understand their starting point. Some approaches begin with experimentally gathered data, whereas others begin with phenomenologically gathered data. In this paper, I analyse how the most influential phenomenology-first approach, namely the Integrated...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
March 18, 2022
Michiru Nagatsu, Mikko Salmela
This paper contributes to the interdisciplinary theory of collective affective niche construction, which extends the extended mind (ExM) thesis from cognitive to affective phenomena. Although theoretically innovative, the theory lacks a detailed psychological account of how collective affectivity is scaffolded. It has also been criticized for its uncritical assumption of the subject qua the...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
2022
Maxwell J D Ramstead, Anil K. Seth, Casper Hesp et al.
75 citations
This paper presents a version of neurophenomenology based on generative modelling techniques developed in computational neuroscience and biology. Our approach can be described as computational phenomenology because it applies methods originally developed in computational modelling to provide a formal model of the descriptions of lived experience in the phenomenological tradition of philosophy...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
December 22, 2021
Maja Spener
15 citations
In this paper I critically examine uses of introspection in present-day philosophy of perception. First, I introduce a distinction between two different meanings of the term ‘introspection’: introspective access and introspective method. I show that they are both at work in the philosophy of perception but not adequately distinguished. I then lay out some concerns about the use of introspection...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
August 14, 2021
N. Nikolova, Peter Thestrup Waade, Karl Friston et al.
The mainstream science of consciousness offers a few predominate views of how the brain gives rise to awareness. Chief among these are the Higher Order Thought Theory, Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, Integrated Information Theory, and hybrids thereof. In parallel, rapid development in predictive processing approaches have begun to outline concrete mechanisms by which interoceptive inference...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
August 10, 2021
M. Vilas, R. Auksztulewicz, Lucia Melloni
Recently, the mechanistic framework of active inference has been put forward as a principled foundation to develop an overarching theory of consciousness which would help address conceptual disparities in the field (Wiese 2018; Hohwy and Seth 2020). For that promise to bear out, we argue that current proposals resting on the active inference scheme need refinement to become a process theory of...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
April 1, 2021
Daniel S Shabasson
20 citations
According to illusionism, phenomenal consciousness is an introspective illusion. The illusion problem (Frankish 2016) is to explain the cause of the illusion, or why we are powerfully disposed to judge—erroneously—that we are phenomenally conscious. I propose a theory to solve the illusion problem. I argue that on the basis of three hypotheses about the mind—which I call introspective opacity,...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
February 27, 2021
Krzysztof Sękowski, Wiktor Rorot
The discussion of the nature of consciousness seems to have stalled, with the “hard problem of consciousness” in its center, well-defined camps of realists and eliminativists at two opposing poles, and little to none room for agreement between. Recent attempts to move this debate forward by shifting them to a meta-level have heavily relied on the notion of “intuition”, understood in a rather...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
2017
Marie Guillot
115 citations
In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the "qualitative character" of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its "subjective character", i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
2017
Kathrin Glüer
13 citations
In natural language, looks-talk is used in a variety of ways. I investigate three uses of 'looks' that have traditionally been distinguished - epistemic, comparative, and phenomenal 'looks' - and endorse and develop considerations in support of the view that these amount to polysemy. Focusing on the phenomenal use of 'looks', I then investigate connections between its semantics, the content of...