Only consciousness truly exists? Two problems for IIT 4.0's ontology.
Ignacio Cea, Niccolò Negro, Camilo Miguel Signorelli
Frontiers in Psychology 2024 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1485433 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness science Extrinsic existence Formal metaphysics Idealism Integrated information theory Intrinsic existence Intrinsicality problem Ontology of consciousness |
| Key points | Argues that IIT 4.0's equation of true existence with phenomenal existence leads to two ontological problems where conscious entities could depend on non-objectively existing entities, requiring a reconsideration of the ontological status of extrinsic entities. |
Abstract
In this article we present two ontological problems for the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness 4.0: what we call the (i) the intrinsicality 2.0 problem, and (ii) the engineering problem. These problems entail that truly existing, conscious entities can depend on, and be engineered from, entities that do not objectively exist, which is problematic: if something does not exist in objective reality (i.e., in itself, independently of another entity's consciousness), then it seems that it cannot be part of the material basis and determinants of other entities that do exist on their own. We argue that the core origin of these problems lies in IIT's equation between true existence and phenomenal existence (consciousness), and the corresponding ontological exclusion of non-conscious physical entities (i.e., extrinsic entities) from objective reality. In short, these two problems seem to show that IIT should reconsider the ontological status of these extrinsic entities, because they need to exist objectively to account for the ontological implications of the scenarios we present here, which are permitted by the operational framework of the theory.