Axioms and postulates: Finding the right match through logical inference.
The Behavioral and brain sciences March 23, 2022 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x2100193x (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractIntegrated information theory (IIT) attempts to explain consciousness, but Merker and colleagues contend its formal structure does not align with subjective experience. This commentary argues that they do not fully clarify how IIT's postulates are derived from its axioms. A reformulated version of this problem is proposed, which could offer a new perspective on IIT's usefulness for studying consciousness.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that Merker et al.'s critique of integrated information theory does not adequately articulate the inference problem from axioms to postulates, and proposes a different version of this problem to rethink IIT's utility for consciousness research. |
Abstract
Merker et al. argue that integrated information theory (IIT) is not a theory of consciousness because the IIT formalism does not match phenomenology. I argue that the authors ultimately fail to articulate the problem of the inference of the postulates from the axioms. I suggest a different version of this problem, and argue that this can help rethink IIT's potential for consciousness science.