Axioms and postulates: Finding the right match through logical inference.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences March 23, 2022 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x2100193x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Merker et al.'s critique of integrated information theory does not adequately articulate the inference problem from axioms to postulates, and proposes a different version of this problem to rethink IIT's utility for consciousness research. |
Abstract
Merker et al. argue that integrated information theory (IIT) is not a theory of consciousness because the IIT formalism does not match phenomenology. I argue that the authors ultimately fail to articulate the problem of the inference of the postulates from the axioms. I suggest a different version of this problem, and argue that this can help rethink IIT's potential for consciousness science.
Citations in the library
Cited by 4
- We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic Neuroscience of Consciousness August 29, 2022
- Applying category theory to the study of consciousness? December 27, 2022
- Category theory in consciousness science: going beyond the correlational project Synthese August 1, 2024
- The Fundamental Tension in Integrated Information Theory 4.0's Realist Idealism. Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) October 16, 2023
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