15 papers in the library · 19 citations · publishing 2016-2025
Phenomenology and Mind 2025 Edoardo Fugali
In this paper I will argue that self-awareness and world-awareness are inherently embodied, with the embodied first-person perspective as their primary structure. Challenging dominant views, I contend that the first-person perspective is not reducible to subjective ownership of experiences or linguistic self-reference but arises from the body’s role as the zero-point of an oriented spatial...
Phenomenology and Mind 2024 Thomas Fuchs
Not only our conscious expectations, wishes and intentions are directed towards the future, but also pre- or unconscious tendencies, hunches and anticipations. Using a term coined by Ernst Bloch, they can be summarized as the not-yet-conscious. This not-yet-consciousness usually unfolds spontaneously and without a plan; it is not expected or striven for, but rather emerges in consciousness in...
Phenomenology and Mind November 1, 2019 Joerg Fingerhut 10 citations
In this paper, I review recent enactive approaches to art and aesthetic experience. Radical enactivists (Hutto, 2015) claim that our engagement with art is extensive, in the sense that it is non-contentful and artifact-including. Gallagher (2011) defends an embodied-enactive account of the specific kind of affordances artworks provide. For Noë (2015) art is a reorganizational practice. Each of...
Phenomenology and Mind November 1, 2019 Andrea Giannotta 1 citation
In this paper, I present the enactive theory of color that implies a form of color relationism. I argue that this view constitutes a better alternative to color subjectivism and color objectivism. I liken the enactive view to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, arguing that both deconstruct the clear duality of subject and object, which is at the basis of the other theories of color, in...
Phenomenology and Mind September 21, 2018 Qiantong Wu
This paper discusses the enactivist attempt to entail the hypothesis of extended conscious mind (ECM). The enactists suggest that conscious experience is a relational interaction between the subject and the external environment; this personal-level description of conscious experience naturally entails an extended sub-personal characterization of the material basis of conscious experience (i.e....
Phenomenology and Mind September 17, 2018 Roberta de Monticelli 2 citations
Thatcher’s Perceptual Illusion is presented as a case study to test the fruitfulness of Helmuth Plessner’s Aesthesiology for contemporary philosophical and empirical research on sensory perception (§1). In one reading, Thatcher Illusion’s seems to question Gestalt Theory. We argue that it limits ideed its explanatory power, by forcing us to distinguish physiognomic identity from emotional...
Phenomenology and Mind September 17, 2018 Lynne Baker 2 citations
I review a number of approaches that attempt to deal with the gap that seems to exist between first-person and third-person accounts of consciousness, and some of the conceptual, epistemological, and methodological issues that surround this distinction. I argue, with reference to Carnap and Schrödinger, that one cannot simply reduce data from the first-person perspective to third-person data,...
Phenomenology and Mind September 17, 2018 Philip Tonner 1 citation
This paper deals with the question concerning the effects of the sense of self on agency, particularly the implications that a disharmonious sense of self can have for agency. Consciousness, as intimately connected with a sense of self has a unique status in being accessible both from a first-person and a third-person perspective. A study of self therefore requires phenomenological approaches...
Phenomenology and Mind September 17, 2018 Elisa Magrì 1 citation
In this paper, I shall focus on the role of bodily self-displacement in Stein’s account of empathy, pointing out its relevance in the general dimension of affectivity. In my view, Stein grounds empathy on a dynamic model of embodied self-experience, which shares significant similarities with Varela & Depraz’s neurophenomenology. However, I shall argue that Stein’s view of empathy cannot be...
Phenomenology and Mind September 17, 2018 Niccolò Negro
Modern science was born when physicists started studying phenomena by recruiting mathematical explanatory frameworks. Since this appears to be the direction followed in recent studies on consciousness, philosophers have to analyze the justification of this third-person methods of explaining a phenomenon that is supposed to be entirely subjective. In this paper I argue that this kind of...
Phenomenology and Mind September 17, 2018 Andrea Zhok
The following pages are devoted to an attempt to examine Andrew Meltzoff’s discoveries concerning neonatal imitation in the light of Husserl’s discussion of Fremderfahrung. We criticise Meltzoff’s explanatory model AIM (Active Intermodal Mapping), which is introduced to account for his empirical findings, for two main reasons. First, the AIM model does not seem to properly reconcile the...
Phenomenology and Mind September 17, 2018 Andrea Lavazza
Many philosophers have made the distinction between two phenomenological aspects of consciousness, namely, the partition between clear and distinct contents/vague and peripheral feeling. Such a distinction is relevant for Husserl, while James (1890) provides the most comprehensive account of nucleus and fringe. A concept close to that of fringe, and in particular to the more recently proposed...
Phenomenology and Mind January 4, 2017 E. Harcourt
This paper interweaves a ‘micro’ theme concerning shame and guilt and a ‘macro’ theme concerning self-regulation generally. Neither shame nor guilt is more other-independent than the other. Moreover, because other-dependence in either emotion is not a mark of heteronomy, neither emotion is more characteristic of a well-functioning moral consciousness. Then, relying on phenomena described by...
Phenomenology and Mind November 26, 2016 Elisabetta Sacchi 2 citations
The paper’s main target is strong and reductive “representationalism”. What we claim is that even though this position looks very appealing in so far as it does not postulate intrinsic and irreducible experiential properties, the attempt it pursues of accounting for the phenomenology of experience in terms of representational content runs the risk of providing either an inadequate...
Phenomenology and Mind November 26, 2016 Richard Charles Strong
This short essay attempts to flesh out the extended mind thesis by showing the nontrivial role of the body in skilled epistemic action. This is attempted by bringing Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body schema together with Clark and Chalmers account of the extended mind. What the author hopes to show is that the incorporation of new habits into one’s body schema can make a meaningful difference...