ISSN 2280-7853
26 papers in the library · 26 citations · publishing 2016-2025
Phenomenology and Mind 2025 Edoardo Fugali
In this paper I will argue that self-awareness and world-awareness are inherently embodied, with the embodied first-person perspective as their primary structure. Challenging dominant views, I contend that the first-person perspective is not reducible to subjective ownership of experiences or linguistic self-reference but arises from the body’s role as the zero-point of an oriented spatial...
Phenomenology and Mind 2024 Thomas Fuchs
Not only our conscious expectations, wishes and intentions are directed towards the future, but also pre- or unconscious tendencies, hunches and anticipations. Using a term coined by Ernst Bloch, they can be summarized as the not-yet-conscious. This not-yet-consciousness usually unfolds spontaneously and without a plan; it is not expected or striven for, but rather emerges in consciousness in...
Phenomenology and Mind 2022 Daniel S. H. Kim 1 citation
This paper defends the idea that phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness can enrich the current analytic philosophy of perception, by showing how phenomenological discussions of minimal self-consciousness can enhance our understanding of the phenomenology of conscious perceptual experiences. As a case study, I investigate the nature of the relationship between naïve realism, a...
Phenomenology and Mind 2022 Federico Zilio 1 citation
Intuitively, we can conceive of the existence of a conscious state as a pure activity that does not necessarily require a body (or even a brain). This idea has found new support in certain recent theories that present the possibility of a totally disconnected and disembodied consciousness. Against this hypothesis, I argue that human experience is intrinsically embodied and embedded, though in a...
Phenomenology and Mind 2022 Sam Coleman
According to Brentano, mentality is essentially intentional in nature. Other philosophers have emphasized the phenomenal-qualitative aspect of conscious experiences as core to the mind. A recent philosophical wave – the ‘phenomenal intentionality programme’ – seeks to unite these conceptions in the idea that mental content is grounded in phenomenal qualities. However, a philosophical and...
Phenomenology and Mind November 1, 2019 Joerg Fingerhut 10 citations
In this paper, I review recent enactive approaches to art and aesthetic experience. Radical enactivists (Hutto, 2015) claim that our engagement with art is extensive, in the sense that it is non-contentful and artifact-including. Gallagher (2011) defends an embodied-enactive account of the specific kind of affordances artworks provide. For Noë (2015) art is a reorganizational practice. Each of...
Phenomenology and Mind November 1, 2019 Andrea Giannotta 1 citation
In this paper, I present the enactive theory of color that implies a form of color relationism. I argue that this view constitutes a better alternative to color subjectivism and color objectivism. I liken the enactive view to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, arguing that both deconstruct the clear duality of subject and object, which is at the basis of the other theories of color, in...
Phenomenology and Mind September 21, 2018 Ancuţa Mortu
This paper discusses the question of how art might reveal important aspects of human cognition by taking as a starting point Alva Noë’s book Strange Tools. Art and Human Nature (2015). I argue that the enactive approach defended in this book has strong affinities with some recent art-historical approaches that take their cue from cognitive neuroscience, such as neuroarthistory (Onians, 2016)....
Phenomenology and Mind September 21, 2018 Qiantong Wu
This paper discusses the enactivist attempt to entail the hypothesis of extended conscious mind (ECM). The enactists suggest that conscious experience is a relational interaction between the subject and the external environment; this personal-level description of conscious experience naturally entails an extended sub-personal characterization of the material basis of conscious experience (i.e....
Phenomenology and Mind September 17, 2018 Lynne Baker 2 citations
I review a number of approaches that attempt to deal with the gap that seems to exist between first-person and third-person accounts of consciousness, and some of the conceptual, epistemological, and methodological issues that surround this distinction. I argue, with reference to Carnap and Schrödinger, that one cannot simply reduce data from the first-person perspective to third-person data,...
Phenomenology and Mind September 17, 2018 Roberta de Monticelli 2 citations
Thatcher’s Perceptual Illusion is presented as a case study to test the fruitfulness of Helmuth Plessner’s Aesthesiology for contemporary philosophical and empirical research on sensory perception (§1). In one reading, Thatcher Illusion’s seems to question Gestalt Theory. We argue that it limits ideed its explanatory power, by forcing us to distinguish physiognomic identity from emotional...
Phenomenology and Mind September 17, 2018 Elisa Magrì 1 citation
In this paper, I shall focus on the role of bodily self-displacement in Stein’s account of empathy, pointing out its relevance in the general dimension of affectivity. In my view, Stein grounds empathy on a dynamic model of embodied self-experience, which shares significant similarities with Varela & Depraz’s neurophenomenology. However, I shall argue that Stein’s view of empathy cannot be...
Phenomenology and Mind September 17, 2018 Philip Tonner 1 citation
This paper deals with the question concerning the effects of the sense of self on agency, particularly the implications that a disharmonious sense of self can have for agency. Consciousness, as intimately connected with a sense of self has a unique status in being accessible both from a first-person and a third-person perspective. A study of self therefore requires phenomenological approaches...
Phenomenology and Mind September 17, 2018 Niccolò Negro
Modern science was born when physicists started studying phenomena by recruiting mathematical explanatory frameworks. Since this appears to be the direction followed in recent studies on consciousness, philosophers have to analyze the justification of this third-person methods of explaining a phenomenon that is supposed to be entirely subjective. In this paper I argue that this kind of...
Phenomenology and Mind September 17, 2018 Andrea Zhok
The following pages are devoted to an attempt to examine Andrew Meltzoff’s discoveries concerning neonatal imitation in the light of Husserl’s discussion of Fremderfahrung. We criticise Meltzoff’s explanatory model AIM (Active Intermodal Mapping), which is introduced to account for his empirical findings, for two main reasons. First, the AIM model does not seem to properly reconcile the...
Phenomenology and Mind September 17, 2018 Andrea Lavazza
Many philosophers have made the distinction between two phenomenological aspects of consciousness, namely, the partition between clear and distinct contents/vague and peripheral feeling. Such a distinction is relevant for Husserl, while James (1890) provides the most comprehensive account of nucleus and fringe. A concept close to that of fringe, and in particular to the more recently proposed...
Phenomenology and Mind September 17, 2018 Susi Ferrarello
What is a practical intention, particularly an evaluating intention? Are values representational states that work differently from epistemological truths? Are our perceptual experiences representational states? To simplify the inquiry, I will theoretically divide the questions into two groups: the former concerning the distinction between signitive and practical intention and the latter...
Phenomenology and Mind August 9, 2017 Alessandra Buccella
Hill (2014) argues that perceptual qualia, i.e. the ways in which things look from a viewpoint, are physical properties of objects. They are relational in nature, that is, they are functions of objects’ intrinsic properties, viewpoints, and observers. Hill also claims that his kind of representationalism is the only view capable of “naturalizing qualia”. After discussing a worry with Hill’s...
Phenomenology and Mind January 4, 2017 E. Harcourt
This paper interweaves a ‘micro’ theme concerning shame and guilt and a ‘macro’ theme concerning self-regulation generally. Neither shame nor guilt is more other-independent than the other. Moreover, because other-dependence in either emotion is not a mark of heteronomy, neither emotion is more characteristic of a well-functioning moral consciousness. Then, relying on phenomena described by...
Phenomenology and Mind January 3, 2017 Marta Jorba 1 citation
In this paper I focus on what we can call “the obvious assumption” in the debate between defenders and deniers (of the reductionist sort) of cognitive phenomenology: conscious thought is phenomenal and phenomenal thought is conscious. This assumption can be refused if “conscious” and “phenomenal” are not co-extensive in the case of thought. I discuss some prominent ways to argue for their...
Phenomenology and Mind January 3, 2017 John Joseph Dorsch
Elijah Chudnoff’s case for irreducible cognitive phenomenology hinges on seeming to see the truth of a mathematical proposition (Chudnoff 2015). In the following, I develop an augmented version of Chudnoff’s case, not based on seeming to see, or intuition, but based on being in a state with presentational phenomenology of high-level content. In contrast to other cases for cognitive...
Phenomenology and Mind November 27, 2016 Vittorio Gallese
This text contributes to a necessary dialogue, and possibly a translation of the different notions employed by neuroscience and phenomenology. This effort is particularly significant for cognitive neuroscientists whose main topic is social cognition and the related notion of intersubjectivity. What I qualify as “embodied simulation” (which exploits, not only but mainly, the intrinsic functional...
Phenomenology and Mind November 27, 2016 Beril Sözmen
Archaeologists, neuroscientists and philosophers all aim to shed light on the holistic and coconstitutive role played by bodies and brains, objects and culture over the course of hominin cognitive evolution. Recent advances in neuroscience and brain imaging have enabled exploration of the foundation for tool using capacity in modern human brains. In tandem with this has been the development of...
Phenomenology and Mind November 26, 2016 Michele Di Francesco, Massimo Marraffa, Alfredo Paternoster 4 citations
The current philosophical discussion on the self and consciousness is characterized by a contrast or dilemma between the no-self (eliminativist) perspective, on the one hand, and the arguably naïve account that takes the self as a robust entity, on the other.in order to solve the dilemma, in this paper we suggest restoring a robust theory of the subject based on a bottom-up approach (fully...
Phenomenology and Mind November 26, 2016 Elisabetta Sacchi 2 citations
The paper’s main target is strong and reductive “representationalism”. What we claim is that even though this position looks very appealing in so far as it does not postulate intrinsic and irreducible experiential properties, the attempt it pursues of accounting for the phenomenology of experience in terms of representational content runs the risk of providing either an inadequate...