Neurosci Conscious
August 27, 2021
Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Joanna Szczotka, Robert Prentner
93 citations
Different models of consciousness subscribe to different notions of explanation, use different tools, and aim to explain different phenomena, making direct comparison difficult. A framework is presented that compares models along three minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation, and target of explanation. The approach may help identify driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, and experimental predictions, and points toward more integrative theoretical research where axiomatic models could resolve current contradictions.
May 27, 2021
Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Joanna Szczotka, Robert Prentner
13 citations
preprint
Current models of consciousness are not universally accepted on theoretical or empirical grounds, and direct comparison is difficult because they differ in what counts as a satisfactory explanation, the tools they use, and the phenomena they aim to explain. A framework is presented for comparing models along three minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation, and target of explanation. The empirical consequences of these discrepancies are discussed. The approach may help identify driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, and experimental predictions, and improve the design of future tests. The conclusion advocates for more integrative theoretical research, where axiomatic models may resolve current contradictions.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
August 29, 2022
Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Ignacio Cea, Robert Prentner
8 citations
Integrated information theory (IIT) aims to explain consciousness by linking its subjective structure to physical systems without reducing it to neural activity alone. This article identifies ambiguities in IIT, particularly tensions between its claim that experience is ontologically and epistemologically primary and its goal of explaining consciousness in physical, operational terms. The authors propose ways to resolve these issues and suggest alternative explanatory approaches—mathematical, processual, and autonomy-based—that may better guide future models of consciousness. The goal is to clarify points of contention for both supporters and critics of IIT.
Robert Prentner
6 citations
preprint
Conscious inner life appears structured, with unity of consciousness as a key feature. This paper outlines three aspects of that unity—environmental embedding, mutual constraint between local and global representations, and top-down object formation—and formalizes them using mathematical relations in a phenomenal space defined by mereological and topological concepts. A projector-based calculus describes the dynamical structure of this space. The approach reframes the mind-matter problem as a series of transitions between structured layers of experience rather than a single brain-to-mind leap, offering a precise framework for theoretical questions in cognitive science and consciousness studies.
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2024
Robert Prentner, Donald D Hoffman
5 citations
Consciousness science is at an impasse, and the physicalist worldview is blamed. Conscious agent theory (CAT) posits that consciousness is fundamental and exists outside spacetime, with agency and mathematical structure as core features. For CAT to become a robust scientific framework, it must integrate with the interface theory of perception (ITP), an evolutionary model of perception. ITP suggests that perception is an interface that hides reality, not a window onto it. The authors argue that we live inside a simulation instantiated in consciousness, not digitally, where the simulation is an interface representation of conscious agents' dynamics. This implies AI could be used in consciousness science by customizing this interface.
Artificial General Intelligence
January 1, 2026
Robert Prentner
A framework called SLP-tests offers three criteria—subjective-linguistic, latent-emergent, and phenomenological-structural—to assess whether an AI system's interface representations enable consciousness-like properties. Using category theory, interface representations are modeled as mappings between relational substrates and observable behaviors. The approach reframes subjective experience not as an intrinsic property of physical systems but as a functional interface to a relational entity, making the question of artificial consciousness empirically testable.
Journal of Consciousness Studies
February 1, 2026
Robert Prentner
The interface theory of perception proposes that sensory systems evolved to present a simplified 'adaptive desktop' rather than an accurate picture of reality, with physical reality being an evolutionary construct and consciousness and agency fundamental rather than emergent. The quantum interface theory (QIT) extends this, suggesting quantum features like entanglement and superposition are artifacts of the interface. Perception is modeled as a quantum instrument, allowing study of back-reactions on agent-environment dynamics. Consciousness exhibits quantum-like properties when it 'measures itself,' predicting that quantum coherence in biological systems correlates to consciousness only if it modulates an agent's interface dynamics. QIT integrates evolutionary theory, quantum information, and metaphysics to unify consciousness science.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
March 3, 2023
Larissa Albantakis, Robert Prentner, Ian T. Durham
Integrated information theory (IIT) was originally developed to characterize the causal information a system specifies about itself as a theory of consciousness, but its compatibility with quantum mechanics has been unclear. This work extends IIT's latest formalism to evaluate mechanism integrated information (φ) for discrete, finite-dimensional quantum systems such as quantum logic gates. The authors translate a measure of intrinsic information into a density matrix formulation and extend conditional independence to accommodate quantum entanglement. The compositional analysis may reveal structure in composite quantum states and operators not accessible through standard information-theoretical methods. The results aim to inform theoretical arguments about the links among consciousness, causation, and physics across classical and quantum domains.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
January 9, 2023
Donald D Hoffman, Chetan Prakash, Robert Prentner
Conscious subjects and experiences are entities beyond spacetime, not within it. Their dynamics are described by Markov chains. Agents can combine into more complex agents, fuse into simpler agents, and qualia fuse to create new qualia. The possible dynamics of n agents form an n(n-1)-dimensional polytope with n^n vertices, the Markov polytope M_n. The total fusions of n agents and qualia form an (n-1)-dimensional simplex, the fusion simplex F_n. Projecting these dynamics onto spacetime yields scattering processes: a new map from Markov chains to decorated permutations encodes physical information for scattering amplitudes. Spacetime and scattering processes are a data structure coding for interactions of conscious agents; a particle in spacetime is a projection of the Markovian dynamics of a communicating class of conscious agents.
arXiv Preprint Archive
January 4, 2023
Larissa Albantakis, Robert Prentner, Ian T. Durham
Integrated information theory (IIT), originally a framework for characterizing consciousness through causal information, is extended to finite-dimensional quantum systems such as quantum logic gates. The authors translate a measure of intrinsic information into a density matrix formulation and adapt conditional independence to account for quantum entanglement. This quantum extension of IIT may reveal internal structure of composite quantum states and operators that standard information-theoretic analysis misses. The work aims to inform debates about the relationship among consciousness, causation, and physics across classical and quantum domains.
arXiv Preprint Archive
February 12, 2021
Shanna Dobson, Robert Prentner
A mathematical model of subjective experience is proposed using hierarchical geometries of representations called n-awareness. The framework draws on higher category theory, homotopy theory, and (infinity, 1)-topoi. Three conjectures enrich the model: that the (infinity, 1)-category of perfectoid diamonds is an (infinity, 1)-topos, that topological localization extends to diamonds, and that Efimov K-theory of diamonds captures structural equivalences between the category of diamonds and subjective experience (privacy, self-containedness, self-reflexivity). A grammar (n-declension) and temporal scheme (n-time) are introduced to express n-awareness. The model revisits philosophical problems of change, simultaneity, and coincidence. Personal identity is modeled as weakly persistent moduli spaces in the K-theory of perfectoid diamonds, resembling a categorical bundle theory.
Philosophies
November 8, 2018
Robert Prentner
A new philosophy of nature is needed because physicalism cannot account for consciousness. The authors propose 'experiencing' as a conceptual primitive: a process involving an agent's interaction with its world through action based on phenomenal experience. This process has two aspects: a subjective 'what-it-is-likeness' and an objective physical description. Experiencing is distinguished from metacognitive awareness, and scientific theories of awareness should respect this distinction. Experiencing is non-exclusive, a-personal, and primitive, not limited to humans. The concept is linked to theoretical biology through information processing by organisms.
Philosophies
December 6, 2017
Robert Prentner
Contrary to the prevailing view, the molecular organization of biological systems is essential for understanding the dynamics linked to conscious experience in complex organisms. Molecular sciences can either identify mechanisms directly tied to phenomenology or characterize the dynamics of the underlying substrate. The perspective also addresses substrate-independence in information-processing theories of consciousness and the combination problem in panpsychism, arguing from a molecular standpoint that molecular details are crucial.