The perceived role of consciousness in moral status attributions
Rony Hirschhorn, Niccolò Negro, Liad Mudrik
PsyArXiv August 31, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/ve6c5_v3 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Preregistered survey experiment |
|---|---|
| Sample size | 1,493 |
| Population | 1493 study participants responding to questions about diverse entities |
| Key findings | Consciousness was strongly associated with moral status but was perceived as neither necessary nor sufficient for it: participants granted moral status without consciousness and withheld it despite consciousness. Respondents clustered into distinct decision profiles predicted by individual background, so moral judgments depended on the person making them, not only on the target entity's properties. |
Abstract
Determining which entities deserve moral consideration is crucial to policy debates about animal welfare and artificial intelligence regulation. A common assumption is that consciousness is a key criterion for moral status, often considered to be necessary or sufficient for it. However, it is unclear whether public attitudes also share this assumption. In a large, preregistered study (N=1493), we tested the perceived relationship between consciousness and moral status by triangulating direct questions, moral dilemmas, and attribution questions across diverse entities. Although consciousness was strongly associated with moral status, it was neither perceived as necessary nor sufficient: participants attributed moral status without consciousness, and denied moral status despite its presence. Moreover, respondents clustered into distinct decision profiles, which were predicted by their individual background. Therefore, moral decisions did not depend solely on the properties of the target entity, but also on those of the person making the judgment. These results have implications for how ethical and policy decisions are framed.