When philosophical nuance matters: safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptions.
Marius Usher, Niccolò Negro, Hilla Jacobson, Naotsugu Tsuchiya
Frontiers in Psychology 2023 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1306023 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Blockhead Iit Causal structure Consciousness Functionalism Recurrency Unfolding argument |
| Citations | 7 |
| Key points | Argues that the Unfolding Argument's assumptions are unwarranted and that consciousness science should adopt a more inclusive methodology tested on humans rather than on systems considerably different from us. |
Abstract
In this paper, we revisit the debate surrounding the Unfolding Argument (UA) against causal structure theories of consciousness (as well as the hard-criteria research program it prescribes), using it as a platform for discussing theoretical and methodological issues in consciousness research. Causal structure theories assert that consciousness depends on a particular causal structure of the brain. Our claim is that some of the assumptions fueling the UA are not warranted, and therefore we should reject the methodology for consciousness science that the UA prescribes. First, we briefly survey the most popular philosophical positions in consciousness science, namely physicalism and functionalism. We discuss the relations between these positions and the behaviorist methodology that the UA assumptions express, despite the contrary claim of its proponents. Second, we argue that the same reasoning that the UA applies against causal structure theories can be applied to functionalist approaches, thus proving too much and deeming as unscientific a whole range of (non-causal structure) theories. Since this is overly restrictive and fits poorly with common practice in cognitive neuroscience, we suggest that the reasoning of the UA must be flawed. Third, we assess its philosophical assumptions, which express a restrictive methodology, and conclude that there are reasons to reject them. Finally, we propose a more inclusive methodology for consciousness science, that includes neural, behavioral, and phenomenological evidence (provided by the first-person perspective) without which consciousness science could not even start. Then, we extend this discussion to the scope of consciousness science, and conclude that theories of consciousness should be tested and evaluated on humans, and not on systems considerably different from us. Rather than restricting the methodology of consciousness science, we should, at this point, restrict the range of systems upon which it is supposed to be built.
Citations in the library
Cited by 4
- Extrapolating Other Consciousnesses: The Prospects and Limits of Analogical Abduction Philosophy of Science August 27, 2025
- Consciousness science and constitutive a priori principles: on the fundamental identity of integrated information theory Philosophical Explorations September 2, 2025
- Functionalist theories of consciousness: unfolding, substitution and the indeterminacy of function by the physics of the brain. Consciousness and Cognition September 8, 2026
- A caveat regarding the unfolding argument: implications of plasticity. Neuroscience of Consciousness 2026
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and 46 more in the library