This chapter examines the nature and sources of agentive phenomenology—the experiences associated with intentional actions. It reviews pioneering work from the early 1980s in psychology and neuroscience that motivates much current research. The discussion covers the scope of these experiences, their relationship to other types of experiences, how best to characterize different aspects, and the function of various agentive experiences.
A motor theory of control consciousness holds that nonsensory states, such as motor commands, directly contribute to the awareness of being in control of one's actions, contrary to a sensory imagery theory that denies such a role. Mandik (2010) defends this motor theory and argues it is preferable to Prinz's (2007) sensory imagery theory. This paper contends that Mandik's criticisms of Prinz's theory fall short, yet still finds reasons to favor the motor theory over the sensory imagery theory. The argument suggests that nonsensory states play a direct role in generating control consciousness.