Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2021
Francesco Ellia, Jeremiah Hendren, Matteo Grasso et al.
61 citations
Subjective experience can be objectively explained in physical terms by moving beyond cognitive functions and understanding how experience is structured. Integrated information theory provides a framework to account for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do, avoiding the fallacy that only objective properties should be explained by science.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2025
Francesco Ellia, Naotsugu Tsuchiya
2 citations
A commentary argues that recent computational functionalist theories of consciousness, while making a welcome structural turn, largely echo predictions already made by Integrated Information Theory. The authors question whether key claims—about subjective experience, local lateral connectivity in sensory areas, and the role of silent units—are coherent within the functionalist paradigm. They emphasize the need to distinguish genuine predictions from post-hoc accommodations in consciousness science.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
April 7, 2026
Francesco Ellia, Naotsugu Tsuchiya
Contemporary consciousness science is stuck in an impasse because competing theoretical frameworks—such as structuralist versus functionalist, universal versus local, and intrinsic versus extrinsic approaches—are creating philosophical deadlocks and conceptual standstills. These parallel debates have generated insights but lack a systematic framework to understand their relationships. The authors argue that these disputes reflect deeper unresolved tensions in how consciousness is conceptualized. They propose that the debates can be addressed by recognizing three fundamental meta-theoretical dimensions: explanatory medium, scope, and perspective. The interplay among these dimensions shapes evidence, language, and concepts, reframing theoretical conflicts into tractable disagreements.
Consciousness and Cognition
April 1, 2022
Francesco Ellia, Robert Chis-Ciure
This paper compares two conceptual frameworks for explaining phenomenal experience: Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) by Feinberg & Mallatt and Integrated Information Theory (IIT) by Tononi and colleagues. The authors first introduce each framework, then outline a plan for analysis, articulate the philosophical profiles of NN and IIT—including their ontological commitments and epistemological foundations—and finally compare them point-by-point, including their positions on artificial consciousness. The analysis is meta-theoretical, assessing similarities previously noted by Feinberg & Mallatt.
Francesco Ellia, Robert Chis-Ciure
preprint
Two frameworks for explaining conscious experience, Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) and Integrated Information Theory (IIT), are compared from a meta-theoretical perspective. IIT treats consciousness as a fundamental feature of the world, investigating its structure mathematically through integrated information. NN treats consciousness as an emergent feature confined to living organisms with complex brains, investigated via neurobiology, complex systems theory, and irreducible subjectivity. The two theories are found to be constitutionally different, including in their stances on artificial consciousness.
Francesco Ellia, Robert Chis-Ciure
preprint
This paper compares two conceptual frameworks for explaining phenomenal experience: Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) and Integrated Information Theory (IIT). The authors first introduce both frameworks, then outline their analytical approach. They articulate philosophical profiles of NN and IIT, addressing each theory's ontological commitments and epistemological foundations. Finally, they compare the two frameworks point-by-point, including their respective positions on artificial consciousness. The analysis suggests that despite some similarities noted by proponents of NN, the two theories differ in significant ways.
Robert Chis-Ciure, Francesco Ellia
preprint
The paper offers a philosophical analysis of the Hard Problem of consciousness, focusing on Integrated Information Theory (IIT). It introduces a Layered View that distinguishes a Core Problem of Consciousness from a Layered Hard Problem, the latter tied to Chalmers' conceivability argument. The authors argue that IIT resists conceivability scenarios and is equipped to address the hard problem in its broadest sense.