Micro-phenomenology has recently gained traction in HCI as ways of accessing embodied, lived dimensions of interaction that resist conventional qualitative capture. By foregrounding pre-reflective experience, this approach promises greater experiential precision. However, when designers and HCI researchers attempt to apply Micro-phenomenology in practice, frictions often emerge. The method was...
This paper examines the so-called hard problem of life: how supposedly non-conscious matter could become a living, self-organising and experientially unified being. Similarity Theory argues that the problem arises from the materialist assumption that consciousness must emerge from matter. Within the Similarity Theory framework, consciousness is ontologically primary, matter is a structured...
Altered-state phenomenology around ketamine may relate to longer-term changes in imaginal processes, but observations across routine care are scarce. We report an educational case focusing on pre-defined dream motifs over time, without making treatment efficacy claims. A 48-year-old Japanese man with severe chronic primary low back pain reported dreams during insight-oriented psychotherapy from...
One of the challenges our current polycrisis presents is to comprehend the role of our understanding of consciousness in the genesis of this host of intertwined crises. Instead of focusing on the so-called hard problem of how experience and subjectivity arise from matter, the suggestion is that the actual hard problem is how our minds and bodies lost their sensual, nurturing embeddedness in the...
Abstract The hard problem of consciousness, introduced by Chalmers (1995, 2017), reveals that merely dispositional and relational physical properties cannot ground phenomenal properties. Panpsychism attempts to address this problem by positing that micro-objects possess phenomenal properties that ground our phenomenal properties. However, Nagasawa (2021) has argued that panpsychism faces the...
The article offers a reflection on the collective monograph “Kant and the Philosophy of Mind” and analyzes the current state of analytic philosophy of consciousness through the lens of Kant’s critical project. It examines which aspects of Kantian thought are most fruitful for understanding phenomenal consciousness and the limits of inquiry. The central question concerns which feature of...
We argue that a distinctive form of intersubjective experience – shared minimal-dual awareness (MDA) or “intercorporeal present” – can be jointly enacted by individuals. In this mode, two embodied persons co-engage in a present-centered attentional field such that each person’s habitual self-narrative falls silent, while a mutual salience‐space forms between them, yet without erasing their...
Abstract This chapter provides the reader with two things that are helpful in orientating them for what is to come across the study. In the first instance it provides a substantive reconstruction of the notion of an intentional horizon. Secondly, it offers theoretical background, motivation, and defence for the approach to the study of perceptual experience that is taken in the book, namely one...
This conceptual paper proposes a methodological reframing of the hard problem of consciousness through the notion of projected presence. Building on the Projected Stabilization Thesis, it argues that first-person immediacy should not be granted automatic foundational authority. Consciousness is not treated as an inner observer, a private theater, or an illusion, but as the biologically...
This hypothesis paper proposes that psychosis preserves an individuals native cognitive architecture while disrupting reality attribution. Building on predictive processing, dreaming, and the Cognitive Languages framework, it suggests that the phenomenology of psychotic experience reflects the brain's pre-existing representational systems rather than a completely new mode of cognition. The...