The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy
October 21, 2026
Alexander Ehmann, Daniel Neumann
At the turn of the 20th century, several philosophical movements emerged with a shared ambition: to develop a theory of knowledge that takes seriously the idea that we can access the world as it is in itself . These movements opposed reducing knowledge to psychological processes, subjective impressions, or pragmatic considerations. Instead, they sought to ground cognition in the very things the...
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy
October 21, 2026
Stefano Micali
Within the phenomenological tradition, few experiences have received as much sustained attention as religious experience. Among its various forms, prayer occupies a central place. This chapter interprets Christian prayer as a limit experience par excellence . The limit concerns the complex relation between possibility and impossibility. Prayer is inhabited by different senses of the impossible,...
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy
October 21, 2026
Valeria Bizzari
If you look for a detailed phenomenological analysis of peculiar kinds of quasi-imaginative experiences—such as dreaming—you will be disappointed by the fact that there is no systematic account of this phenomenon and its related forms. The aim of this chapter is therefore to sketch a phenomenology of the dream in what seem to be its most important features. To do this, I will mainly follow two...
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy
October 21, 2026
Andreas Gonçalves Lind
Marion’s phenomenology reveals a notion of truth that contrasts with the Greek concept of alētheia , where truth is unveiled through the subject’s faculties. Instead, Marion conceives of truth as a manifestation from elsewhere, reminiscent of biblical apocalypses . Here, truth surpasses the subject’s capacities, highlighting a profound disproportion between what is revealed and what can be...
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy
October 21, 2026
Kristjan Laasik
“Perception is governed by norms that I call perceptual , that is, immanent to its own structure”—so argues Maxime Doyon in his excellent new book, Phenomenology and the Norms of Perception (Doyon 2024, p. xv). Eschewing a more traditional emphasis on narrowly epistemic standards, Doyon builds on the insights of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, arguing that “perception has its own standards, its own...
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy
October 21, 2026
James Mensch
Events, like death and dreamless sleep, “show” themselves in their inability to be immediately experienced. They exhibit liminal phenomena insofar as their appearing is also a concealing. This is the case for the Others we encounter. We cannot directly experience the Other’s consciousness. Rather, we overcome this lack by projecting onto the Other material from our own consciousness. Insofar as...
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy
October 21, 2026
Matthias Neuber
In his The Concept of Consciousness (1914), Edwin B. Holt advocated an externalism according to which consciousness is not located “in the head” but is to be regarded as a “cross-section” at the interface of the neural system and its environment. This approach formed part of a comprehensive “neorealism,” which was also defended by Samuel Alexander. However, Alexander did not agree with Holt’s...
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy
October 21, 2026
Riccardo Paparusso
This chapter aims to reconstruct the autonomous phenomenological theory that Patočka subtly articulates in his 1931 dissertation The Concept of Evidence and Its Significance for Noetics . This proposal is based on two fundamental elements: the first consists of a non-transcendental phenomenological consciousness, which is finite because its temporality derives from a duration more original than...
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy
October 21, 2026
Karl Mertens
The process of falling asleep involves a gradual dissolution of experience and consciousness. This phenomenon seems to resist phenomenological analysis that aims to examine phenomena in their original experience. However, it is precisely this structure of fading experience that provides a unique phenomenological perspective on falling asleep. This chapter focuses on the diminishing conscious...
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy
October 21, 2026
Valeria Bizzari, Stefano Micali
Approaching the question of limit-phenomena within phenomenology is not an easy task. For this reason, it seems appropriate, from a systematic point of view, to introduce a distinction that concerns two closely interrelated issues, which nonetheless deserve to be treated separately. The first concerns the analysis of specific phenomena that escape direct intuition and elude intentional...
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy
September 8, 2023
Panos Theodorou, Costas Pagondiotis, Anna Irene Baka et al.
1 citation
Neurophenomenology maintains that the intelligent behavior we recognize in living beings is based on the fact that they are intentionally directed toward and are embodied and embedded in a world, which they actively constitute. This is the way in which it understands the intentionality of the mind and its meaning-making essence. Meaning-making, however, presupposes organization and synthesis of...
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy
September 3, 2018
Roberta de Monticelli
5 citations
Contemporary philosophical research on emotions has focused on their intentionality, in particular on the specific intentional work done by feeling (“feeling-towards”, in Peter Goldie’s positive phrasing, as opposed to a tendency to “over-intellectualize” emotions, that is, to explain them in terms of beliefs and desires, or to reduce them to purely subjective states or qualia). But is there...