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Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (A Draft)

Myles Burnyeat

November 9, 1995 DOI: 10.1093/019823600x.003.0003 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Topics Philosophy of mind
Citations 171
Key points Argues that the Putnam-Nussbaum thesis that modern functionalism is Aristotelian is false, because Aristotle's conception of the material or physical side of the soul-body relation cannot be shared by modern functionalists. The argument is examined through Aristotle's theory of perception and the doctrine that the sense-organ assumes the sensible form of the object without its matter.

Abstract

Abstract This essay argues that the Putnam-Nussbaum thesis that modern functionalism is Aristotelian is false. It fails as an interpretation of Aristotle since it fails to notice that Aristotle’s conception of the material or physical side of the soul-body relation is one which no modern functionalist could share. The Putnam-Nussbaum thesis is examined within the context of the theory of perception. This involves the need to understand one of the most mysterious Aristotelian doctrines – the doctrine that in perception, the sense-organ assumes the sensible form of the object perceived without its matter.

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  • Argues that the Putnam-Nussbaum thesis equating modern functionalism with Aristotelianism is false, because Aristotle's conception of the material side of the soul-body relation cannot be shared by modern functionalists.

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