Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
October 15, 2023
Dan Zahavi, Dominik Želinský
28 citations
Abstract Sociologists tend to see G. H. Mead's conceptualization of self as fundamentally correct. In this paper, we develop a critique of Mead's notion of the self as constituted through social interactions. Our focus will be on Mead's categorial distinction between the socially constructed self and subjective experience, as well as on the tendency of post‐Meadian sociologists to push Mead's...
Research at the University of Copenhagen
2023
Dan Zahavi
1 citation
preprint
Recent years have seen an upsurge of interest in the second-person perspective, not only in philosophy of mind, language, law and ethics, but also in various empirical disciplines such as cognitive neuroscience and developmental psychology. A distinctive and perhaps also slightly puzzling feature of this ongoing discussion is that whereas many contributors insist that a proper consideration of...
Ethos
December 1, 2022
Dan Zahavi
Is selfhood socially constituted and distributed? Although the view has recently been defended by some cognitive scientists, it has long been popular within anthropology and cultural psychology. Whereas older texts by Marcel Mauss, Clifford Geertz, Hazel Rose Markus, and Shinobu Kitayama often contrast a Western conception of a discrete, bounded, and individual self with a non-Western...
Acta Neurochirurgica
March 23, 2022
Felipe León, Dan Zahavi
8 citations
The aim of this mini-review paper is to present an overview of work on consciousness from a philosophical perspective, and to argue for the continuing relevance of philosophy in consciousness research. After introducing some major philosophical positions about the relationship between consciousness and matter, we argue that the problem of consciousness that many authors have focused on-the...
Psychopathology
2022
Karl Erik Sandsten, Dan Zahavi, Josef Parnas
42 citations
The concept of schizophrenia (SCZ) was originally associated with a disorder of formal strata of the self. During the last two decades, empirical studies have demonstrated a selective hyper-aggregation of self-disorders in the SCZ spectrum. As with other scientific research areas, the role of self-disturbances in SCZ has been up for debate in various disciplines including cognitive sciences,...
Psychopathology
2021
Julie Nordgaard, Mads Gram Henriksen, Lennart Jansson et al.
52 citations
Disordered selfhood in schizophrenia was rediscovered at the turn of the millennium. In 2005, Psychopathology published the psychometric instrument, the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE). In this article, we summarize the historical background of the creation of the EASE, explicate the notion of the disorder of basic or minimal self with the help of phenomenological philosophy,...
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness
July 9, 2020
Dan Zahavi
9 citations
Not that long ago, discussions of selfhood in philosophy of mind tended to focus on diachronic identity and the so-called persistence question. Important as this question might be, it does, however, not exhaust the topic of selfhood. In recent years, the focus has shifted somewhat from diachronic to synchronic identity and given rise to a lively debate concerning the relationship between...
Consciousness and Cognition
September 1, 2019
Mads Gram Henriksen, Josef Parnas, Dan Zahavi
82 citations
In contemporary consciousness research, we have defended a position of experiential minimalism, arguing that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood) is a necessary, universal feature of phenomenal consciousness. The concept of for-me-ness refers to the fact that experiences are given first-personally to the subject of experience. To challenge the universality of for-me-ness, several authors have...
The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition
October 9, 2018
Dan Zahavi, John Michael
12 citations
Abstract When considering the current debate on empathy, it quickly becomes evident that a diversity of definitions of and approaches to the topic are available, and that no consensus seems forthcoming. The aim of our contribution is not to resolve these disputes or to argue in favor of any one particular way of conceptualizing empathy. Instead, our aim is to open up a new perspective by...
Oxford Scholarship Online
January 18, 2018
Dan Zahavi
Husserl’s turn from a descriptive phenomenology to a transcendental phenomenology is linked to his methodological employment of the reduction and the epoché. But how should one interpret these notions? Are they crucial to phenomenology, do they enable phenomenology to become metaphysically committed, or are they tools that reveal Husserl’s commitment to a form of methodological solipsism?...
Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture
April 14, 2017
Dan Zahavi
71 citations
What is a self? Plenty of competing and complementary definitions abound. Over the years, I have articulated and defended am experientially based minimal conception of selfhood. In the following short text, I reply to some objections and suggestions for revisions that Ratcliffe as well as Ciaunica and Fotopoulou offer in their contributions to this volume. Is it a viable proposal to suggest...
Oxford Handbooks Online
September 5, 2013
Thor Grünbaum, Dan Zahavi
This chapter argues that explicit (reflective) self-conscious thinking is founded on an implicit (pre-reflective) form of self-awareness built into the very structure of phenomenal consciousness. In broad strokes, the argument is that a theory denying the existence of pre-reflective or minimal self-awareness has difficulties explaining a number of essential features of explicit first-person...
Schizophrenia Bulletin
December 23, 2012
Josef Parnas, Louis Sass, Dan Zahavi
Questions concerning both the ontology and epistemology of the "psychiatric object" (symptoms and signs) should be at the forefront of current concerns of psychiatry as a clinical neuroscience. We argue that neglect of these issues is a crucial source of the stagnation of psychiatric research. In honor of the centenary of Karl Jaspers' book, General Psychopathology, we offer a critique of the...
Oxford University Press eBooks
December 1, 2010
Dan Zahavi
80 citations
This chapter first outlines a view regarding the relationship between consciousness, self-consciousness, and a minimal notion of self that is widespread in the phenomenological tradition. It then discusses some of the motivations behind this proposal, and then in the main part of the chapter critically engages with various objections that have recently been raised against this view by Albahari...
Phainomenon
October 1, 2008
Dan Zahavi
Abstract Whereas 20 or 30 years ago one might have been inclined to characterize the development of 20th century philosophy in terms of a linguistic turn, a turn from a philosophy of subjectivity to a philosophy of language, it might today be more apt to describe the development in terms of a turn from anti-naturalism to naturalism. But insofar as naturalists consider the scientific account of...
December 9, 2005
Dan Zahavi
What is a self? Does it exist in reality or is it a mere social construct—or is it perhaps a neurologically induced illusion? The legitimacy of the concept of the self has been questioned by both neuroscientists and philosophers in recent years. Countering this, in Subjectivity and Selfhood, Dan Zahavi argues that the notion of self is crucial for a proper understanding of consciousness. He...