Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
June 20, 2026
Søren Overgaard, Laura Oppi, Kasper Møller Nielsen et al.
Abstract It is surprisingly difficult to provide an account of hallucination that captures all the cases that clinicians typically class as hallucinations, without at the same time admitting cases that would not typically be classed as such. Most attempts to specify exactly what a hallucination is supposed to be fails to meet at least one of these conditions, as we show in the first part of the...
Psychopathology
May 19, 2026
Barbara Kariž, Mads Gram Henriksen, Borut Škodlar
There is a growing need to translate insights from phenomenological psychopathology into psychotherapeutic practice. Phenomenology offers a deeper understanding of the lived experience of psychosis, and this understanding can render psychotherapy more individualized, empathically attuned, and recovery-oriented by attending to experiential dimensions that conventional, symptom-focused approaches...
Psychopathology
April 27, 2026
Mads Gram Henriksen, Håvard Hovstad, Helena Cobanovic et al.
The Inventory of Psychotic-Like Anomalous Self-Experiences (IPASE) was developed as an easy-to-use, self-report measure of self-disorders. Self-disorders are subtle, trait-like, non-psychotic anomalous self-experiences that are traditionally assessed by trained raters using a semi-structured clinical interview, such as the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE). Whether self-disorders...
European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience
April 1, 2026
Lars Siersbæk Nilsson, Julie Nordgaard, Mads Gram Henriksen et al.
5 citations
Poor insight is a core feature of schizophrenia and empirical studies have demonstrated associations with important symptom domains, cognitive functions, and clinical outcomes. While recent explanatory accounts mostly focus on neuro-, social-, or meta-cognitive deficits, a complementary model from phenomenological psychopathology suggests that impaired insight in schizophrenia is tied to...
Schizophrenia Bulletin
May 25, 2025
Andrea Raballo, Mads Gram Henriksen, Michele Poletti et al.
9 citations
Self-disorders (SD) designate a pattern of non-psychotic anomalous self-experiences, which specifically aggregate in clinical and subclinical forms of schizophrenia spectrum disorders (SSD), including familial high-risk configurations. SD have been corroborated as a valuable, quantitatively tractable, trait phenotype for indexing genetic liability to SSD, and, as a risk phenotype, they offer...
Frontiers in Psychology
2022
Vincent Ringgaard Christoffersen, Borut Škodlar, Mads Gram Henriksen
Although tranquility is a fundamental aspect of human life, the experiential nature of tranquility remains elusive. Traditionally, many philosophical, religious, spiritual, or mystical traditions in East and West have strived to reach tranquil experiences and produced texts serving as manuals to reach them. Yet, no attempt has been made to compare experiences of tranquility and explore what...
Psychopathology
2021
Julie Nordgaard, Mads Gram Henriksen, Lennart Jansson et al.
52 citations
Disordered selfhood in schizophrenia was rediscovered at the turn of the millennium. In 2005, Psychopathology published the psychometric instrument, the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE). In this article, we summarize the historical background of the creation of the EASE, explicate the notion of the disorder of basic or minimal self with the help of phenomenological philosophy,...
Research at the University of Copenhagen
May 22, 2020
Mads Gram Henriksen, Josef Parnas
3 citations
In contemporary consciousness studies, a central question concerns the nature of the most primitive and fundamental features of phenomenal consciousness. Some authors (e.g., Zahavi) have argued that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood) is a fundamental and necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness. The concept of for-me-ness articulates that experiences are first-personally manifest, i.e. they...
Consciousness and Cognition
September 1, 2019
Mads Gram Henriksen, Josef Parnas, Dan Zahavi
82 citations
In contemporary consciousness research, we have defended a position of experiential minimalism, arguing that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood) is a necessary, universal feature of phenomenal consciousness. The concept of for-me-ness refers to the fact that experiences are given first-personally to the subject of experience. To challenge the universality of for-me-ness, several authors have...
Consciousness and Cognition
July 1, 2016
Josef Parnas, Mads Gram Henriksen
128 citations
Mysticism and schizophrenia are different categories of human existence and experience. Nonetheless, they exhibit important phenomenological affinities, which, however, remain largely unaddressed. In this study, we explore structural analogies between key features of mysticism and major clinical-phenomenological aspects of the schizophrenia spectrum disorders-i.e. attitudes, the nature of...