The transcendental turn
Oxford Scholarship Online January 18, 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199684830.003.0004 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Husserl's transcendental turn, through the reduction and the epoché, does not abandon the world but suspends a dogmatic attitude toward it, allowing a proper understanding of the world's constituted being. Contends that Husserl's descriptive phenomenology was metaphysically neutral, while his transcendental turn engaged metaphysical questions about the world's mind-dependent character. |
Abstract
Husserl’s turn from a descriptive phenomenology to a transcendental phenomenology is linked to his methodological employment of the reduction and the epoché. But how should one interpret these notions? Are they crucial to phenomenology, do they enable phenomenology to become metaphysically committed, or are they tools that reveal Husserl’s commitment to a form of methodological solipsism? Chapter 3 offers an interpretation of the reduction and the epoché that makes it clear why Husserl’s transcendental turn does not involve a turning-away from the world, but a suspension of a specific dogmatic attitude towards the world, that for the first time permits a proper understanding of the (constituted) being of the world. Contrary to various existing interpretations, it is consequently argued that whereas Husserl’s descriptive phenomenology was indeed metaphysically neutral, he started to engage with metaphysical questions concerning the mind-dependent character of the world the moment he effectuated his transcendental turn.