Experience, Subjectivity, Selfhood: Beyond a Meadian Sociology of the Self
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour October 15, 2023 DOI: 10.1111/jtsb.12396 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 28 |
| Key points | Argues that Mead's account of the self as constituted through social interaction is flawed, particularly its separation of the socially constructed self from subjective experience, and that post-Meadian sociologists have extended this position too far. Proposes, drawing on Husserlian phenomenology, that the most basic level of selfhood is anchored in irreducible subjective experience. |
Abstract
Abstract Sociologists tend to see G. H. Mead's conceptualization of self as fundamentally correct. In this paper, we develop a critique of Mead's notion of the self as constituted through social interactions. Our focus will be on Mead's categorial distinction between the socially constructed self and subjective experience, as well as on the tendency of post‐Meadian sociologists to push Mead's position in ever more radical directions. Drawing inspiration from a multifaceted understanding of selfhood that can be found in Husserlian phenomenology, we then propose that the most basic level of selfhood is anchored in irreducible subjective experience.