The current debate on empathy suffers from a diversity of definitions and no consensus. This paper does not aim to resolve these disputes but instead explores the potential of applying embodied, extended, enactive, and embedded (4E) approaches to empathy research. These approaches integrate insights from phenomenology and cognitive sciences, highlighting the role of reciprocity, intentional alignment, embodied simulation, and the second-person perspective. They also challenge the widespread assumption that empathy amounts to affective matching or mirroring.
The prediction error minimization (PEM) framework is gaining influence across cognitive sciences. A central debate concerns how PEM conceptualizes the relationship between brain, body, and environment. Clark argues for a version of PEM that retains commitments to Embodied Cognition and the Extended Mind Hypothesis. Hohwy contends that PEM rules out at least some versions of Embodied and Extended cognition. This paper aims to facilitate constructive debate by explicating the different theoretical motivations underlying these two alternatives and identifying relevant issues that may help adjudicate between them.