Voices in Psychosis
September 8, 2022
Sam Wilkinson, Joel Krueger
3 citations
Abstract The experiences described in the Voices in Psychosis transcripts are incredibly varied and yet frequently explicitly labelled by participants as ‘voices’. How can we make sense of this? If we reflect carefully on uses of the word ‘voice’, we see that it can express at least two entirely different concepts, which pick out categorically different phenomena. One concept picks out a speech...
Behavioural Brain Research
February 1, 2021
Shane N Glackin, Tom Roberts, Joel Krueger
28 citations
In addiction, apparently causally significant phenomena occur at a huge number of levels; addiction is affected by biomedical, neurological, pharmacological, clinical, social, and politico-legal factors, among many others. In such a complex, multifaceted field of inquiry, it seems very unlikely that all the many layers of explanation will prove amenable to any simple or straightforward,...
Synthese
2021
Joel Krueger
55 citations
AbstractAlthough enactive approaches to cognition vary in terms of their character and scope, all endorse several core claims. The first is that cognition is tied to action. The second is that cognition is composed of more than just in-the-head processes; cognitive activities are (at least partially) externalized via features of our embodiment and in our ecological dealings with the people and...
PsyArXiv
January 8, 2020
Tom Froese, Joel Krueger
preprint
Much of the characteristic symptomatology of schizophrenia can be understood as resulting from a pervasive sense of disembodiment. The body is experienced as an external machine that needs to be controlled with explicit intentional commands, which in turn leads to severe difficulties in interacting with the world in a fluid and intuitive manner. In consequence, there is a characteristic...
The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition
October 9, 2018
Joel Krueger
49 citations
Abstract Defenders of a view called “direct social perception” (DSP) argue that our social-cognitive capacities rest on our ability to directly perceive others’ mental states—their emotions, desires, intentions, etc.—embodied in their expressive, goal-directed behavior. DSP thus challenges the widespread assumption that mental states are intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible to...
Topoi
March 8, 2018
Joel Krueger
81 citations
A family of recent externalist approaches in philosophy of mind argues that our psychological capacities are synchronically and diachronically “scaffolded” by external (i.e., beyond-the-brain) resources. I consider how these “scaffolded” approaches might inform debates in phenomenological psychopathology. I first introduce the idea of “affective scaffolding” and make some taxonomic...
Frontiers in Psychology
2018
Marcin Miłkowski, Robert W. Clowes, Zuzanna Rucińska et al.
82 citations
In this paper, we argue that several recent 'wide' perspectives on cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and distributed) are only partially relevant to the study of cognition. While these wide accounts override traditional methodological individualism, the study of cognition has already progressed beyond these proposed perspectives toward building integrated explanations of the...
January 5, 2015
Joel Krueger
I respond to Kersten’s criticism in his article “Music and Cognitive Extension” of my approach to the musically extended emotional mind in Krueger (2014). I specify how we manipulate—and in so doing, integrate with—music when, as active listeners, we become part of a musically extended cognitive system. I also indicate how Kersten’s account might be enriched by paying closer attention to the...
Schizophrenia Bulletin
July 2014
Angela Woods, Nev Jones, Marco Bernini et al.
Despite the recent proliferation of scientific, clinical, and narrative accounts of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs), the phenomenology of voice hearing remains opaque and undertheorized. In this article, we outline an interdisciplinary approach to understanding hallucinatory experiences which seeks to demonstrate the value of the humanities and social sciences to advancing knowledge in...
Frontiers in Psychology
January 6, 2014
Joel Krueger
I defend a model of the musically extended mind. I consider how acts of "musicking" grant access to novel emotional experiences otherwise inaccessible. First, I discuss the idea of "musical affordances" and specify both what musical affordances are and how they invite different forms of entrainment. Next, I argue that musical affordances - via soliciting different forms of entrainment - enhance...
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
April 9, 2013
Simon McCarthy-Jones, Joel Krueger, Frank Larøi et al.
One of the leading cognitive models of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) proposes such experiences result from a disturbance in the process by which inner speech is attributed to the self. Research in this area has, however, proceeded in the absence of thorough cognitive and phenomenological investigations of the nature of inner speech, against which AVHs are implicitly or explicitly...
Consciousness and Cognition
September 1, 2011
Joel Krueger
The extended mind thesis (EM) asserts that some cognitive processes are (partially) composed of actions consisting of the manipulation and exploitation of environmental structures. Might some processes at the root of social cognition have a similarly extended structure? In this paper, I argue that social cognition is fundamentally an interactive form of space management--the negotiation and...
Oxford University Press eBooks
December 1, 2010
Joel Krueger
16 citations
This chapter argues for the counter-intuitive thesis that consciousness does not require a self. Granted, a central feature of conscious states is that their mode of appearance exhibits an irreducibly first-personal nature, and this ‘how’ of consciousness is what secures its phenomenal character. It seems natural to assume that this ‘how’ points back to a ‘who’. This chapter argues, however,...
Sartre Studies International
2006
Joel Krueger
2 citations
In this essay, I argue that Sartre's notion of pre-reflective consciousness can be summoned to offer a general challenge to contemporary functionalist accounts of mind, broadly construed. In virtue of the challenge Sartre offers these contemporary functionalist accounts and the richness of his phenomenological analysis, I conclude that his voice needs to be included in ongoing debates over the...