The Experiential Self: Objections and Clarifications
Oxford University Press eBooks December 1, 2010 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593804.003.0003 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 80 |
| Key points | Argues that the phenomenological view of consciousness as entailing self-consciousness and a minimal self withstands recent objections, and clarifies the position by addressing semantic and metaphysical disputes, concluding with reflections on self and diachronic unity. |
Abstract
This chapter first outlines a view regarding the relationship between consciousness, self-consciousness, and a minimal notion of self that is widespread in the phenomenological tradition. It then discusses some of the motivations behind this proposal, and then in the main part of the chapter critically engages with various objections that have recently been raised against this view by Albahari and Dreyfus. Discussing these objections will allow for an important clarification of the view defended here. Also discussed are some of the semantic and metaphysical disagreements that separate defenders and deniers of self, concluding with some reflections regarding the relation between self and diachronic unity.
Citations in the library
Cited by 11
- Mindfulness-induced changes in gamma band activity – Implications for the default mode network, self-reference and attention Clinical Neurophysiology September 21, 2011
- The Hitchhiker's Guide to Neurophenomenology - The Case of Studying Self Boundaries With Meditators. Frontiers in Psychology 2020
- Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia. Consciousness and Cognition September 1, 2019
- Pattern Theory of Selflessness: How Meditation May Transform the Self-Pattern Mindfulness August 1, 2024
- Reflexivity, Subjectivity, and the Constructed Self: A Buddhist Model Asian Philosophy July 3, 2015
and 6 more in the library