Thin, Thinner, Thinnest: Defining the Minimal Self
Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture April 14, 2017 DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262035552.003.0010 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 71 |
| Key points | Argues that the minimal self is not interpersonally constituted. |
Abstract
What is a self? Plenty of competing and complementary definitions abound. Over the years, I have articulated and defended am experientially based minimal conception of selfhood. In the following short text, I reply to some objections and suggestions for revisions that Ratcliffe as well as Ciaunica and Fotopoulou offer in their contributions to this volume. Is it a viable proposal to suggest that the minimal self is interpersonally constituted? My answer is negative.
Citations in the library
Cited by 14
- From many to (n)one: Meditation and the plasticity of the predictive mind. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews September 1, 2021
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- Free Energy and the Self: An Ecological–Enactive Interpretation Topoi April 12, 2018
- Forgetting ourselves in flow: an active inference account of flow states and how we experience ourselves within them Frontiers in Psychology June 3, 2024
- Psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy for the treatment of major depression: a synthesis of phenomenological explanations. Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy June 1, 2022
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