Consciousness and Selfhood
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.29 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe debate about selfhood in philosophy of mind has recently shifted from questions of persistence over time (diachronic identity) to the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and selfhood in the present moment (synchronic identity). The central question is whether conscious experiences inherently involve or disclose a self, or whether, as Lichtenberg argued against Descartes, it is enough to say that experiences simply occur without positing an 'I'. The text outlines this shift and frames the disagreement without taking a definitive position.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 9 |
| Key finding | Argues that the debate over whether conscious experiences are self-involving or self-disclosing, or whether positing a self is unwarranted, has become a central topic in philosophy of mind. |
Abstract
Not that long ago, discussions of selfhood in philosophy of mind tended to focus on diachronic identity and the so-called persistence question. Important as this question might be, it does, however, not exhaust the topic of selfhood. In recent years, the focus has shifted somewhat from diachronic to synchronic identity and given rise to a lively debate concerning the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and selfhood. Are our conscious experiences self-involving or self-disclosing (in a manner yet to be determined), or was Lichtenberg right in his famous objection to Descartes: Experiences simply take place, and that is all. Is saying cogito and affirming the existence of an I already saying too much?